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Human capital mobility, broadly defined as the free movement of knowledge, skills, and
abilities embodied in people, is important for the efficient allocation of this scarce re-
source. Yet, numerous factors, such as political borders, administrative obstacles, phys-
ical and social distances limit mobility, thus exposing firms and individuals to certain
constraints. These barriers have changed over time and have evolved in both directions.
While some obstacles to human capital mobility disappeared with stronger economic inte-
gration and technology advancements, new barriers arose, for instance, as some countries
restricted labour mobility or as political conflicts imposed new legal and psychological
borders between people. The changes to human capital mobility modify constraints, un-
der which people and firms optimise, and hence affect economic decisions and outcomes.
Therefore, from a research perspective, these changes provide good opportunities to inves-
tigate the role of human capital and human interactions for economic performance. This
knowledge, apart from being of academic interest, can help firms in designing optimal
personnel policies and can guide decisions of policy-makers.
This thesis exploits two natural experiments to analyse the economic consequences of
changes in human capital mobility. The first two Chapters use the introduction of free
labour mobility in Europe to examine the impact of higher international labour mobil-
ity on firm productivity and innovation in source countries. The third Chapter uses a
somewhat reverse setting: an unexpected political conflict introduced new barriers to
international collaboration on an online open-source platform - an environment, where in
theory no legal or physical barriers to human capital mobility exist. My work in Chap-
ter 3 aims at uncovering the nature of these barriers and at estimating their role for
performance of international teams. All three Chapters use credible exogenous variation
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to establish a causal link between changes in human capital mobility and economic out-
comes. The conducted microeconomic analysis allows to identify the channels, related to
firm or individual decision-making, which could explain the observed effects and establish
the role of human capital and human interactions for firm productivity, innovation, and
team performance. Below, I summarise the results and contributions of each of the three
Chapters.
The first two Chapters focus on the effects of free labour mobility for countries that have
become net generators of migration flows. The consequences of free labour mobility for
source countries of migrants remain controversial. On the one hand, skilled emigration
might lead to brain-drain and hence exacerbate the existing income differences among
countries. On the other hand, removing legal barriers to human capital mobility may
lead to better allocation of resources, stimulate knowledge flows and international col-
laboration. Policy decisions without proper understanding of costs and benefits of free
labour mobility might lead to suboptimal outcomes.
When estimating the effects of emigration, an empirical challenge arises due to the en-
dogeneity of migration flows. To overcome this problem, both Chapters exploit a novel
instrumental variable strategy, which is based on changes in labour mobility legislations.
In particular, we exploit differences in labour mobility regulations across European coun-
tries and industries throughout 2004-2014. These regulations were subject to the political
decisions in destination countries and hence can be treated as exogenous to economic con-
ditions in migrants’ source countries, which are the focus of the empirical analysis.
Chapter 1 (based on joint work with Yvonne Giesing) examines the impact of emigration
on firm total factor productivity (TFP). We conduct our empirical analysis using the
panel firm-level data from Eastern and Central European countries, which following their
accession to the European Union (EU) experienced unprecedentedly high emigration
rates. Our identification builds on the transitional provisions applied by old EU member
states, which could temporarily restrict the access to their labour markets for citizens
from new member countries. While these transitional provisions were in force, emigration
opportunities for citizens from new member countries varied, depending on their country
of origin and the industry they were qualified to work in. According to our results, firms
2
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in industries that were exposed to higher labour mobility of their workers, experienced
a drop in TFP. This result is statistically and economically significant and robust to
various measures of TFP and firm profits. Yet, we also note the substantial heterogeneity
among firms. More productive foreign-owned and patenting firms avoid losses in TFP,
suggesting that these firms are better able to adjust to the changing environment. We
further develop a simple conceptual framework that characterises the plausible channel
behind the negative effect on TFP. Better emigration opportunities increase turnover of
skilled workers, thus leading to the loss in the firm-specific human capital and lowering
incentives for firms to invest in the intensive training of new employees. As a consequence,
the firm-specific stock of knowledge, which represents part of the firm’s TFP, decreases.
The empirical evidence is consistent with this channel. We observe higher worker turnover
in the affected industries, furthermore, firms’ personnel and training costs increase.
This Chapter makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the
literature on the economic impacts of migration (Clemens, 2013; Docquier and Rapoport,
2012; Freeman, 2006; Grossmann and Stadelmann, 2011, 2013) by providing the causal
microeconomic evidence of migration effects for source countries. We combine the novel
identification strategy with the detailed firm-level dataset, which allows to obtain credible
estimations of the effect. Second, we complement the emerging migration literature,
which focuses on the firm as the level of analysis (Dustmann and Glitz, 2015; Kerr and
Kerr, 2013; Kerr et al., 2014; Paserman, 2013; Peri, 2012). Looking at the firm level
allows to account for firm heterogeneity and to shed light on the possible mechanisms of
the migration effect. Third, apart from migration literature, we make a contribution to
the works on the determinants of firm total factor productivity (Bartelsman et al., 2013;
Bloom et al., 2012, 2016; Fox and Smeets, 2011). While TFP is one of the best predictors
of firm growth, it is often referred to as "the measure of our ignorance" (Syverson, 2011).
We discuss theoretically and then provide empirical evidence for the channel that links
firm total factor productivity to skilled emigration and, thus, emphasise the firm-specific
human capital as an important determinant of TFP.
Chapter 2 of this thesis (based on joint work with Yvonne Giesing and Thomas Fackler)
complements Chapter 1 by focusing on potential benefits of emigration. We combine
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industry-level migration and patenting data from 32 European countries and show that
emigration can foster innovation in source countries. We attribute this positive effect to
the knowledge flows trigged by emigrants.
Similarly to Chapter 1, we exploit changes in the European labour mobility laws through-
out 2004-2014 to construct an instrumental variable for migration and thus to overcome
the endogeneity problem between emigration and innovation. We obtain two main empiri-
cal results. First, innovation, as measured by the number of patent applications, increases
in the number of emigrants. This effect is strong enough to lower patenting asymmetries
between more and less advanced countries. Second, we use patent citations as a proxy for
knowledge flows and show that migration stimulates cross-border knowledge flows from
destination back to origin countries of migrants. While skilled emigrants do not patent in
their home country anymore, they can contribute to knowledge and technology diffusion,
thus improving the patent production in origin countries and helping them to catch-up
with the technology frontier. For all the three results, the effects are quantitatively more
pronounced when we consider only migration of people with patenting potential.
This Chapter complements the research by Bosetti et al. (2015), Choudhury (2015),
Kaiser et al. (2015), Kerr (2008), and Kerr and Lincoln (2010) on the effects of labour mo-
bility for innovation. First, we establish causality between skilled emigration and higher
patenting in the source countries. Second, because we possess comparable patenting data
for source and destination countries of migrants, we can extend this result and show that
emigration helps convergences between less and more advanced countries. The latter re-
sult is important, given the wide-spread concerns that skilled emigration can exacerbate
inequalities between countries. By investigating the channel behind the positive effect
of emigration, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of knowledge flows
(Jaffe et al., 1993; Singh and Marx, 2013; Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005). We provide
evidence from the European context that labour mobility fosters cross-border knowledge
diffusion and thus increases innovation efficiency in the source countries of migrants. The
empirical setting allows separating this effect from other potential channels such as trade
and foreign direct investment.
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Bringing the results of the two Chapters together shows that international human capital
mobility generates both new opportunities and new challenges. Firms and policy-makers
can address the challenges and maximise benefits if they put the right policies in place.
For firms, our results would call for active human resource strategies, for instance, to
invest in better training technologies aimed at new workers. From the policy perspec-
tive, rather than trying to limit skilled emigration, origin countries can benefit more by
reducing internal search frictions, facilitating inflows of foreign workers, and preserving
ties with emigrants who work in more advanced economies.
While Chapters 1 and 2 investigate the economic consequences of removing legal barriers
to the international labour mobility, Chapter 3 estimates the consequences of imposing
barriers to international collaboration in the environment, where legal or physical ob-
stacles to human capital mobility should not play a role. In Chapter 3, I study the
consequences of an exogenous political conflict for performance of international teams on
GitHub, the world’s largest open-source platform. In particular, I exploit the unexpected
crisis between Russia and Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and
analyse the impact of this conflict on the online collaboration between Ukrainian and
Russian programmers. Using microdata from GitHub, I show that the conflict reduced
the scope of the Ukrainian-Russian collaboration on the platform. The empirical ap-
proach comprises the difference-in-difference and triple-difference methods and allows to
argue that this reduction was the direct consequence of the political conflict. In addition,
I provide empirical evidence that the economic reasons, such as higher transaction costs
or career expectations, cannot rationalise the observed changes. Rather, the drop in col-
laboration concords with the identity-based explanation (following Akerlof and Kranton
(2000)). The political conflict, though external to the working environment on the open-
source platform, modified prescriptions related to the national identities of programmers
and thus shifted their preferences for teammates or projects. This shift in preferences
distorted existing and future collaborations, profitable from an economic perspective. I
further discuss and link to the empirical evidence two potential channels, through which
identity could affect team performance: first, by increasing communication costs due to
poorer interaction between team members and second, by lowering incentives to con-
tribute to projects associated with a "hostile" social group.
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Chapter 3 adds to the literature on performance of diverse teams (Bandiera et al., 2005,
2009; Lazear, 1999; Mas and Moretti, 2009) by providing empirical evidence for one of
the risks that diverse teams face: external events can exacerbate social differences within
teams and hence inhibit performance. My results also complement the findings of theo-
retical and experimental literature on social identity and group performance (Charness
et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2014; Chen and Li, 2009) by emphasising the importance of
common (non-conflicting) identity for efficient team collaboration. Lastly, Chapter 3
contributes to the literature on microeconomic effects of international or ethnic tensions
(Fisman et al., 2013; Hjort, 2014; Ksoll et al., 2010; Marx et al., 2015; Rohner et al.,
2013a,b) by providing causal evidence that even in the settings where national or eth-
nic borders should play no role, identity-based conflicts can impose social barriers on
international collaboration and hence inhibit the efficient allocation of human capital.
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Firms Left Behind: Emigration and
Firm Productivity∗
1.1 Introduction
The emigration of high-skilled workers poses a challenge for many countries, not only
in the developing world. As workers leave their firms to follow better opportunities
abroad, policy-makers and managers complain about skill shortages and emphasise the
negative effects of brain drain. However, whether there is a causal link from skilled
emigration to firm productivity is not clear. Scarcity of firm-level data from emigrants’
countries of origin and the endogeneity of migration flows inhibit from going beyond
anecdotal evidence. The direction of causation could well go the other way with migrants
leaving the least productive firms or a change in unobservable variables triggering both
lower firm performance and higher emigration rates. Yet, identifying firm-level effects of
emigration and thoroughly disentangling the mechanisms is indispensable for the design
of appropriate policies in source countries.
Central and Eastern Europe is a region that has experienced particular high emigration
rates in recent years. Following the EU accession of Central and Eastern European
countries in 2004 and 2007, migration flows from new member states (NMS) to old
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Yvonne Giesing.
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EU member states have increased considerably. In 2003, the number of NMS migrants
residing in other EU countries amounted to 846,000 people and by 2014 this number
had reached 3.95 million. Although the skill level of emigrants varies across destination
countries, on average, NMS migrants have been positively selected. As of 2014, 25% of
the post-accession NMS emigrants had tertiary education. To compare, among NMS non-
migrants, people with university degree accounted for 13.5%.1 Despite important positive
consequences of free labour mobility in terms of lower unemployment and a better skill
match, there have been growing concerns that the emigration of skilled workers has
created a severe challenge for source countries (Kahanec, 2012; OECD, 2013; Zaiceva,
2014).
This paper investigates the causal effects of skilled emigration on firm performance. As
‘skilled’, we denote individuals with either tertiary education or a professional quali-
fication. To identify the effect of interest, we exploit changes in EU labour mobility
legislation from 2004 to 2014. The transitional provisions applied by old EU member
states created a quasi-experimental setting by allowing earlier or later free labour mo-
bility for certain categories of NMS workers. While these transitional provisions were
in place, emigration opportunities for NMS citizens varied, depending on their country
of origin and the industry they were qualified to work in. Using firm-level data from
NMS countries, we show that firms in industries that were exposed to higher outflows of
skilled workers experienced a drop in total factor productivity (TFP). The estimates are
qualitatively robust to various measures of TFP and firm profits.
Apart from analysing the reduced-form effects of legislation changes on firm productivity,
we also perform 2SLS regressions to estimate the effect for firms which effectively expe-
rienced skill shortages due to higher emigration rates. Changes in EU labour mobility
laws strongly predict skill shortages as reported by firms in NMS. This allows us to use
the legislation changes as an instrument. We argue for the validity of this instrument:
detailed sector- and country-specific legislation changes had not been anticipated and are
uncorrelated with other integration-related events, such as the free movement of goods
or capital. Using annual data from the European Commission Business Survey, we find
1 Source: Eurostat LFS Data. Only migrants, who entered the old EU countries after the EU
accession are taken into account.
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that a one percentage point increase in instrumented skill shortages leads to a 1.6 percent
drop in firm TFP.
To analyse more thoroughly how emigration reduces firm productivity, we develop a
simple theoretical framework that illustrates one plausible channel behind this result.
Better emigration opportunities induce more skilled workers to quit their jobs. This re-
sults in higher job turnover rates that reduce the existing firm-specific human capital and
lower firms’ incentives to invest in firm-specific training of new employees. As turnover
increases and more workers have to be trained, intensive training programmes become
costlier. Consequently, the stock of firm-specific skills and knowledge decreases. The ef-
fect is captured by TFP, as this form of human capital is not fully accounted for in wages.
Our results are consistent with this mechanism. We find evidence for higher turnover
of workers in sectors that are strongest hit by emigration and document an increase in
firms’ personnel and training costs. This mechanism fits well into the previous literature.
Konings and Vanormelingen (2015) find that the productivity of workers increases by
more than their wage after they have participated in training. Consequently, if trained
workers are leaving, this is captured by labour productivity and residual TFP. Jäger
(2016) shows that longer-tenured workers are harder to replace with outsiders. For more
studies on the relationship between job turnover, firm-specific human capital, and firm
productivity we refer to Brown and Medoff (1978), Shaw (2011), Strober (1990), and
Yanadori and Kato (2007). The firm has several ways to adapt to higher quitting rates
of skilled workers. It can substitute labour with capital (see Dustmann and Glitz (2015)
for the case of immigration), substitute high-skilled with low-skilled workers or improve
training technology for new hires.
Panel data allow us to account for firm heterogeneity and to explore the link between
firms’ characteristics and their sensitivity and adaptation to higher quitting rates of
workers. We find that innovating and foreign-owned firms substantially increase their
per-employee personnel costs. These firms are apparently able to (at least, partly) match




This paper makes three key contributions to the literature. The first and main contribu-
tion is that we analyse the effects of emigration at the firm level. So far, the economic
effects of emigration and brain drain have focused on the aggregate level (Clemens, 2013;
Docquier and Rapoport, 2012; Freeman, 2006; Grossmann and Stadelmann, 2011, 2013).
We expect that the migration literature can gain richer insights into the consequences
of migration by investigating firm-level outcomes. Kerr et al. (2014), Kerr et al. (2013)
and Kerr (2013), for instance, are encouraging the firm-level approach for the analysis of
migration. Accounting for firm level outcomes, adaptation mechanisms and firm hetero-
geneity is important as it shapes the observable effect of migration on macro outcomes.
While there is an emerging migration literature that focuses on the firm as the unit of
analysis, it has focused on immigration until now. Peri (2012), Kerr and Kerr (2013),
Kerr et al. (2014), Paserman (2013), Mitaritonna et al. (2014) and Ottaviano et al.
(2015) study the effects of immigration on firm productivity in the US, Israel, France and
the UK respectively. They find that an increase in the supply of foreign-born workers
positively affects firm productivity due to a faster growth of capital and the specialisation
of natives in more complex tasks. Lewis (2013) furthermore finds that besides increased
investment, firms also adapt new technology. Using firm-level German data, Dustmann
and Glitz (2015) analyse how industries and firms respond to changes in the local labour
supply. They find that immigration alters the local skill composition and investigate three
adaptation mechanisms: a change in factor prices, a within-firm change in skill intensity,
and an adjustment through the entry and exit of firms. Our research is complementary to
this literature. While these authors look at the effects of immigration on firms, we focus
on the consequences of emigration. Moreover, we propose a plausible mechanism that
links the outflow of skilled workers to firms’ total factor productivity. This mechanism
emphasises the role of firm-specific human capital for firms’ performance and allows
drawing concrete policy recommendations for firms.
The second contribution is the creation of an instrument that circumvents the endogeneity
of migration. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to exploit industry-
level variation in labour mobility laws to causally evaluate the effect of emigration on firm
performance. Due to a lack of firm level data for source countries and the endogeneity
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of migration, the causal analysis is not trivial. To address these issues, we create an
extensive dataset that merges migration and firm level data on the country, year and
industry level to exogenous labour mobility legislation changes. We are thus able to
show that emigration imposes binding skill shortages for firms and lowers TFP via a loss
of firm specific human capital.
Third, we add to the literature on the consequences of EU enlargement. This is of
very high relevance to policy makers in Brussels, in accession countries, and in candidate
countries, for instance Serbia. In particular, we complement the research that investigates
the consequences of the recent emigration wave from the NMS. Mayr and Peri (2009)
develop a model to study the consequences of European free labour mobility on human
capital in the sending countries and differentiate between brain drain and brain gain
due to return migration and increased incentives to invest in education. Dustmann et
al. (2015) and Elsner (2013) estimate the effects of emigration on wages in Poland and
Lithuania and find that wages increase for the stayers. Our contribution is to illustrate
that, while firms in general experience a drop in TFP, there are various adaptation
mechanisms for firms. Moreover, we suggest policies that concerned governments can
implement to mitigate the negative effects.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines a theoretical framework to
motivate and structure our empirical analysis. Section 3 provides background information
on the EU opening and transitional provisions regarding free labour mobility, which
helps to understand our identification strategy. Section 4 describes the data, followed
by Section 5 that presents the empirical specification. Section 6 discusses the results






Our theoretical framework illustrates the consequences of skilled emigration at the firm
level in the source country. Using a partial-equilibrium framework, we generate predic-
tions about changes in firms’ factor demand, training provision, and TFP.
We assume that there are frictions in the labour market: job separations occur at an
exogenous rate and in order to fill vacant positions firms post costly vacancies. One
trigger for job separations, for instance, is an easier access to foreign labour markets,
which induces higher emigration. If the job separation rate increases, firms in source
countries experience higher skill shortages. In this setting, skill shortages are not a
disequilibrium phenomenon, but correspond to some measure of search frictions (for
example, the number of posted vacancies for skilled employees).
We allow firm-specific human capital to explicitly enter the production function. A
higher labour turnover destroys part of the firm-specific human capital. Since the latter
is not fully captured by wages, this loss translates to a drop in TFP. In this way, we
characterise one possible micro channel, through which skilled emigration directly affects
firm productivity.2
The economy consists of a representative firm that produces output according to the
production function:
Y = Af(K,Ls, Lu) (1.1)
Af() is a general production function, where K is the capital input and Ls and Lu are
the skilled and unskilled labour inputs. f() increases in the production factors K,Ls, Lu;
exhibits diminishing marginal returns toK,Ls, Lu and is twice-differentiable. Each period
Ls and Lu workers are involved in the production process. At the end of the period, a
2On a macro level, this problem was examined by Grossmann and Stadelmann (2011). In their
overlapping generations model, the drop in TFP is attributed to less firm entry and, consequently, to
the reduction in human capital externalities of skilled employees.
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proportion δs (δu) of skilled (unskilled) job matches are destroyed. The total turnover
rate δ is defined as the number of separations over the total number of employees. To
fill the positions with new workers, a firm posts vacancies. For simplicity, we assume
that vacancies are matched with probability one. In equilibrium, the number of job
separations must equal the number of matched vacancies:
Vi = δiLi, i = s, u. (1.2)
Posting vacancies creates a search cost of cs (cu) per period.
We represent TFP as A = tγ. In our setting, the firm TFP consists entirely of firm-
specific knowledge t. This tacit knowledge makes all the input factors more productive.
It could be, for instance, a collection of the firm’s best practices, a code of conduct, or
tricks of an internal IT system. In order to employ this knowledge in the production,
the firm has to train all skilled workers in using it. We assume that there is no training
needed for unskilled workers. If a skilled worker leaves and the firm hires a new worker as
a replacement, it has to pay the training costs for the new worker, which are proportional
to the amount of firm-specific knowledge to learn. Given a turnover rate δs, the total
training costs per period would amount to δsLsctt, where δsLs is the number of newly
hired skilled workers. ct denotes the costs of training, which we set equal to 1. The
total training costs can also be interpreted as the loss of firm-specific human capital due
to worker turnover. We treat the amount of training per worker t as adjustable when
the firm hires new skilled workers. For instance, if it becomes too expensive to teach a
particular firm practice to all the new hires, the firm can drop this practice, thus reducing
its knowledge t. If there is no turnover, δs = 0, the firm-specific knowledge stays constant.
1.2.2 The Firm’s Optimisation Problem
The firm chooses inputs K,Ls, Lu to maximise profits Π. In addition, when hiring skilled
workers, the firm decides on t - the amount of firm-specific knowledge to teach. The
13
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exogenous variables are the output price (P ), wages (ws, wu), the interest rate (r), the
job destruction rate (δs, δu), and the vacancy costs (cs, cu).
Π = PY − ∑
i=s,u
(wiLi + ciVi)− rK − Vst (1.3)
s.t.
Vi = δiLi, i = s, u;
Y = tγτf(K,Ls, Lu)
Using the constraint to substitute for Vi yields the total personnel costs of skilled workers:
Ls(ws + csδs + tδs). These costs comprise wages, search costs, and training expenses.
Similarly, the total personnel costs of unskilled workers are equal to Lu(wu + cuδu).




marginal hiring costs of a skilled worker (δs(cs+t)) increase.3 Thus, emigration augments
the marginal personnel costs of a skilled worker (ws+δs(cs+t)) and affects the relative in-
put demand of the firm. Further, the incentives for training change. The higher turnover
rate makes training more expensive, which consequently reduces the optimal level of the
firm-specific knowledge t. This result follows from the fact that the firm has to teach all
its specific knowledge t to all newly hired skilled workers.4 Therefore, when δs increases,
it becomes more expensive for a firm to sustain its knowledge level due to higher training
costs. We provide a proof of the comparative statics results for a general production
function in the Appendix.
3The model is generalisable to the situation in which both skilled and unskilled workers emigrate.
In this case turnover would increase for both groups but firm-specific human capital would only be lost
for skilled workers.
4For instance, unless all of the firm’s sales managers know how to use a Customer Relationship
Management (CRM) system, there will be very poor coordination among them. This may lead to both




We are interested in the effect of emigration on firm productivity. If workers obtain the
possibility to emigrate to a country with higher wages, this results in a higher quitting
probability. This can be triggered by exogenous political events such as the EU accession.
In the model, the introduction of free labour mobility that resulted in higher emigration
rates can thus be represented by higher job separation rates δs and δu. In the comparative
statics, we focus on the effect of raising δs, because it has direct implications for firm
TFP.
Proposition: An increase in the job separation rate δs reduces the firm’s TFP through
the reduction in firm-specific knowledge t.
1. An increase in δs raises the marginal hiring costs of a skilled worker. This cor-
responds to an increase in the personnel costs ws + δs(cs + t). Depending on the
elasticity of substitution between the inputs, firms might find it optimal to substitute
high-skilled workers with low-skilled workers or with capital. The ratio Ls
L
decreases
and/or the ratio C
L
increases.
2. An increase in δ leads to a lower provision of training (t) per hired skilled worker
because higher turnover rates increase marginal training costs. This results in a
negative effect on the firm’s TFP. However, the total training costs δsLst might
increase as, on the extensive margin, due to a higher δs, the firm has to train more
workers.
In our simple framework, we assume that wages are exogenously given, which is a realistic
assumption if we consider an average small or medium-sized firm. Emigration lowers the
available supply of skilled labour and should lead to a general increase of ws. This will
increase personnel costs ws + δs(cs + t) and thus lower the relative demand for skilled
workers. Provided δs is now kept constant, the effect on the training provision t will be
of a second order. Hence, if emigration leads only to the adjustment of wages, we would
not observe a strong negative effect on firm TFP.
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1.3 Transitional Provisions for the Free Movement
of Workers from New Member States
Before testing the derived predictions with the data, we provide background information
on the transitional provisions applied by old EU member states from 2004 to 2014. This
section shows how the gradual opening of the EU labour markets created time, country,
and industry-level variation in the emigration rates of NMS citizens.
In 2004, ten Eastern and Southern European Countries joined the EU: Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
While free mobility of goods and capital was introduced either prior to or at the point
of accession by all countries, free labour mobility was initially restricted. Some EU15
countries5 feared an inflow of cheaper labour. The EU Commission thus allowed the old
member states to unilaterally restrict their labour markets by national laws for a period
of up to seven years. These transitional arrangements were applied to all new members in
the same way, except Malta and Cyprus. We thus denote the remaining eight countries as
NMS8. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania (NMS2) joined the European Union, also facing
the transitional agreement rules.
The option to unilaterally restrict labour markets generated different rules within the EU.
While Ireland, Sweden, and the UK decided to open their labour markets immediately
in 2004 without any restrictions, other countries delayed the access or applied special job
schemes in certain industries. Denmark, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, for instance, re-
moved restrictions only in 2009. France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Austria opened their
labour markets gradually, allowing only workers in certain industries and introducing
quotas. Germany kept the labour market almost completely closed until the expiration
of the transitional agreements (2011 for NMS8; 2014 for NMS2). Other EFTA members,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, also applied transitional provisions and
we thus include them in our analysis (EU15+4 denote all countries that applied tran-
5Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (EU15).
16
Firms Left Behind
Table 1.1: Overview of the Gradual Opening of the EU15+4 Labour Markets
Country NMS8 NMS2 Sectoral Exceptions
(2004 entry) (2007 entry)
Austria 2011 2014 NMS8 (2007-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): Construction, Manufactur-
ing of Electronics and Metals, Food and beverage services (restau-
rant business), other sectors with labour shortages
Belgium 2009 2014 -
Denmark 2009 2009 -
Finland 2006 2007 -
France 2008 2014 NMS8 (2005-2007), NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Construction,
Accommodation and food services (tourism and catering), other
sectors with labour shortages
Germany 2011 2014 NMS8 (2004-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): sectors with labour short-
ages
Greece 2006 2009 -
Iceland 2006 2012 -
Ireland 2004 2012 -
Italy 2006 2012 NMS8 (2004-2005): sectors with labour shortages; NMS2 (2007-
2011): Agriculture, Construction, Engineering, Accommodation
and food services (tourism and catering), Domestic work and care
services, other sectors with labour shortages; Occupations: Man-
agerial and professional occupations
Lichtenstein 2011 2016 -
Luxembourg 2008 2014 NMS2 (2007 - 2013): Agriculture, Viticulture, Accommodation and
food services (tourism and catering)
Netherlands 2007 2014 NMS8 (2004-2006), NMS2 (2007-2013): International transport, In-
land shipping, Health, Slaugther-house/meet-packaging, other sec-
tors with labour shortages
Norway 2009 2012 NMS8 (2004-2008), NMS2 (2007-2011): sectors with labour short-
ages
Portugal 2006 2009 -
Spain 2006 2009 Reintroduction of restrictions for Romanians: 11/08/2011 -
31/12/2013
Sweden 2004 2007 -
Switzerland 2011 2014 -
United Kingdom 2004 2014 NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Food manufacturing
Notes: Column 2 shows the year of the labour market opening of the respective country for NMS8 countries, column 3
shows the year of the labour market opening of the respective country for the NMS2 countries. Column 4 shows, which
sectors were exempt from restrictions.
Source: European Commission.
sitional provisions). Table 1.1 provides an overview of the precise opening dates and
industry details per country.
This sequential opening by country, year and industry had a significant effect on migration
rates. Constant (2011) and Kahanec (2012) provide descriptive evidence of EU migration
flows following the enlargement. They show that the transitional agreements influenced
the movement of migrants. The UK and Ireland, for example, have become the main
EU destination country for Polish, Slovakian and Latvian workers. Kahanec et al. (2014)
apply a difference-in-differences analysis and confirm that outward migration from the




One might argue that the restriction of a country’s labour market is endogenous and
related to local labour market conditions. Germany, for instance, experienced high un-
employment rates during the mid-2000s and this was one of the reasons for its labour
market restrictions. However, while the transitional arrangements are endogenous to
labour market conditions and firm productivity in the receiving country, they are exoge-
nous to firm outcomes in the source countries.
There are additional worries that concern the validity of the instrument. One possible
identification problem could arise if the decisions to open a particular industry by EU15
countries were to some extent endogenous to conditions in the new member countries.
For example, mobility restrictions might have been directed at the NMS citizens working
in countries and industries with high volumes of EU15 FDIs. This is not the case for
the following reasons. First, EU15 countries could not differentiate transitional provi-
sions across countries in NMS8 and NMS2 groups. Second, this proposition is hard to
reconcile with significant time-variation in the removal of provisions. One might further
suggest that the industry-specific timing of labour market openings coincided with trade
liberalization. Yet, all new EU member countries had signed and enforced Free Trade
Agreements with the EU prior to their accession. It is plausible to conclude that the ap-
plication of transitional provisions by the EU15 was driven mainly by their own economic
conditions and is thus exogenous to firm outcomes in the NMS.
The transitional agreements have not only affected the employed people in the new mem-
ber states, but have also given new opportunities to the unemployed. One might assume
that the unemployed had the highest incentives to leave their countries and to look for
work abroad. This would bias our estimated coefficient towards zero as the emigration of
unemployed workers would not lead to the loss of firm-specific human capital and would
leave firm productivity unaffected. Another concern is that people might change indus-
tries as they migrate. This will again bias our estimate towards zero. It is plausible to
assume though that people have the smallest emigration costs if the industry they work
in opens for immigration. If they eventually work in another industry after migration,
this does not affect our results as we are only interested in the fact that they left and it




For our analysis we use firm-level financial and survey data, aggregate industry- and
country-level indicators, detailed migration data, and information from EU labour legis-
lation.
We obtain firm-level data from Bureau Van Dijk’s AMADEUS database that provides
standardised annual balance-sheet and profit information for European public and private
companies. We work with an unbalanced panel of about 110,000 firms located in NMS.
The period covered ranges from 2000 to 2013, and there are five annual observations for
each firm on average. The sample includes companies in manufacturing, construction,
retail trade and services. Apart from financial reports, the dataset provides information
on firms’ patenting activities, ownership structures, export markets, and exit status (such
as bankruptcy or liquidation).
We include firms with at least two years of available financial data to calculate the TFP
index. As a note of caution, we might not capture companies at the lower tail of the
productivity distribution if they are less likely to be included in the sample. Based on
observables, though, firms in the regression samples are not statistically different from
the full sample (see table A.1). We used the largest possible number of firms with non-
missing observations. The number of firms across regression results slightly varies due to
differences in the availability of variables.
To obtain data on the training of employees, we complement this data with firm-level in-
formation from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS)
administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in all
NMS. The survey was conducted in 2002, 2005, 2009 and 2012 and contains an extensive
questionnaire on firms’ self-reported financial performance, workforce composition, man-
agement practices, innovation, and perceptions of the business environment (including
the availability and quality of human capital). The survey data provides a representative
sample of manufacturing, construction, service, and retail trade firms. In total, there




Disaggregated emigration data by country and industry does not exist.6 Therefore, we
cannot perform a meaningful OLS or first-stage regression using migration data. For our
baseline estimations, we thus conduct reduced-form regressions where the main explana-
tory variable Free Movement (FM) is constructed directly using the legislation informa-
tion. To construct the FM variable, we use the Labour Reforms database (section on
labour mobility) of the EU Commission and complement it with information from the
national legislation of EU15+4.
To shed more light on one potential channel, we measure if the opening of labour markets
predicts firms’ labour shortages. The measure of skill shortages is taken from the EU
Commission Business Survey, which is conducted quarterly in all EU member countries
by the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). The survey
addresses representatives of the manufacturing, service, retail trade, and construction
sectors and asks for firms’ assessment and expectations of the business development.
Among other questions, the survey’s participants are asked to evaluate factors limiting
their production (such as labour, access to finance, demand, and equipment). The EU
commission publishes information on a two-digit NACE industry level, thus the obtained
measure is equal to the share of firms in a given industry reporting to be constrained by
labour. To match the data to other datasets, we aggregated quarterly indicators to annual
levels. As an alternative measure, we consider firms’ replies from the BEEPS survey,
which asks respondents to evaluate the importance of ‘inadequately educated labour’ as
an obstacle for businesses. To make it more comparable with the EU Commission Survey,
we aggregate individual firm responses on a two-digit industry level.
As additional covariates, we use aggregated (two- and four-digit NACE) industry level
data, which is available for all EU member states and is harmonised by Eurostat. The
structural business statistics database contains annual information on industries’ perfor-
mance, including output, investment, employment, and personnel costs. Macroeconomic
6The Eurostat Labour Force Survey provides information on the industry, education, and occupa-
tion of immigrants, but aggregates the country-of-origin information. While observing immigrants in
EU15+4, we can only see if they come from NMS8 (2004 entry) or NMS2 (2007 entry). Even if the
detailed origin information were available, though, it would likely be noisy and the labour force sample
would have small numbers in the specific country-industry-year cell.
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controls (GDP, FDI, unemployment, interest rates) come from the Worldbank statistical
database.
1.5 Econometric Specification
The aim of the empirical analysis is to test the predictions of our model. We thus
want to establish how the exogenous increase in the emigration influences TFP, person-
nel costs, training, and the capital/labour ratio of firms. For identification, we exploit
legislation changes, which generate exogenous variation in emigration. In this section,
we first present the baseline reduced-form regressions of firm outcomes on legislation
changes. The latter are summarised by the Free Movement variable described in Section
1.5.3 below. We then present the specification for the 2SLS regression. As there is no
disaggregated country- and industry-specific emigration data for Eastern Europe, we do
not explicitly use the Free Movement variable as the instrument for emigration. Instead,
to estimate the treatment effects (LATE), we conduct 2SLS regressions with a measure
of skill shortages, which are reported on the industry level. The 2SLS coefficients thus
capture the effect in industries, where emigration created binding skill shortages.
1.5.1 Baseline Model: Reduced Form
The reduced-form empirical specification is described below:
Yfict = β1FMict−l + β2Xfict + β3Iict + β4Jit + β5Cct + τt + νf + fict (1.4)
where Yfict are different performance measures of a firm (f) in industry (i), country (c) and
year (t). FMict−l indicates the Free Movement variable. We include it in equation (1.4)
with a lag of length l. β1 is the reduced-form effect of the legislation change on a firm-level
outcome. Xfict is a set of time-varying firm controls, such as age and capacity utilization.
Iict includes country-specific industry controls such as total investment, average mark-up
(ratio of revenues to costs), and inward FDI. These variables account for variation due
to other shifters of labour demand within an industry of a particular country, namely,
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technical change or higher competition. Jit are controls that are common to all countries
such as industry-specific total sales and skill shortages. Cct is a vector of macroeconomic
covariates, accounting for country-wide changes: the GDP growth rate and FDI inflows.
All monetary variables are in natural logarithms. τt are time dummies. νf represent firm
fixed effects, and fict is the error term. In the baseline empirical model, we consider
only within-firm variation. Such a specification allows us to take care of firm unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity (as initial management ability or quality of business ideas)
and other constant characteristics of a firm’s location or industry-specific production
technologies.
The focus of this project is to estimate the effect of emigration on firm total factor
productivity. We compute firm productivity in several ways: using a TFP-index and a
semi-parametric approach as in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The latter method allows
us to overcome the simultaneity bias between firms’ inputs and unobserved productiv-
ity shocks. For details regarding the TFP calculation, we refer to the Appendix A.3.
As alternative measures of productivity, we consider firm profits: EBIT
Assets
calculated as
the ratio of earnings before interest and tax over assets. Using a number of different
productivity measures ensures that the effects we find are not driven by measurement
issues.
To understand if our additional model predictions for firms’ adjustment hold, we look at
several other outcome variables and use the same regression equation. In particular, we
are interested in the effects on the capital/labour ratio, the personnel costs, and training.
1.5.2 Two Stage Least Squares Model with Skill Shortages
Due to a lack of disaggregated migration data, we cannot directly test the relevance of
the Free Movement variable for actual emigration rates from NMS. Instead we can go one
step further in the causality chain and check if the EU15+4 labour mobility laws explain




SHict = γ1FMict−l + γ2Iict + γ3Jit + γ4Cct + τt + κic + uict (1.5)
SHict is the industry-country-year measure of skill shortages. γ1 is the coefficient of
interest and reflects the marginal contribution of the Free Movement variable, given
industry- and country-specific time-varying covariates (Iict, γ3Jit, Cct), and time dummies
(τt). By including industry-country fixed effects κic, we identify the Free Movement effect
only from within-industry variation in the propensity to emigrate.
We run a second-stage regression, similar to (1.4), but instead of the Free Movement
variable, use the instrumented measure of skill shortages. The coefficient βˆ1 thus captures
the productivity effect of skill shortages caused by the transitional provisions. It is
identified only for industries where the legislation changes created binding skill constraints
for firms.
1.5.3 Construction of the Free Movement Variable
In our model, we analyse an exogenous increase in the turnover rate due to emigration.
In the data, this corresponds to the opening of the EU15+4 labour markets for NMS,
which induced emigration and therefore increased the turnover rate. These openings are
captured by the Free Movement (FM) variable. We construct it directly by aggregating
information about EU15+4 labour mobility laws. We use it as the main explanatory
variable in our baseline empirical specification and as the instrument for skill shortages
in the 2SLS regression.
A country-industry-year cell makes up one observation. Industries are represented at the
NACE two-digit level. The main period under consideration is from 2000 to 2014 (from
the accession of NMS8 countries to the termination of all transitional provisions applied
to NMS2). First, for each observation we construct a set of 15 dummies Dccjit, with each
dummy corresponding to one of the EU15+4 countries, cj. A dummy takes the value of 1
if according to the legislation of an old EU member, its corresponding industry i is open
to labour migrants from a given new member state c. For example, the UK completely
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opened up its labour market for the NMS8 group in 2004. Therefore UK dummies for
all industries for all NMS8 countries equal 1 starting from 2004. In contrast, France held
the transitional provisions for the 2004-entrants until 2008. Prior to 2008, the French
government applied a special job scheme, which allowed for free labour market access
only in construction, tourism, and catering. France dummies for NMS8 industries take a
value of 0 until 2008, except for the three mentioned sectors. Figure A.1 in the Appendix
shows how the legislation dummies enter our dataset.
One of the limitations of the legislation dummies is low industry-level variation. Austria,
Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, for instance, did not explicitly specify which
industries are open to labour migrants from new member states, but rather allowed for
special job schemes in sectors that experienced skill shortages. The dummies also do
not capture different capacities of EU15+4 markets to absorb migrants. To account
for this, we multiply the legislation dummies Dccjit by a measure of skill shortages in a
given industry of a jth EU15+4 country. For this, we use the share of firms (in destination
industries) reporting to be constrained by the labour factor. These data are available from
the EU Commission Business Survey. This modification controls for implicit legislation
changes and for differences in labour market conditions across and within industries in
old EU members.7 Easiness to find a job, which increases in sectors experiencing skill
shortages, can be another important criteria for worker mobility. A possible concern
with such a modification is that skill shortages in the old EU member states might not
be fully exogenous to firm productivity in NMS countries, due, for example, to common
technology shocks. We can control for this by including industry-specific time dummies
or an average measure of skill shortages in a given industry for all EU members. Another
concern is that labour demand could increase in EU15+4 industries, which after the
EU enlargement had become more competitive relative to their rivals from new member
states. In this case, however, one would expect to see negative tendencies in NMS firm
performance already prior to the outflow of workers. We can also control for higher
product-market competition by including a mark-up measure.
7This allows to capture, for example, a decrease in demand for foreign labour force during and after
the economic crisis in 2008-2009. At this time, many labour markets were already open for NMS citizens,
but effective job possibilities were limited. De-jure, only Spain reacted to the worsening of economic
conditions by reintroducing restrictions for Romanian citizens in 2011.
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To summarise the set of 19 dummies in a single measure, we apply special weights that
reflect how strongly the opening of a particular EU15+4 labour market affects the citizens
of a given new member state. It is reasonable to assume that labour migrants, for
example, from Estonia were more sensitive to the opening of the Finnish labour market
than the Portuguese one. One approach is to use bilateral distances between the two
largest cities of each source and destination country as a measure of proximity: the
shorter the distance, the larger is the weight for a corresponding EU15+4 labour market.





FMcit is the value for one observation (source country-industry-year). Dccjit denotes
the legislation dummy for openness of the labour market in a jth old EU member’s
corresponding industry for the citizens of a given source country in a given year and wc,cj
denote the weights. To ensure the comparability of different versions of Free Movement
variables, we standardise them to be in the range [0;1]. Figure 1.1 illustrates the variation
in the Free Movement variable across industries of NMS.
To investigate the plausibility of our identifying assumption, we check if firms’ outcomes
prior to 2004 predict changes in the legislation over 2004-2014. We also run several
placebo tests. We report the results in Section 1.7.
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Notes: This graph shows the variation in the instrument. We compare different industries (y-Axis) in different countries
(x-Axis) in 2005 and 2008. The darker the shading, the stronger these industries in these countries have been exposed to
emigration.
1.6 Empirical Results
This section presents and discusses the empirical results and compares them with the
model’s predictions. All regressions include firm fixed effects and thus capture within-
firm variation in performance as a response to changes in an industry’s exposure to
emigration.
1.6.1 Reduced Form Regressions
Table 1.2 presents the reduced form estimations: we regress firm outcomes directly on the
Free Movement (FM) variable. We use a one-period lag for the Free Movement variable
to account for some inertia between the legislation change and the migration decisions.
All dependent variables are in natural logarithms, and the Free Movement variable is in
the range from 0 to 1. The coefficients may be interpreted as the log point (' percent)
change in dependent variables when the FM increases from 0 (no free labour mobility
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Table 1.2: Free Movement Effect on Firm Performance, Reduced Form, Amadeus Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
L.FMict -0.273*** -0.234*** -0.0344** 0.270*** 0.172
(0.0696) (0.0619) (0.0141) (0.0628) (0.106)
Mark − upict 0.212*** 0.186*** 0.0906*** -0.133*** -0.0824**
(0.0526) (0.0350) (0.0165) (0.0279) (0.0404)
L.log_investmentict 0.00178 -0.00707 -0.00556*** 0.00521 0.0243**
(0.00680) (0.00500) (0.00203) (0.00792) (0.0106)
L.log_FDI_inwardict -0.00125 2.82e-05 -0.000435 0.00242 0.00502**
(0.00143) (0.00114) (0.000509) (0.00148) (0.00219)
Log_total_salesit 0.00350 -0.00910 0.000439 0.0516*** 0.00880
(0.0100) (0.00913) (0.00262) (0.00851) (0.0126)
Mean skill sh.it 0.0763 0.160 0.175*** 0.0702 -0.0866
(0.158) (0.117) (0.0384) (0.115) (0.169)
L.log_FDIct 0.0123*** 0.0108*** 0.00231*** 0.00819*** 0.0113***
(0.00248) (0.00226) (0.000617) (0.00175) (0.00229)
D.log_GDPct 1.520*** 1.301*** 0.179*** 0.397*** 0.130
(0.163) (0.142) (0.0443) (0.0996) (0.135)
Observations 546,661 322,938 542,500 529,567 529,567
Number of firms 108,413 71,652 107,585 105,572 105,572
R2 0.074 0.040 0.053 0.105 0.122
Dummies f y f y f y f y f y
Clusters 2660 2521 2630 2618 2618
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of the free movement. All specifications are estimated with firm fixed
effects and time dummies. Dependent variables: TFP index, TFP LP - TFP estimated with the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) procedure, ROA - return on assets, Pers. costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. L.FM -
Free Movement variable (distance-weighted, interacted with skill shortages in destination industries), 1 year lag. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
within EU for workers qualified to work in a particular industry) to 1 (maximum exposure
to free labour mobility in our sample).
For the main sample of firms, the effect of free movement on productivity is negative,
which confirms the prediction of our model. The result is robust to different measures of
productivity, to the exclusion of outliers (firms with sales below the 1st and above the
99th percentiles), and to the exclusion of firms that entered the market after 2002.
The maximum annual increase in the value of the FM variable in our sample is equal
to 0.52 (for certain industries in Romania in 2007), while on average NMS industries
experienced a maximum annual increase of 0.25. We can use this information to give a
quantitative interpretation of our result. One year following the maximum increase in
labour mobility, a firm’s TFP drops by 0.25 · 0.234 = 0.059 or 5.9 log points. Given an
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average TFP of 29,500 EUR (estimated with the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method),
this translates to annual losses of about 1,700 EUR per firm.
We can also see that firms adjust to emigration by increasing personnel costs. In our
dataset, personnel costs include wages and other employee-related costs. We are thus not
able to compare this aggregate data directly with our model predictions. However, the
observed increase in personnel costs is consistent with more hiring and training expenses
due to worker turnover. The annual increase in the Free Movement value of 0.25 would
lead to 0.25 · 0.27 = 0.0675 or 6.75 log point increase in personnel costs per employee.
With average annual employee costs of 7,840 EUR, this leads to additional 550 EUR per
worker. The change in the capital/labour ratio is positive, but imprecisely estimated.
To confirm our results and to analyse additional variables, we perform the same regres-
sion using firm-level data from the BEEPS survey. Table 1.3 presents the reduced form
estimates. BEEPS contains only a limited number of firms with available panel data.
Therefore, in the reported specification we pooled firm observations together, adding
firm-level covariates: lagged sales, capital, quadratic terms for firm age and lagged num-
ber of employees, share of foreign capital, share of export in sales. All regressions are esti-
mated with country·year (c·y), country·industry(c·i), and industry·year(i·y) fixed effects.
The remaining variation in dependent variables should come from country-industry-year
changes in the value of the Free Movement variable. As with the Amadeus data, we
find a negative effect of the EU labour market opening on firm TFP. Furthermore, we
report significant increases in the share of trained employees by firms in industries, which
have potentially experienced higher labour emigration. Combining this with our model
predictions, it suggests that firms train more people as they increase their hiring due to
turnover.
One assumption we are making to bring the model to the data is that the Free Movement
variable affected average turnover in NMS industries. Using Eurostat LSF data, the
results in Table 1.4 are in line with our hypothesis: industries exposed to higher labour
mobility experience a decrease in average tenure (which corresponds to higher turnover).8
The estimates are robust to the inclusion of country-specific time trends. To check for
8Tenure can be expressed as 1/Turnover
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Table 1.3: Free Movement Effect on Firm Performance, Reduced Form, BEEPS Data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP index Wage Train New product
L.FMict -0.541*** 0.772 1.706*** -3.589
(0.083) (0.620) (0.577) (2.772)
log_lag_lfict -0.0501 -0.211*** 0.0630*** 0.0201
(0.118) (0.0347) (0.0170) (0.0159)
log_lag_salesfict 0.215** 0.225*** 0.0218** -0.0144*
(0.107) (0.0221) (0.00945) (0.00831)
% foreignfict -0.187 0.462*** 0.179*** 0.115
(0.207) (0.118) (0.0637) (0.0717)
export_sharefict -0.0135 0.0620 -0.105* -0.0681
(0.198) (0.100) (0.0589) (0.0707)
Observations 1,344 5,432 5,078 2,179
R2 0.971 0.227 0.243 0.247
Dummies cy ci iy cy ci iy cy ci iy cy ci iy
Robust yes yes yes yes
Clusters 296 591 574 290
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of free movement on firm performance using BEEPS data. All
specifications are estimated with country·year (c·y), country·industry(c·i), and industry·year(i·y) fixed effects. The
variable Train represents the share of trained workers in the total workforce. Additional firm-level covariates include
lagged sales, capital, quadratic terms for firm age and number of employees, share of foreign capital, share of export in
sales. L.FMict represents the sum of legislation dummies, weighted by distance to a given old EU member-country and
interacted with skill shortages in destination industries. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry
level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the presence of pre-trends, we add a one-period forward of the Free Movement variable
(column 3), which turns out to be insignificant, as expected.
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Table 1.4: Free Movement Effect on Tenure, Reduced Form, Eurostat Data
(1) (2) (3)
Mean tenure Mean tenure Mean tenure
F.FMict -0.268
(0.320)
L.FMict -0.858*** -1.052*** -1.842***
(0.144) (0.219) (0.272)
L.log_investmentict -0.110*** -0.0899** -0.107**
(0.0389) (0.0390) (0.0422)
log_total_salesict 0.0261 0.00509 -0.00460
(0.0907) (0.0883) (0.0943)
L.log_FDIct -0.172*** -0.148*** -0.166***
(0.0336) (0.0320) (0.0394)
D.log_GDPct -1.200 -0.141 -3.564**
(0.904) (0.870) (1.424)
Observations 1,873 1,873 1,564
Number of idc 314 314 312
R2 0.142 0.136 0.208
Dummies ic y ic y ic y
Clusters 314 314 312
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of free movement on average tenure. All specifications are estimated
with industry·country fixed effects and time dummies. L.FM - Free Movement variable, 1 year lag. In specification 1, we
use only distance-weighted FM dummies. In specifications 2 and 3, FM dummies are interacted with skill shortages in
destination industries. In specification 3, we add a forward lag of the FM variable to check for the absence of pre-trends.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.6.2 Heterogeneity
In the main specification, we analyse the effect of free movement for the full sample
of firms. To check for heterogeneous effects, we estimate specification 1.4 for different
sub-samples of firms.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show the results for foreign-owned and innovating firms. The estimated
effect of free movement on firm TFP is smaller compared to the full sample and loses its
statistical significance. At the same time, the estimated coefficients for personnel costs
and capital/labour ratios suggest that these firms adjust much stronger to the increased
emigration opportunities of their workforce. Foreign-owned firms increase their personnel
costs significantly more. They might be able to offer wage increases to retain workers
and training to newcomers to teach firm-specific human capital. Patenting firms seem to
adapt in particular through increasing the capital/labour ratio. These firms might also
be able to provide an interesting work environment and have retention initiatives to keep
their essential research staff. There is also evidence that innovating firms benefit from
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Table 1.5: Free Movement Effect on Firm Performance, Reduced Form, Foreign-Owned
Companies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
L.FMict -0.0571 -0.124 0.0191 0.396*** 0.395***
(0.0796) (0.0805) (0.0269) (0.0642) (0.110)
Mark − upict 0.105*** 0.143*** 0.0480*** -0.0509 -0.0546
(0.0339) (0.0357) (0.0136) (0.0399) (0.0446)
L.log_investmentict 0.0127* -0.0108 -0.00692* -0.0115 -0.0274**
(0.00768) (0.00798) (0.00375) (0.0110) (0.0140)
L.log_FDI_inwardict 4.88e-06 0.000242 -0.000519 0.00119 0.00414
(0.00170) (0.00182) (0.000606) (0.00139) (0.00260)
Log_total_salesit -0.0114 -0.0245* -0.00649 0.0509*** 0.0302*
(0.0119) (0.0130) (0.00538) (0.0121) (0.0171)
Mean skill sh.it -0.103 0.178 0.0425 0.0712 0.0603
(0.139) (0.154) (0.0647) (0.149) (0.204)
L.log_FDIct 0.00938*** 0.00639* 0.000382 -0.00195 -0.00690*
(0.00292) (0.00347) (0.00165) (0.00301) (0.00394)
D.log_GDPct 0.809*** 0.791*** 0.0941 0.196 0.200
(0.145) (0.172) (0.0650) (0.134) (0.175)
Observations 56,960 34,354 56,580 55,730 55,730
Number of firms 10,415 6,846 10,361 10,308 10,308
R2 0.021 0.019 0.016 0.088 0.044
Dummies f y f y f y f y f y
Clusters 1683 1489 1668 1670 1670
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of the free movement effect on firm performance. The sample is
restricted to firms with foreign capital. All specifications are estimated with firm fixed effects and time dummies.
Dependent variables: TFP index, TFP LP - tfp estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin procedure, ROA - return on assets,
Pers. costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. L.FM - Free Movement variable (distance-weighted,
interacted with skill shortages in destination industries), 1 year lag. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on
country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
reverse knowledge flows and increased research networks through their former employees
(Braunerhjelm et al., 2015; Kaiser et al., 2015).
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Table 1.6: Free Movement Effect on Firm Performance, Reduced Form, Firms with
Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
FM -0.0702 -0.0883 -0.104*** 0.256* 0.604***
(0.127) (0.109) (0.0363) (0.144) (0.132)
Mark − upict 0.0460 0.125*** 0.0103 -0.0768 -0.0220
(0.0380) (0.0385) (0.0126) (0.0563) (0.0638)
L.log_investmentict -0.0156 -0.0245* -0.00272 0.0251** 0.0440**
(0.0121) (0.0139) (0.00479) (0.0117) (0.0184)
L.log_FDI_inwardict -0.000839 -0.00584*** -0.000692 0.000865 -0.000384
(0.00184) (0.00203) (0.000740) (0.00213) (0.00277)
Log_total_salesit -0.0147 -0.0304 0.00435 0.00534 0.00906
(0.0180) (0.0189) (0.00715) (0.0162) (0.0252)
Mean skill sh.it 0.0703 0.284 0.0201 0.239 -0.110
(0.154) (0.193) (0.0644) (0.166) (0.226)
L.log_FDIct 0.00130 0.00194 0.00176 0.0128*** 0.0151***
(0.00351) (0.00450) (0.00167) (0.00292) (0.00398)
D.log_GDPct 0.383 0.263 0.0656 -0.00291 -0.474*
(0.253) (0.252) (0.0700) (0.250) (0.274)
Observations 20,526 13,276 20,507 19,694 19,694
Number of firms 2,812 2,165 2,812 2,769 2,769
R2 0.113 0.037 0.120 0.128 0.266
Dummies f y f y f y f y f y
Clusters 843 729 843 832 832
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of the free movement effect on firm performance. The sample is
restricted to firms with patents. All specifications are estimated with firm fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent
variables: TFP index, TFP LP - tfp estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin procedure, ROA - return on assets, Pers.
costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. L.FM - Free Movement variable (distance-weighted,
interacted with skill shortages in destination industries), 1 year lag. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on
country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.6.3 Skill Shortages Due to Emigration: 2SLS Regressions
The reduced form regressions represent the “intention-to-treat” effect. Furthermore, it is
of interest to estimate the effects for those firms that were effectively constrained by the
outflow of skilled workers. We consider skill shortages as an indicator for this problem.
If changes in EU15+4 labour mobility legislation indeed induce higher emigration rates
of the qualified workforce, we will observe increasing skill shortages as reported by firms
in NMS. The measure of skill shortages is described in Section 1.4.
Table 1.7 shows the OLS results of different firm outcomes regressed on skill shortages.
We find that only one measure of TFP is significantly negative, while for other measures
the association appears to be zero or even positive. We believe that these OLS results
are upward biased due to reverse causality and omitted variable bias. For instance, those
firms that experience a positive shock are likely to be more productive and thus need more
labour. They are consequently more likely to report skill shortages. In the following, we
perform a 2SLS analysis, which confirms the upward bias of the OLS regression.
Table 1.8 presents 2SLS estimates with the Free Movement variable serving as an in-
strument for skill shortages. Comparable to the reduced form estimations, we estimate
the reported models using the distance-weighted instrument. The first-stage details (FM
coefficient with the standard error) are presented below the main regression results.9
The measure of skill shortages (share of firms in an industry, reporting to be constrained
by labour) ranges from 0 to 1. The coefficient of interest thus represents the log point
change in the dependent variables when skill shortages increase by 1 unit (or 100%). A
one percentage point increase in skill shortages caused by the EU15+4 labour market
opening thus leads to a 1.6-3.1% drop in firm TFP (depending on the measure) and a
3.0% increase in personnel costs. Comparable to the reduced-form estimates, innovating
and foreign-owned companies do not experience significant decreases in TFP, but raise
their personnel costs and increase their capital intensity.
9The reported first-stage coefficients might differ slightly from those reported in Table A.2, since
some industry-year observations were dropped due to missing firm-level data.
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Table 1.7: Skill Shortages and Firm Performance, OLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
L.skill sh. -0.0183 -0.0751*** 0.0287*** 0.0964*** -0.181***
(0.0300) (0.0258) (0.00856) (0.0323) (0.0482)
Mark − upict 0.336*** 0.302*** 0.120*** -0.0254 0.0132
(0.0817) (0.0537) (0.0205) (0.0297) (0.0474)
L.log_investmentict 0.00636 -0.00531 -0.00668*** 0.00391 0.0238**
(0.00698) (0.00573) (0.00198) (0.00704) (0.00955)
L.log_FDI)ct -0.00158 -0.000693 -0.000471 0.000983 0.00242
(0.00153) (0.00119) (0.000351) (0.00128) (0.00200)
Log_total_salesit -0.00339 -0.0161 -1.11e-06 0.0504*** 0.00719
(0.0109) (0.0107) (0.00232) (0.00819) (0.0123)
Mean skill sh.it -0.0205 0.106 0.158*** 0.128 0.0451
(0.160) (0.124) (0.0365) (0.110) (0.167)
L.log_FDIct 0.0141*** 0.0130*** 0.00213*** 0.00772*** 0.0117***
(0.00269) (0.00245) (0.000669) (0.00199) (0.00246)
D.log_GDPct 1.549*** 1.294*** 0.239*** -0.0605 -0.285*
(0.171) (0.148) (0.0370) (0.0940) (0.163)
Observations 501,277 291,346 497,393 486,190 486,190
Number of firms 88,370 54,965 87,651 86,960 86,960
Dummies y f y f y f y f y f
Robust yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 2377 2210 2345 2361 2361
Notes: The table presents estimations of the skill shortages effect on firm productivity. All specifications are estimated
with firm fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent variables: TFP index, TFP LP - tfp estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin
procedure, ROA - return on assets, Pers. costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Skill Shortages as the Consequence of the Free Movement, 2SLS Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TFP index TFP LP ROA Pers. costs C/L
L.skill sh. -3.071* -1.635*** -0.281 3.042** 2.127
(1.631) (0.595) (0.187) (1.315) (1.872)
Mark − upict 0.330*** 0.308*** 0.119*** -0.0106 0.0247
(0.106) (0.0647) (0.0230) (0.0594) (0.0670)
L.log_investmentict 0.0298 0.00582 -0.00426 -0.0161 0.00814
(0.0216) (0.0101) (0.00263) (0.0179) (0.0224)
L.log_FDI_inwardict -0.00338 -0.00171 -0.000652 0.00275 0.00381
(0.00331) (0.00193) (0.000475) (0.00271) (0.00362)
Log_total_salesit 0.0102 -0.00712 0.00135 0.0361* -0.00400
(0.0226) (0.0140) (0.00370) (0.0211) (0.0200)
Mean skill sh.it 0.977* 0.654*** 0.260*** -0.826** -0.702
(0.562) (0.231) (0.0665) (0.403) (0.706)
L.log_FDIct 0.0311** 0.0238*** 0.00384** -0.0100 -0.00219
(0.0136) (0.00705) (0.00150) (0.0116) (0.0147)
D.log_GDPct 1.375*** 1.236*** 0.221*** 0.211 -0.0718
(0.237) (0.162) (0.0510) (0.249) (0.240)
Observations 501,277 291,346 497,393 486,190 486,190
Number of firms 88,370 54,965 87,651 86,960 86,960
Dummies y f y f y f y f y f
Robust yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 2377 2210 2345 2361 2361
fs_coef 0.0988 0.147 0.0981 0.0985 0.0985
fs_se 0.0423 0.0463 0.0424 0.0435 0.0435
Notes: The table presents estimations of the skill shortages effect on firm productivity. All specifications are estimated
with firm fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent variables: TFP index, TFP LP - tfp estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin
procedure, ROA - return on assets, Pers. costs - personnel costs per employee, C/L - capital-labour ratio. L.FM - Free
Movement variable (distance-weighted, interacted with skill shortages in destination industries), 1 year lag. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-industry (NACE 4-digit) level. Firststage_coef is the first-stage
coefficient of the instrument and Firststage_se is the standard error.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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We include a number of covariates to switch off demand-driven changes in the reported
measure of skill shortages. Country GDP growth rates and FDI inflows (GDPct, FDIct)
control for general country-specific shocks. Lagged investment (investmentict) accounts
for country-industry specific increases in skill shortages due to the expansion of existing
companies or new entries. The measure of average skill shortages in a given industry in
EU15 countries (Mean skill shit) controls for industry-specific labour demand shocks,
which are common across all EU members.
For all the specifications, we report the coefficients from the first-stage regressions (where
we regress skill shortages on the Free Movement variable). A complete opening (from
FM=0 to FM=1) of one industry in all EU15+4 labour markets results in a 10% increase
in skill shortages for firms in the corresponding industry in the NMS. The free move-




The identification of the skill shortages effect builds on the exogeneity assumption of the
constructed instrumental variable. Variation in the Free Movement variable comes from
changes in legislation, bilateral distances, and skill shortages in destinations. All three
components are determined on the industry level for old EU member states and hence
should be exogenous to country-industry-year productivity shocks or changes in other
unobservables in new EU member countries. As a robustness check for the validity of
our IV approach, we ran the first-stage regression (1.5) on another variable, which also
varies at the country-industry-year level, but, in contrast to skill shortages, should not
systematically react to changes in EU labour mobility legislation. In the EU Business
Survey, apart from skill shortages, firms also report on financial constraints. Table A.3
presents first-stage regression results with financial constraints as a dependent variable.
While for skill shortages all four IV modifications returned statistically significant coef-
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ficients, only one of them is weakly correlated with reported financial constraints. This,
however, is not the modification we use in our regressions. This result reassures that
the constructed IV captures labour supply shrinking due to emigration instead of other
contemporaneous shocks.
1.7.2 Using Different Lags of the Instrument
In our main specification, we have looked at the effects of emigration on firm performance
one year after the respective labour market opening. We have chosen a one-year lag
because we expect the effects appear with a certain delay, for instance due to the decision
making process to migrate, the migration preparation process and the notice period. In
the following, we are looking at simultaneous effects as well as the effects up to three
years before and after the sector opening.
Figure 1.2 shows firm TFP that is regressed on lagged (1, 2 and 3 year lag), simultaneous
and forwarded (1, 2 and three year forward) FM values. One can see that the forwarded
values are always insignificantly different from zero. This is reassuring for us, as we
do not want the future sector openings to affect current firm outcomes (for instance
due to anticipation). The Free Movement variable gains significance during the year of
the opening but is only borderline significant. The effect becomes stronger and more
significant after one year and then remains at this lower level during the following two
years.
Figure A.2 in the appendix shows other firm outcomes that are regressed on lagged (1, 2
and 3 year lag), simultaneous and forwarded (1, 2 and three year forward) FM values.
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Figure 1.2: Annual Treatment Effects of Free Movement on Firm TFP
Notes: Dependent variable - firm TFP, estimated with Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. The displayed coefficients correspond
to the number of years before and after the largest increase in the Free Movement variable for a given industry. Year,
industry, and country-fixed effects are included. Errors are clustered at the country-industry level.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper uses firm- and industry-level panel data to evaluate the effect of skilled em-
igration on firm productivity. To overcome the endogeneity problem, we exploit the
natural experiment of the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007. We argue that the gradual
and industry-specific opening of the EU and EFTA labour markets to citizens from new
member states throughout 2004-2014 has created exogenous variation in the emigration
rates experienced by NMS. We show that an emigration-driven reduction in labour sup-
ply resulted in lower total factor productivity for firms in NMS. We also document an
increase in personnel costs and training expenditures. This confirms the predictions of
our model. Furthermore, we find that innovating and foreign-owned firms increased their
personnel costs by more and experienced smaller drops in productivity. These firms have
been more successful in circumventing the loss in TFP.
Our results are important both for firms and for policy-makers. Being aware of the
problem helps firms to react timely and in an adequate way. Firms can benefit from active
human resource strategies, focusing, for instance, on providing training and retention
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measures. For policy makers, the effects of migration ‘are not a matter of fate, [but] to
a large extent, they depend on the public policies adopted in the receiving and sending
countries’10. The prevalence of skill shortages, for instance, justifies the need to invest in
the skills of their local labour force and to mitigate search frictions. A skill upgrading of
the local labour force can in the short term be addressed by providing specific training
courses by public institutions and in the long term by adjusting the education system
to labour market needs. Knowing that those skilled people are needed can justify the
investment. An increase in local human capital might also happen in the long term due
to increased incentives to invest in education, which rise with the prospect to emigrate
(Beine et al. (2001)).
While the outflow of skilled workers leads to deteriorating firm performance in the short
term, emigration can also create opportunities and countries can experience brain gain
if they put the right policies in place. One possibility for brain gain is return migration.
If companies and politicians in the new EU member states succeed in bringing back
their skilled workers after some time abroad, then firms could benefit from even more
experienced workers. These workers can create knowledge spillovers and bring their firms
closer to the technological frontier. Another opportunity is to attract workers from other
EU member states. An efficient labour agency, and especially harmonised EU-wide labour
agencies, could inform workers within the EU of all EU-wide job vacancies. This might
encourage unemployed workers in other EU states to search for a job in countries and
industries that experience shortages. By attracting workers from other EU countries and
incentivising return migration, firms in new member states could also reap the benefits
of labour migration in an enlarged Europe.
This paper does not take General Equilibrium effects or aggregate effects at the European
level into consideration. It might well be that while emigration reduces firm productivity
in the source country, the better allocation of workers and jobs increases efficiency and
welfare at the European level. We leave these questions for further research.




Does Emigration Foster Innovation?∗
2.1 Introduction
Remittances, the money international migrant workers are sending back from the coun-
try of employment to their home country, represent an important source of income for
developing countries and hence constitute a direct benefit of emigration.1 Furthermore,
apart from financial contributions, skilled migrants can “send” back the knowledge they
have acquired while working in other countries. This remittance of knowledge has the
potential to increase innovation in the origin countries and bring them closer to the tech-
nology frontier, thus mitigating the negative effects of the loss of human capital due to
emigration.
The number of highly educated foreigners in the OECD area now exceeds 31 million,
accounting for 45 percent of the increase in the foreign born population over the last
decade (OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries, 2016). The number of
skilled migrants has especially increased within Europe since many members of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) have introduced




free movement for citizens of the partner countries. Given the strong increase in labour
mobility and raising concerns in countries experiencing net outflows of skilled people, it is
important to understand the consequences of migration. Should firms and policy-makers
think and act in the context of a “global war for talent” or can the international mobility
of skilled individuals make everyone better off, in particular, by stimulating cross-border
knowledge flows?
In this project, we establish a causal link between labour mobility, knowledge flows, and
innovation activities. By exploiting changes in the European labour mobility legislation
as a quasi-experimental setting, we evaluate the effect of skilled emigration on innovation.
We find that the emigration of skilled individuals increases patenting in source countries
and argue that knowledge remittances can explain this positive effect. Using data on
patent citations and migration flows from 32 European countries, we find that emigration
increases cross-border knowledge flows. Industries that are exposed to a higher mobility of
their workers start to cite patents from the emigrants’ destinations more frequently than
before. The international mobility of skilled workers seems to enlarge R&D networks and
promote the transfer of tacit knowledge. In this way, migration enables a faster diffusion
of knowledge from more to less technologically advanced countries and helps the latter
to catch up.
We embed these results within the following conceptual framework. We assume a know-
ledge production function, where innovation (here, for instance, measured by the number
of patents) is produced with the inputs of capital and labour and a certain production
technology. Emigration leads to a reduction in labour and thus has a direct negative
effect on innovation production. However, there might also be an indirect effect, which
has often been overlooked in this discussion. International migration can increase the
flow of ideas and knowledge across borders. Migrants might share knowledge about new
technologies, processes, and products with their former colleagues and friends at home.
This increases the stock of knowledge in the source countries and, through the recombi-
nation of ideas, positively affects innovation. The production technology thus improves
and patent production can grow even if the available skilled labour is reduced. Our con-
ceptual considerations thus suggest that migration has a negative direct and a positive
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indirect effect on patenting levels in source countries. Although we cannot disentangle
these effects with our data, we provide empirical evidence on the total effect.
The main challenge in the empirical analysis is the endogeneity of migration flows. This
could be due to reverse causality or omitted variables. To establish causality, we construct
an instrumental variable (IV) for migration, using changes in labour mobility laws within
Europe. These laws are adopted and enforced by the destination countries and hence can
be treated as exogenous to economic conditions in migrants’ source countries.
The aim of our estimations are twofold. Combining several data sources, we do not only
establish a link between emigration and innovation in the source country, but also shed
light on the effect on knowledge remittances, potentially driving innovation. We start
by analysing the effects of international labour mobility on total patenting activity in
source countries. The IV estimate suggests that a one percent increase in the number
of emigrants increases patent applications by 0.64 percent in the following two years.
This result is statistically significant at the one percent level and robust to controls, fixed
effects, and varying lags. The effect is quantitatively more pronounced when we consider
only the flows of migrants with patenting potential.
We complement the analysis of innovation activity by looking at the convergence in
patenting between migrants’ origin and destination industries. We limit the sample
to pairs where the destination is more technologically advanced than the origin and
analyse whether the difference in patenting levels changes with migration flows. This is
a highly policy-relevant question, especially in the context of the European Union: Some
countries may block the initiatives aimed at enhancing within-EU labour mobility by
arguing that the outflow of skilled people will further augment the asymmetries between
richer and poorer member states. Contrary to this argument, though, our results show
that patenting differences between origins and destinations decrease in the number of
emigrants. Hence, emigration can promote convergence to the innovation level of more
advanced economies.
To establish the channel for the positive impact of emigration on innovation, we link
emigration to reverse knowledge flows, that is the transfer of knowledge from migrants’
destinations back to their origins. While skilled emigrants do not patent in their home
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country anymore, they can stimulate knowledge and technology diffusion, thus improving
the production technology in the origin country. Common to the innovation literature,
we use cross-border patent citations as a proxy for knowledge flows. The regression
analysis relates the number of citations to a particular destination country with the
number of migrants that currently work there. We find evidence that knowledge flows
from destination to origin indeed increase with migration: the 2SLS regressions yield an
elasticity of knowledge flows to emigration equal to 0.59.
Our project relates to two broad strands of the literature. The first one investigates the
effects of labour mobility on innovation. Several papers have established a positive effect
of migration on patenting in destination countries. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) use random
visa allocations to find causal effects for the US. Bosetti et al. (2015), Parrotta et al.
(2014), Ozgen et al. (2014) and Niebuhr (2010) focus on European countries and establish
cultural diversity as one of the main channels to generate new ideas and innovation. The
effect of migration on source countries received less attention. Kerr (2008) and Choudhury
(2015) find that source countries benefit from knowledge flows and return migration
and consequently increase patenting and innovation. Kaiser et al. (2015) provide firm-
level evidence by looking at worker mobility within Denmark. They find that hiring
new knowledge workers increases a firm’s patenting activity. Interestingly, the former
employers of these workers also increase patenting, which can be explained by reverse
knowledge flows. Braunerhjelm et al. (2015) conduct a similar analysis with a matched
employer-employee dataset from Sweden and also show that both the receiving and the
sending firms benefit from the mobility of knowledge workers. The effects are stronger
for interregional mobility. We contribute to this literature by providing causal evidence
that emigration leads to an increase in patenting. We thereby confirm what Kerr (2008)
and Choudhury (2015) showed for China and India in a very different context and using
another methodology. As we have comparable patenting data for source and destination
countries, we can extend this result and show that emigration leads to a catch-up process.
The second strand of the literature analyses the determinants of knowledge flows. Starting
with the seminal contribution by Jaffe et al. (1993), these studies have established that
knowledge is localised beyond the effects of agglomeration. Later studies focused on
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international knowledge spillovers (Hu and Jaffe, 2003; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999),
showing that knowledge takes time to cross country borders. Thompson and Fox-Kean
(2005) challenge the approach by Jaffe et al. (1993) and point out that intra-national
localization effects are not robust to a finer technology classification. However, even with
their more conservative estimations, the international localization remains significant.
Singh and Marx (2013) investigate whether advances in communication technologies and
lower costs of travelling reduce the localisation of knowledge over time. While they find
evidence for a reduction in the significance of state borders in the US, their results show
that the effect of international borders has even strengthened over time. Few studies
so far analysed the impact of international migration on cross-border knowledge flows.2
Kerr (2008), for instance, studies the role of skilled immigrants in the U.S. and finds
that immigrants form ethnic scientific networks that enhance the technology transfer to
source countries.
We extend this literature on knowledge flows to the European context using an identi-
fication strategy that allows for a causal interpretation. We build a unique dataset by
merging comparable migration data for 32 European countries with European patent
data and find evidence for knowledge flows. Due to our unique European enlargement
setting, we are able to estimate causal effects of labour mobility independently of other
integration events by exploiting different opening times for trade, FDI and migration. We
find that the positive effect of mobility on knowledge remittances is particularly high for
migrants with patenting potential and is robust to a variety of specifications and samples.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes a conceptual framework
to guide our empirical analysis. Section 3 outlines the data, followed by Section 4 that
presents the empirical specification and describes the instrument. Section 5 discusses the
results. Section 6 suggests knowledge flows as the channel. Section 7 provides robustness
checks and Section 8 concludes.
2Prior literature on the international knowledge flows has focused on trade, foreign direct investment




This paper analyses the effects of emigration on innovation in source countries. As there
are two opposing effects, our storyline becomes clearer if we support it with some con-
ceptual considerations. The considerations are based on a classical knowledge production
function as introduced by Griliches (1979) and further developed by Jaffe (1986) and Jaffe
(1989). We augment the knowledge production function with emigration. The concept
illustrates two opposing effects: a reduction in knowledge production due to a decreasing
skilled labour force vs. an increase due to a better production technology induced by
knowledge flows and technological spillovers.
We assume a simplified knowledge production function of the form
Y = Af(K,Ls). (2.1)
K is a measure of relevant capital available for research and development such as laborato-
ries and equipment. Ls stands for skilled labour and A measures total factor productivity
(efficiency of knowledge production). In our case A describes how well labour and cap-
ital can be combined to produce the knowledge output Y and captures factors that are
not explicitly modelled, such as the knowledge stock on which researchers can build. To
measure the output Y , we refer to patents, as is common to the literature.
The direct effect of emigration, in this setting, is a reduction in Ls. Due to the outmigra-
tion of skilled people, less workers are available for the production of innovation in the
source country. The innovation output Y should thus decrease.
However, there is a second indirect effect of emigration that works through the total
factor productivity A. After emigration, workers send back knowledge to their home
countries. For instance they may transmit technological information and ideas back to
their previous employer through communication with former colleagues. This employer
becomes better at producing innovation, which is reflected in an increasing A.
Theoretically, it is unclear whether the negative direct or the positive indirect effect
prevails. This depends on several other characteristics such as the industry, the technol-
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ogy, and the innovation process. Consequently, it is even more important to gain this
knowledge from a rigorous empirical assessment of the question. Using patent data as a
measure of innovation output Y and controlling for various other factors corresponding
to K and components of A that are unrelated to the stock of knowledge, our empirical
specification is able to identify this net effect.
2.3 Data Description
We create a unique dataset by merging comparable migration data for 32 European
countries with European patent data. The dataset has four dimensions: origin region3,
destination country, industry (two-digit, NACE Rev. 2), and year. The dependent
variables of interest are the number of patent applications (by origin-industry-year) as
a proxy for innovation and the number of cross-border citations (by origin-destination-
industry-year) as a proxy for knowledge flows. The main explanatory variable is the
annual number of emigrants from a given origin currently employed in a given destination
industry.
The ideal migration dataset would contain precise data on migration flows, disaggregated
by origin and destination (countries and employing industries), skill level, and occupation.
In the absence of such a dataset, we use the second-best data from Eurostat Labour
Force Surveys (2000 - 2014). These are harmonised surveys, which take place annually
in all EU countries, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland and cover around 5% of national
populations. The surveys provide demographic information on individuals, including
their current country of residence, region of origin (EU15+4, NMS10, NMS2 or Other),
3Here and in the following text “region” refers to the region to which Eurostat’s LFS data aggregate
migrants’ origin countries: EU15+4 (EU15 and EFTA), NMS10 (new member states in 2004), NMS3
(Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) and all other countries. The fact that the EU3 region consists of
Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007, and Croatia, which followed only in 2013, adds
further imprecision, as we cannot tell from the data how many emigrants from this region came from
Bulgaria and Romania and were able to take advantage of the EU’s right to free movement already.)
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education level, occupation, and currently employing industry.4 We thus obtain the stock
of migrants by year, region of origin, destination country, and destination industry. In
addition, we can use the information by education level (university degree, vocational
degree, or below) and by occupation (two-digit, ISCO) to identify the stock of migrants
with patenting potential.5 The available dataset has several limitations. We can only
observe the region of migrants’ origin instead of the country. This means that we cannot
differentiate between different 2004 accession countries but have to treat them as one
region (NMS10). Similarly we have to treat Romania and Bulgaria as one region (NMS2).
Furthermore, as we do not observe the origin industry of a migrant, we assume that it is
the same as the current industry at the destination. Besides, we cannot identify flows of
return migrants. These limitations result in high observational noise and might bias our
estimations towards zero.
To construct the instrument for migration flows we use changes in the European labour
mobility legislation. We obtain the relevant information from the Labour Reforms
database, prepared by the European Commission, which we complement with informa-
tion from national legislations of the destination countries. Our baseline dataset covers
the years from 2000 to 2012, this period encompassed several changes to European labour
mobility as described in more detail in Subsection 2.4.2.
The data on innovative activity and knowledge flows come from the EPO’s Worldwide
Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT, 2014 Autumn Edition).6 We are able to assign
patents to industries (two-digit NACE Rev. 2) via the International Patent Classification
4EU15+4 include 15 pre-2004 EU member countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom)
+ 4 EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland). NMS10 include countries that joined
the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta,
and Cyprus) and NMS2 include countries that joined the EU in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).
5We assign a dummy called patenting potential to migrants working in occupations "Managers" and
"Professionals" (ISCO codes: 11, 13, 21, 22, 23, 25, 31, 32, 35).
6Patents and patent citations are imperfect measures for innovation and knowledge flows and have
been criticised for example by Duguet and MacGarvie (2005). Yet, these are the best proxies, which are
available over long periods of time and comparable across the countries we study.
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(IPC) of patents.7. We then aggregate patent applications by country, industry, and
year and patent citations by patenting country, cited country, industry, and year. In
our dataset, patenting country corresponds to the origin country of migrants, while cited
country corresponds to their current destination. To assign patents to countries, we use
the PATSTAT information about the location of patent inventors and applicants, which
are usually the organisations employing the inventors. Since a patent can have several
inventors, it may be assigned to multiple countries if it is the result of an international
collaboration. In these cases, we assign a share of the patent to each country that is pro-
portional to the share of co-inventors from that country. The causes and consequences of
such collaborations have been studied by Kerr and Kerr (2015). Through this assignment
of patents to the inventors’ countries it is possible to link a patent with the location of
all the patents that cite it.
Figure 2.1 motivates the subsequent econometric analysis: cross-border patent citations
(a proxy for knowledge flows) significantly increase following the introduction of free
labour mobility between a pair of countries. This figure mirrors the response of migra-
tion flows to changes in labour mobility regulation within Europe (Figure B.1 in the
Appendix).
We complement the dataset with several important control variables: bilateral industry-
specific FDI flows (provided by Eurostat), GDP and bilateral trade flows (from CEPII).
By combining these different data sources, we can draw conclusions about the effects of in-
ternational migration on patenting in the origin countries and establish reverse knowledge
flows as the channel, while controlling for possible fixed and time-varying confounders.
7In order to assign four-digit IPC classes to industries, we use the concordance table provided by
Eurostat in Appendix 1 of the publication "Patent Statistics: Concordance IPC V8 - NACE REV.2",
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Notes: Annual treatment effects on cross-border citations in patent applications around the introduction of free movement
(1965-2014). The regression includes year and country-pair fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the citing country
level.
Source: PATSTAT, European Commission, own calculations.
2.4 Econometric Specification
In our empirical analysis we first provide causal evidence for the effect of emigration
on patenting in origin countries. Second, we link this effect to the increase in knowledge
flows. We obtain the elasticities of patenting and cross-border citations to migration using
OLS and 2SLS approaches. In the latter, the variation in migration flows is generated
only by the exogenous changes in labour mobility laws over 2000-2012. Our baseline
regressions include the sample of all patenting European countries. Besides, we provide
separate estimates for a sub-sample of Eastern European countries, which were affected
the most by the changes in labour mobility over the analysed period.
2.4.1 Baseline Regressions
Patenting in Origin Countries
We start by analysing the effects of emigration on total patenting in the origin countries.
For this, we aggregate the data at the origin, industry, and year level. Because we do
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not have detailed country-of-origin data, we use the region of migrants’ origin: EU15+4,
NMS10 and NMS2. The dependent variable is the number of patent application in a
specific origin, industry, and year. The explanatory variable is the number of emigrants
from a specific region that work in the same industry but in other European countries.
We estimate the following fixed-effects regression:
Yoiy = β1Moiy−l + β2Xoiy + φy + φoi + oiy (2.2)
where o denotes the region of origin, i the two-digit industry, and y the year. Yoiy is
the log number of patent applications in a given region and industry. Moiy−l is the log
number of emigrants from an origin region, currently working in a given industry.8 l
stands for the lag between migration and patenting. The coefficient β1 captures the
elasticity of patenting to migration. Xoiy contains time-varying controls: a dummy for
EU membership, trade inflows, and FDI inflows. φy and φoi denote time and origin-
industry fixed effects. oiy is the error term. The identifying variation thus comes from
the within origin-industry changes in the number of emigrants and patent applications.
To account for a possible endogeneity bias, we complement the OLS estimations with the
2SLS results, where we instrument migration with changes in labour mobility legislation.
We describe the instrument in more detail in Section 2.4.2 below.
Patenting Asymmetries between More and Less Advanced Countries
We go one step further and analyse whether migration increases or, on the contrary,
lowers patenting asymmetries between more and less advanced economies. On the one
hand, agglomeration effects and the resources available for research could lead to richer
destinations specializing even more on their comparative advantage, thus hindering con-
vergence. If we assume that skilled migrants move from less innovative to more innovative
places, labour mobility can increase patenting asymmetries despite some positive effects
on the origin. On the other hand, through the migrants working abroad, industries at
origins can get access to the frontier knowledge from more advanced economies. This can
8Here and in all other specifications, before taking logs we add 1 to each observation. This transfor-
mation ensures that we do not lose observations with zero values.
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increase innovation efficiency in origin industries and can allow a faster catch-up process
with the technology leaders. Hence, patenting asymmetries between destinations and
origins of migrants might decrease. We empirically evaluate the effect of migration on
patenting asymmetries with the following regression:
log(Pdiy
Poiy
) = β1Modiy−l + β2X1oy + β3X2dy + β4X3odiy + φy + φodi + odiy (2.3)
The level of observation is origin-destination (od) pair, industry (i), and year (y). The
dependent variable log(Pdiy
Poiy
) is the log difference in patent applications between the
destination and origin industries. The main explanatory variable is Modiy−l - the log
number of migrants from origin o working in industry i in destination d. l stands for
the lag between migration flows and patenting. The coefficient β1 shows whether the
patenting asymmetries increase or decrease in migration. In this specification we can
also control for time-varying origin- and destination-specific effects (X1oy, X2dy, X3odiy):
the total number of patents at origin, the total number of patents at destination, the
total number of patents in a given industry, a within EU dummy (equals one when
both origin and destination are EU members), the ratio of GDP per capita between
destination and origin, bilateral industry-level FDI, and trade flows. φy and φodi denote
time and origin-destination-industry fixed effects. doiy is the error term. The coefficient
β1 is thus identified solely through the variation in the number of emigrants within
an origin-destination-industry. General changes in patenting at origin and destination
cannot confound the results. As with specification 2.2, we estimate OLS and 2SLS
regressions.
Knowledge Flows
Further, we investigate one potential channel behind the effect of migration on innovation:
knowledge flows. One speaks of knowledge flows whenever a researcher or an inventor
builds on the work done by others to create ideas or to solve a specific technological
problem. A common way to track knowledge flows is to use citations data (Jaffe et al.,
1993). This approach assumes that a citation to a particular patent or a publication
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reflects the usefulness of the knowledge contained therein for further work. To determine
the effect of migration on knowledge flows we estimate the following empirical model:
Yodiy = β1Modiy−l + β2X1oiy + β3X2diy−l + β4X3odiy + φy + φodi + odiy (2.4)
As in specification 2.3, the level of observation is origin-destination (od) pair, industry
(i), and year (y). The outcome of interest Yodiy represents the log number of cross-border
citations. Modiy−l is the log number of migrants from origin o working in industry i at
destination d. l stands for the lag between migration flows and patenting. We focus on
reverse knowledge flows, i.e. knowledge flowing from destination to origin countries of
migrants. Hence, Yodiy represents citations to patents from destination countries by new
patents at origin.9 For example, YPL/BEiy counts citations by Polish patents in industry
i, filed in year y, to existing Belgian patents. It proxies the knowledge flows from Belgium
to Poland. MPL/BEiy−l represents the number of Polish migrants in Belgium, currently
working in industry i. The coefficient β1 captures the elasticity of citations to migration.
In our example, it shows the percent change in the number of citations from Poland to
Belgium if the number of emigrants from Poland to Belgium increased by 1 percent.
To avoid mechanic effects from the general increase in patenting at origin or destination
industries, we control for the number of patent applications in the origin industry (X1oiy)
and for the lagged number of patent applications in a destination industry X2diy−l. X3odiy
denote other controls: a within EU dummy (equals one when both origin and destination
countries are EU members), the total number of patents in a given industry, the bilateral
FDI, and trade flows. φy and φodi denote time and origin-destination-industry fixed
effects. doiy is the error term. We again run both OLS and 2SLS regressions.
2.4.2 Instrument for Migration Flows
Even though we control for many observable factors and have a number of fixed effects in
the baseline OLS regressions, an endogeneity problem might still arise. Estimates could
be biased, for instance, if reduced patenting at the origin forces inventors to leave. To
9We consider citations in patent publications and date patents with their application filing date.
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avoid this problem, we use changes in the labour mobility laws in Europe as a source of
exogenous variation for migration flows.
The freedom of movement for workers is a policy chapter of the acquis communautaire
of the European Union and represents one of the four economic freedoms: free move-
ment of goods, services, labour and capital. According to the Article 45 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the EU, “freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.” In practice,
it means that there are no restrictions (such as quotas on foreign workers) or additional
bureaucratic procedures (such as obtaining a work permit or a permission from the local
authorities) related to the employment of foreign citizens. This right primarily concerns
the citizens of the EU and EEA member states who, starting from 1958, have gradually
introduced free labour mobility towards their partner countries.10
In our project, we exploit two episodes of changes in the free labour mobility in Europe.
First, in 2004 all EEA countries introduced free movement for the citizens of Switzerland.
Switzerland responded with a symmetric measure in 2007.11 Second, a special scheme
has been in force following the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007. For up to seven years
after the accession, old EU members could restrict the access to their labour markets
for citizens of new member states. While some countries kept the restrictions for the
whole period, some provided easier labour market access only in certain industries, and
some opened up their entire labour markets directly upon the accession. When imposing
restrictions the countries had to apply them to the whole group of NMS from the same
entry year. Therefore, they could not target labour mobility laws at the citizens of
some particular states. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland applied the
transitional provisions towards the accession countries in the same way. These labour
mobility laws created variation in the migration flows between European countries on the
country, industry, and year level. Table B.1 in the Appendix provides an overview of the
10Norway and Iceland exert this right since 1994. Liechtenstein exerts this right since 1995, but
imposes a permanent quota for all EEA citizens.
11However, as a result of the "Against mass immigration" initiative, Switzerland is scheduled to impose




precise opening dates of countries and industries. Importantly for the identification, these
changes to labour mobility did not coincide with other integration events (free movement
of capital and goods).
Figure 2.2 shows the spikes in migration from NMS during the initial opening in 2004,
when countries such as the UK, Sweden, and Ireland opened their labour markets and
in 2011 when all transitional provisions for the 2004 accession countries where abolished
and Germany, for instance, fully opened its labour market.
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Notes: The graph shows the share of high-skill migrants (born in other European countries) in the EU15 population.
Source: Eurostat.
We can thus instrument real migration with exogenous labour mobility legislation. The
first-stage regression takes the following form:
Modiy = γ1FModiy−1 + γ2FModiy−2 + γ3FModiy−3 + γ4Xodiy + νy + νodi + uodiy (2.5)
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FModiy−l is an indicator variable, which is equal to one if a specific industry i in a
destination country d is open for labour migrants from a country o in a given year y. We
include a one, two and three year lag to allow for the delayed effect. In our sample this
indicator changes only for origin and destination pairs with either Switzerland or new
EU member states. As these migration flows might be different, we show separate results
for migration from only Eastern Europe in every case. Xodiy, νy, and νodi are the same
controls and fixed effects as used in the baseline OLS specifications. When using the
instrument for the patenting regressions (specification 2.2), we aggregate the values of
the free movement variable by origin, industry, and year.12 In this case, the FM variable
can be interpreted as the exposure of a given origin-industry (oi) to free labour mobility
of its workers.
When constructing the free movement dummies, we take into account the fact that many
old EU members did not explicitly specify which industries are open to migrants from
the NMS, but rather allowed for special job schemes in sectors that experienced labour
shortages. In case of such implicit exceptions, we set the free movement dummy equal
to 1 and multiply it by a measure of labour shortages in a given industry of an old EU
member state. As such measure, we use the share of firms (in the destination industries)
reporting to be constrained by the factor labour. These data are available from the
European Commission Business Survey. To account for possible endogeneity (arising,
for instance, when labour shortages are reported in industries that grow faster in all EU
countries), we control for the overall number of patent applications in a given two-digit
industry (aggregate over all European countries).
2.5 Results
In this Section, we first show the effects of migration on total patenting at the origin.
Second, we provide evidence that emigration can reduce patenting asymmetries between
less and more advanced economies. We show OLS as well as 2SLS results. First-stage and
12For each origin region we have 31 free movement indicators corresponding to 31 possible destinations.
We aggregate them to one measure by using proximity weights (the inverse log distances between the
two largest cities of two countries.)
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reduced form regressions are provided in the Appendix. Our baseline sample includes
all patenting European countries. In addition, we show separate estimations for the
sub-sample of Eastern European countries.
2.5.1 Migration and Patenting
This Section shows that the emigration of labour increases overall innovation, measured
by the number of patent applications per year in a region. As the migration data only
allow us to estimate the effect of emigration at the region level, we aggregate the free
movement variable by industry and region of origin: EU15+4, NMS10, and NMS2. The
aggregated FM measure approximates the number of countries to whose labour markets
an inventor in a certain industry and region of origin had access to and is normalised to
be between 0 and 1, where 1 corresponds to full access to all EU15+4 countries.
The first three columns of table 2.1 show the baseline OLS regressions and the last three
columns show 2SLS regressions, which use the labour mobility legislation as an instrument
for migration.13 Columns 1 and 4 estimate the relationship between the overall number
of emigrants and the number of patent applications from inventors in that region. These
regressions show that workers’ migration to other EU member states has a significant
and positive effect on patenting in the regions of origin. As both variables are measured
in logarithms, the coefficient can be interpreted as the elasticity: the effect in the IV
estimation in column 4 suggests that a one percent increase in the number of emigrants
in an industry causes patent applications in the region of origin to increase by 0.6 percent.
The 95% confidence interval for the elasticity is between 0.37 and 0.91. If we consider the
average number of emigrants in the year 2004 (2459 emigrants) and the average number
of patent applications 2 years later (255 applications) for new EU member states per
industry, this implies that about 1 to 2 additional applications result from 25 additional
13Note that the right to free movement was not symmetric due to a one-sided transition period, e.g.
workers of old EU member states have been able to move to new EU member states as a rule earlier than
the other way round. Thus the instrument varies also with the direction of migration and we observe
variation in emigration and patenting over time for pairs of origin region and industry. We cluster on
the origin-industry level to account for autocorrelation in the regressions in table 2.1. When we consider
asymmetries and citations, there is additional variation depending on the destination country, such that
we cluster on the origin-destination-industry level.
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Table 2.1: Patent Applications and Migration, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0994*** 0.0949** 0.637*** 0.903***
(0.0259) (0.0420) (0.139) (0.199)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0572 1.175***
(0.0420) (0.332)
in EU -0.262*** -0.298*** -0.296*** -0.112 -0.0729 -0.406**
(0.0903) (0.0752) (0.0844) (0.157) (0.205) (0.164)
L2.Trade flow 1.634*** 2.535*** 2.124*** -0.679 -0.945 3.325***
(0.348) (0.432) (0.342) (0.607) (0.877) (0.724)
L2.FDI inflow 2.03e-05** 3.15e-05** 2.10e-05** 1.16e-05 1.84e-05 2.34e-06
(9.82e-06) (1.22e-05) (8.06e-06) (2.07e-05) (2.90e-05) (1.12e-05)
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 53 53 53 53 53 53
F 6.517 11.29 7.285
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the relationship between the migration flow out of a country and innovation
in that country. The first three columns are estimated with OLS and the last three column use a 2SLS estimation with
our instrument based on free movement legislation. The dependent variables are the number of patent applications in an
industry and origin region in a year or, in columns 2 and 5, the citation-weighted patent applications (i.e. patent applications
+ forward citations to these patents). Patent application numbers and citation-weighted counts, number of migrants and
trade flows are taken in natural logarithms (more precisely, for variable x we use log(x+ 1) to include observations where
x = 0). The sample includes all EU members and countries in the European Free Trade Association. All specifications
include year and region-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
emigrants.14 Note however, that this number only includes migrants in industries that
were matched to the patent data, i.e. in which there is patenting. Furthermore, the
number of patent applications in 2006 we have used for this calculation already includes
the additional applications, such that the number of additional patents is likely to be
lower. Despite the noise and the level of aggregation in our data the regressions are able
to reject that there is a negative effect.
The second and fifth columns of table 2.1 use citation-weighted patents as the treatment
variable, i.e. the number of patent applications plus the number of citations to these
patents in a region, industry, and year. The number of later patents building on and
therefore citing a patent is often used as a measure of quality.15 The citations for more
recent cohorts in our sample are subject to truncation, which is controlled for through
14One percent of 2459 emigrants is about 25 and 0.37% (0.91%) of 255 applications is 0.94 (2.32).
15The relationship between citations and the social value of an invention has been documented in a
case study on Computed Tomography scanners in Trajtenberg (1990). A more recent study by Moser
et al. (2016) finds a robust correlation between citations of hybrid corn patents and the improvement in
yield reported in field trial data.
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year fixed effects. As the coefficients are similar, we conclude that the quality of patenting
has not deteriorated. Thus, merely a higher propensity of inventors in origin regions to
file patents as a result of European integration does not seem to be the driver of the
effect. Of course, the number of later patents citing a patent (forward citations) is only a
rough measure of quality and may be affected by emigrants spreading information about
their home countries’ latest technologies abroad as well. Nonetheless, a higher number
of forward citations would likely be associated with a greater benefit of source countries’
innovations, since they indicate that more follow-on innovation built on them.
Columns 3 and 6 differ from the other regressions in table 2.1 in the migration variable,
which here includes only emigrants with patenting potential. Whereas the OLS regression
shows a smaller and insignificant partial correlation, the coefficient in the IV regression
is larger than the corresponding coefficient for all migrants in column 4.
The OLS estimate is likely to be downward biased due to omitted variables and reverse
causality. If there is an omitted variable bias in the OLS regressions that is negatively
correlated with emigration and positively with patenting levels, then the OLS estimate is
downward biased. This is very likely and could be driven, for instance, by management
quality. A good manager might lead to a good work and research environment. This
results both in high patenting levels and low emigration from this firm and consequently
biases the OLS estimate downward. Moreover, we might encounter reverse causality in
the OLS regressions. If higher patenting levels lead to less migration, then we observe
a negative relationship between the two variables that goes in the other direction. As a
consequence, the OLS estimator is smaller than it should be and thus downward biased.
Tables B.2 and B.3 in the Appendix provide the first stage results and the reduced form
that complement the 2SLS results analysis. One can see that the instrument is highly
relevant in the first stage and that the overall effect of the three lags for the free movement
variables sum up to a positive effect.
Table B.4 in the Appendix provides the same table with the restricted sample of NMS10
countries (2004 accession years). Due to the level of aggregation in the migration data,
the 2SLS effects are not significant. Importantly we find no evidence of a significant
negative effect, which would be expected if the loss of human capital dominated.
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2.5.2 Migration and Convergence
While the results of the previous Section suggest that emigration can positively affect
innovation at the origin, this Section investigates whether this positive effect is enough
to reduce patenting asymmetries between less and more advanced economies or whether
international migration still benefits knowledge production at destination countries more.
This analysis is relevant for policy discussions about benefits and costs of free labour
mobility in Europe. Furthermore, the results in this Section serve as a robustness check
for the effects found above. When analysing asymmetries we use all four dimensions of our
dataset: origin, destination, industry, and year, and can therefore control for unobserved
origin- and destination-specific time-varying changes, which could bias our estimates of
patenting elasticity to migration in Section 2.5.1.
To have a clear direction of migration flows from less to more advanced economies, we re-
strict the sample to the origin-destination pairs, where destinations are EU15+4 countries
and origins are new EU member states. In addition, in our baseline sample we consider
origin and destination pairs with Switzerland as a destination and other EU15+4 coun-
tries as origins. We also show the results for migration from Eastern Europe only, and
the results are consistent. For each industry and year, we construct an asymmetry mea-
sure as the log difference between the amount of patent applications at destinations and
origins.
On average, destination industries file more than three times the amount of patent appli-
cations compared to origins. As expected, the patent quality of the former is also higher.
We then regress the asymmetry measure on the number of migrants. Table 2.2 presents
OLS (columns 1-3) and 2SLS (columns 4-6) results. The OLS coefficient of migration is
slightly positive, but is not statistically significant. This may be caused by the bias due
to higher migration outflows from more problematic industries. Another reason is that
once we move to the more disaggregated level, we introduce more noise in the migration
data (more missing and zero observations). This especially concerns already disaggre-
gated migration data by skill and occupation. 2SLS estimates, however, suggest that
emigration allows origin industries to catch up to the patenting level of destinations: a
one percent increase in the number of migrants reduces patenting asymmetries by 0.30
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percent (column 4 and 5 in 2.2). The coefficient for migrants with patenting potential
is much larger in magnitude, but is imprecisely estimated (see column 6). Overall, the
regressions’ results fit the framework of a patent production function with decreasing
returns to skilled labour: a marginal increase in patent production at destination (due
to the immigration of skilled labour) is smaller than the marginal increase in patenting
at origins (due to the increase in patenting efficiency).
Table B.6 in the Appendix presents the results from the same specifications but estimated
on a restricted sample with new EU member states as origins and EU15+4 as destinations
(thus excluding emigration from EU15+4 to Switzerland). The obtained coefficients are
slightly smaller in magnitude, but still significant. Table B.7 in the Appendix shows
the reduced form results, where instead of migration figures we use the bilateral free
movement dummies. One of the drawbacks of our migration data is the large amount
of missing observations, which could be either due to the effective absence of migrants
or to misreporting.16 This raises external validity issues to our estimations in terms of a
generalisation to all European countries. Therefore, the most interesting results of Table
B.7 are in columns 5 and 6 where we present the coefficients from the regressions over
the whole sample of origin and destination pairs. The number of observations increases
multiple times, yet the coefficients for the free movement dummies are very close to
the estimates from the baseline sample. Moreover, most coefficients are more precisely
estimated due to improved power: we note that EU membership, higher bilateral trade
flows and FDI also help the convergence.
While interpreting the regression coefficients, we implicitly assume that migrants stay
within the same industry. This is reasonable, as for skilled migrants the losses associ-
ated with changing the industry are substantial. Hence, they are more likely to seek
employment in the same sector in the destination countries. If the assumption would not
hold for some industries, how would this affect our estimations?17 Suppose there are two
industries: L and M in Poland and Belgium. The Polish migrants from industry L move
16For example, due to missing migration data we have to drop all observations with Germany as a
destination country.
17There are pairs of NACE industries, between which inventors may indeed be likely to move, for




Table 2.2: Convergence in Patenting Levels and Migration, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




















VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0319 0.0376 -0.305** -0.334**
(0.0223) (0.0276) (0.146) (0.158)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.117** -1.831
(0.0575) (2.212)
Patents, origin -1.220*** -1.391*** -1.206*** -1.207*** -1.376*** -1.419***
(0.0762) (0.0817) (0.0753) (0.0883) (0.0946) (0.281)
Patents, dest 1.066*** 1.105*** 1.069*** 1.058*** 1.096*** 1.021***
(0.0713) (0.0908) (0.0717) (0.0777) (0.0978) (0.0894)
Within EU 0.00806 -0.0884* 0.0109 0.0194 -0.0759 -0.0180
(0.0483) (0.0531) (0.0487) (0.0520) (0.0572) (0.0635)
GDPd/GDPo -0.173 0.400 -0.197 -0.188 0.384 0.173
(0.316) (0.367) (0.319) (0.338) (0.394) (0.530)
L3.Trade flow -0.0791 -0.0236 -0.0718 -0.0281 0.0326 -0.113
(0.0629) (0.0799) (0.0622) (0.0679) (0.0867) (0.0827)
L3.FDI flow 0.000575 -0.000443 0.000380 -0.000116 -0.00120 0.00254
(0.00668) (0.00668) (0.00671) (0.00783) (0.00786) (0.00926)
Observations 2,946 2,946 2,946 2,864 2,864 2,864
R-squared 0.486 0.551 0.486 0.424 0.500 0.325
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 582 582 582 500 500 500
F 83.92 122.8 76.50
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Patentsdest/Patentsorigin. Number of migrants, number of
patents (in origin and destination countries), GDP ratio between destination and origin, FDI, and trade flows are in natural
logarithms. The sample includes all EU and EFTA members. All specifications include year and origin-destination-industry
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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to Belgium to work in industry M . Empirically, we observe MBE/PL/M/y to increase.
The inflow of the skilled Polish workers in the Belgian industry M raises its innovation
activities (or in the worst case, does not affect them). The performance of the Polish
industry M is likely to remain unchanged. The asymmetry measure log(PBE/M/y
PPL/M/y
) either
increases or at most stays the same, which goes in the opposite direction of the reported
effect. We thus might underestimate the magnitude of the effect.
2.6 The Channel: Knowledge Flows
Having established that emigration leads to an increase in patenting, we want to analyse
one potential channel in more detail: knowledge flows. This Section shows that migrants
stimulate knowledge flows from their new destinations to their countries of origin.
Table 2.3 presents the baseline OLS and 2SLS results. The dependent variable is the log
count of citations by patents in the origin to the destination country. This dependent
variable proxies the knowledge flows due to emigration. In the baseline estimations, we
allow for two-year lags between the time of migration and the citations in the patent
applications. The results are similar for a one-year lag but slightly weaker. Importantly,
given the structure of the dataset, we can account for origin-industry and destination-
industry shocks. A possible threat to identifying the coefficient of interest would arise if
destination industries, which experienced a positive patenting shock, started to attract
more workers from other countries. A higher supply of patents from this destination would
also mechanically increase the amount of citations to this country. We can control for such
an effect by including the number of patent applications in the destination industry (with
a three year lag).18 In a similar way, we control for the number of patent applications in
the source country. The migration effect is identified from the within origin-destination
variation in the migration stocks and the count of cross-border citations. Since both
dependent and explanatory variables are in natural logs, the coefficient represents the
elasticity of cross-border citations to the number of migrants.
18As a rule of thumb, it takes about three years for a patent to be granted.
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Table 2.3: Citations to Destination Industries, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0334* 0.0269 0.799*** 0.588***
(0.0170) (0.0167) (0.213) (0.225)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0638* 2.916
(0.0348) (2.302)
Patents, origin 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.174*** 0.192***
(0.0237) (0.0238) (0.0268) (0.0310)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0435*** 0.0431*** 0.0427*** 0.0219
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0158) (0.0236)
Within EU -0.0501 -0.0471 -0.0698* 0.0468
(0.0378) (0.0379) (0.0416) (0.0845)
L3.Trade flow 0.00665 0.0119 -0.104* 0.00902
(0.0392) (0.0390) (0.0617) (0.0440)
L3.FDI flow 0.00780 0.00711 0.0126** -0.0134
(0.00493) (0.00495) (0.00570) (0.0203)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.080 0.095 0.095
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 20.29 22.20 14.98
Notes: The dependent variable is number of citations from a region and industry to another country per year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. The sample includes all EU and EFTA members. All specifications include year and
origin-destination-industry level fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
In the first column, we regress the citations on the overall number of migrantsModiy, year,
and origin-destination-industry fixed effects; in column 2 we add additional time-varying
controls; in column 3 we use the number of migrants with patenting potential as the main
independent variable. OLS results suggest a positive association between migration and
cross-border citations. The estimated coefficient for migrants with patenting potential is
robust to all controls and is twice as large compared to the overall migration stock.
Columns 4 to 6 of table 2.3 show the 2SLS results that yield quantitatively larger elas-
ticities than the OLS. A one percent increase in emigrants induces a 0.59 percent growth
in cross-border citations to their origins. Table B.8 in the Appendix summarises the
results for the sub-sample where new EU member states are origins and EU15+4 are
destinations. Despite the reduction in the sample size, the main 2SLS coefficients remain
positive and significant. The reduced form regressions (Table B.9 in the Appendix) are
also consistent. When we estimate the reduced form for the whole sample of origins and
destinations, the free movement coefficients gain significance and quantitatively remain
almost identical to those from the baseline sample. This indicates that some of the in-
63
Knowledge Remittances
significant results in the baseline regressions (as, for example, the imprecise coefficient
for migrants with patenting potential) are mainly due to power problems with noisy
migration data.
Previous research has emphasised the role of communication between moving researchers
and their former colleagues at the previous employers (e.g. Braunerhjelm et al., 2015;
Kaiser et al., 2015). To test whether the channel they have found for inventors moving
between firms within a country is also the primary channel of international knowledge
flows in our setting, we exclude the inventor’s network. To do this, we exclude citations
between inventors and all employers (applicants) and other inventors they are listed
with on a patent application at any point in time. Table 2.4 reports the results for
the restricted sample. While the coefficients change slightly, they remain positive and
significant. Thus only a small part of the effect seems to be driven by the inventors’ close
network. Knowledge flows that this method could not capture include, for example, if a
student at an Eastern European university moves on to work in Western Europe, filing
patents for the first time and citing her professors’ research. However, the sizable effect
that remains suggests that wider spillovers play an important role.
Citations are not always added by the inventor himself but can also be added by the
examiner. One worry might thus be that examiners become more aware of research
done in other European countries and that they consequently are more likely to add
citations from these countries. Alternatively, the effect might be driven by the fact that
more patents are filed at the European Patent Office, where examiners may be more
likely to add references to foreign patents than at the national offices.19 This concern is
addressed by Table B.11, which shows the results only with citations that were added by
the applicant (rather than the examiner or a third party) according to PATSTAT and
we can see that there are no qualitative changes.20
19The latter concern is also addressed in table B.10, where only citations among patents filed with
the USPTO are included, such that European institutional changes should not affect the results.
20In unreported regressions, we limit citations further to only include those that are marked in PAT-
STAT as applicant-added and, additionally, where citing and cited patents are both priority patents filed




Table 2.4: Citations to Inventor’s Network Excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0346** 0.0276* 0.797*** 0.631***
(0.0171) (0.0167) (0.197) (0.203)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0464 3.878*
(0.0314) (2.355)
Patents, origin 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.155*** 0.177***
(0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0262) (0.0358)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0353*** 0.0350*** 0.0344** 0.00732
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0150) (0.0247)
Within EU -0.0496 -0.0471 -0.0711* 0.0787
(0.0355) (0.0356) (0.0403) (0.0867)
L3.Trade flow 0.0296 0.0350 -0.0893 0.0312
(0.0389) (0.0387) (0.0597) (0.0484)
L3.FDI flow 0.00982** 0.00925* 0.0150*** -0.0179
(0.00481) (0.00482) (0.00569) (0.0224)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.077 0.091 0.091
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 19.18 19.85 10.82
Notes: In this table, citations within the network of the inventor are excluded, i.e. citations from applicants and inventors
with whom the cited inventor has patented at any point in time. The dependent variable is the number of citations from a
region and industry to another country in a year. Citation counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application
in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample includes all EU and
EFTA members. All specifications include year and origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
There are a number of ways for the knowledge flows to occur in practice. One possibility
is that emigrants increase the awareness of new knowledge or technologies. This could
happen, for example, if emigrants inform their former colleagues or if they meet at con-
ferences. Another possibility is that researchers in the source countries are aware of new
knowledge or technologies but need to learn how to use the tacit knowledge embedded
in them. A close contact among former colleagues might spur the transfer of tacit know-
ledge. Additionally return migration can increase innovation in source countries. Often,
emigrants return to their home countries after several years abroad and create start-ups
or contribute to innovation in other ways.21
21Our time frame of analysis is more likely to reflect the increasing awareness of new technologies or




To confirm the validity of the results, we conducted a number of robustness checks. We
find that the increase in patenting activities as a result of emigration is not driven by
different pre-trends or institutional changes in the European patenting system.
One way to check the validity of the results is to examine pre-trends. If our results
are valid, the coefficient of interest should be zero if we regress citation patterns on
future labour market openings. Figure 2.1 in Section 2.3 shows the annual treatment
effects for the regression of cross-border citations on the free movement variable. We
look specifically at bilateral citations during the time period 15 years before and 15 years
after free movement between two countries has been established. The data we use for
this graph are based on patent applications over the 50 year period from 1965 to 2014.
The regression includes year dummies and country-pair fixed effects to take out trends.
The figure shows that there is no significant change in cross-border citations in the years
prior to the establishment of free labour mobility.22 This is reassuring and increases the
credibility of our results. It becomes clear that the effect only starts to gain momentum
at the time of the introduction of free movement and builds up over the following years.
One might also worry that the institutional framework of registering patents has changed
in the EU, especially in the context of EU enlargement and the European Patent Con-
vention. We thus restrict the sample to patents that have been registered at the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Table B.10 in the Appendix shows the
results. While we have fewer observations, the qualitative results remain the same. The
results thus do not seem to be driven by institutional changes in Europe.
22Note that this graph uses country-level data, such that the free movement indicator only switches
to 1 once all sectors are open. Some of the (insignificant) increase before time 0 may thus be due to




2.8 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper analyses the effects of emigration on patenting levels in source countries. We
find that countries that experience emigration increase their level of patenting. We further
suggest that this has led to a catch-up process that brought origin countries closer to the
technology frontier. We also find that the international mobility of people has increased
technology and knowledge spillovers as evidenced by cross-border patent citation in the
respective countries. Specific channels that could have fostered the knowledge spillovers
are the transfer of tacit knowledge, the increased and improved network of inventors and
return migration.
One policy recommendation that directly follows from these findings is that the EU could
benefit from further facilitating migration within Europe. As there are no more legal
barriers to free labour mobility, hindering factors are mostly language and administrative
barriers. The EU could reduce these barriers by ensuring the recognition of foreign
qualifications and the promotion of language courses at all age levels. In this way, the
EU can exploit the full potential of migrants both for destination and source countries.
Another policy implication is to ease skilled migration to Europe from outside the Eu-
ropean Union. This could be achieved by easing the access to European labour markets
and the recruitment of highly qualified foreign workers. While the Blue Card has been
a step in this direction, its scope could be increased to obtain a higher impact and ad-
ministrative barriers should be reduced. For those skilled migrants that are already in
Europe, for instance skilled refugees, labour market restrictions should be lifted to ease
labour market integration. If these people can be integrated fast into qualified positions
without a loss in human capital, the innovation system would greatly benefit.
We have shown in this paper that source countries can benefit from emigration through
knowledge flowing back into the country. These benefits of knowledge flows can be
maximised by facilitating research networks with emigrated inventors, for example by
organising conferences in the origin countries. Furthermore, governments can design
programmes to actively keep the diaspora engaged and by encouraging and facilitating
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return migration. Return migrants bring back the newly gained knowledge and many
times create their own start-ups which can foster development in the countries of origin.
While this paper establishes that knowledge flows mitigate the negative consequences of
emigration, further research is needed to shed light on the precise way these knowledge
flows are created and characterised. Do migrants possess tacit knowledge that flows with
people but cannot be transferred by other means? Or do migrants enlarge the R&D
network and create better awareness of technologies in other countries? Do migrants
have a competitive advantage in negotiating licensing fees with their country of origin?
These open questions may guide further research in order to better understand how to
increase knowledge flows and maximise their benefits.
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Chapter 3
From Friends to Foes:
National Identity and Team
Performance
3.1 Introduction
In a globalised world, with lower communication costs and fewer obstacles to labour
mobility, diverse teams have become common in many organisations. These teams exist
because the benefits of pooling diverse individuals together outweigh higher communi-
cation and coordination costs. Yet, managing a diverse team is challenging. The team
members might identify themselves as being part of different social groups, for instance,
based on nationality or political preferences. What if, suddenly, these social groups find
themselves on the opposite sides of the barricades, for example, due to a political or an
ethnic conflict? Even if the conflict does not directly influence the team’s environment, it
can change identity prescriptions of the team members, spur stronger in-group/out-group
feelings, lower trust, and thus reduce the team’s productivity. Is there causal evidence
for such effects in real-life teams? Do identity-related conflicts exert the economic impact
by harming the performance of previously efficient teams and by preventing otherwise
profitable future collaborations? Which channels transmit the identity effect?
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This project uses a novel and relevant setting to address the above questions. I study the
consequences of an exogenous political conflict for the performance of teams on GitHub,
the world’s largest open-source platform. In particular, I exploit the unexpected conflict
between Russia and Ukraine following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and anal-
yse the impact of this conflict on the online collaboration between Ukrainian and Russian
programmers. Using microdata from GitHub, I show that the conflict exerted a strong
negative effect on Ukrainian-Russian collaboration and argue for the causal role of iden-
tity. I then investigate how the conflict affected specifically the performance of projects
with mixed Russian-Ukrainian teams. Further, I discuss and link to the empirical evi-
dence two potential channels, through which identity could affect team performance: first,
by hindering communication and coordination within a team and second, by changing
the taste of some team members for projects initiated by a "hostile" social group.
The GitHub setting provides several advantages for my analysis. First, GitHub was
specifically designed as an online platform for collaboration. It offers powerful infrastruc-
ture that allows multiple users from different locations to coordinate their efforts while
working on the same project. Therefore, GitHub represents an ideal laboratory to study
team interactions and performance. Second, GitHub features an environment with very
low information asymmetries: individual contributions of team members are directly ob-
servable by other GitHub users, thus, alleviating free-riding concerns in teams. From a
researcher’s perspective, this also limits the number of available interpretations for the
observed results. Third, since its launch in 2007, GitHub has grown to include more
than 14 million users. Many technology companies use GitHub for both open-source and
commercial projects. Hence, a virtual team on GitHub should be representative of a real
high-skilled team working on complex tasks. Fourth, prior to the 2014 conflict, both
Ukrainian and Russian programmers were well represented at the platform. Because of
a similar (or the same) language and technical backgrounds, Ukrainians and Russians
had often worked together on various projects. After March 2014, there were no major
interruptions in the access to the Internet in Ukraine or Russia nor could the introduced
bilateral sanctions between the countries prevent programmers from working on the US-
based online platform. For my analysis, therefore, I can treat this conflict as exogenous
to the virtual working environment on GitHub. Finally, I work with a detailed dataset,
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generated from GitHub databases. The dataset contains information about all users,
projects, and related activities ever registered on the platform over 2012-2015.
My empirical results show that the negative effect of the conflict on Ukrainian and Russian
collaboration on GitHub has been mainly driven by the drop of Ukrainian contributions to
Russian projects. Over the first six months of 2014, the amount of contributions decreased
sharply relative to the reference period in 2013. The empirical approach comprises the
difference-in-difference and triple-difference methods and controls for the time-varying
quantity and quality of Russian projects and for the activity of Ukrainian programmers.
I conduct several robustness checks, confirming that the economic reasons, such as higher
transaction costs or career expectations, cannot fully rationalise the observed changes.
Rather, the drop in collaboration concords with the identity-based explanation (following
Akerlof and Kranton (2000)). The conflict with Russia created a new prescription for the
Ukrainian identity: "to not collaborate with the enemy country". For Ukrainian program-
mers, collaborating with Russians now means violating this new prescription and results
in additional identity costs. Hence, the conflict could shift Ukrainian programmers’ taste
for teammates or projects and thus distort existing and future collaborations, profitable
from a purely economic perspective.
Intuitively, the identity effect should be larger for Ukrainian programmers with initially
stronger national identity. Although the strength of the national identity cannot be
observed, I can construct a proxy for it by identifying the preferred language of Ukrainian
programmers. Upon registration on GitHub, users report their name and location. I
exploit this information to associate a stronger Ukrainian identity to programmers, who
used the Ukrainian rather than the Russian version of their name and location.1 In
line with the identity hypothesis, programmers identified as having a stronger national
identity reduce the amount of their contributions to Russian projects significantly more
relative to other Ukrainian programmers.
1In practice, most Ukrainians speak both Russian and Ukrainian fluently, so this choice cannot signal
possibly higher communication costs with Russians. Furthermore, at least prior to the 2014 conflict, there
was no negative stigma attached to those speaking Russian.
71
From Friends to Foes
The shock to Ukrainian identity could affect team performance through two channels.
First, it could increase (psychological) communication costs between Ukrainian and Rus-
sian team members, leading to lower coordination within a team and, thus, lower amount
of contributions from both Ukrainian and Russian programmers. I find some evidence for
this channel by looking at the project-level data. I note an almost symmetric reduction
in the amount of contributions from both Ukrainian and Russian programmers that used
to work together on projects from other countries. However, for projects owned by ei-
ther Russians or Ukrainians the response is asymmetric. While Ukrainian programmers
sharply reduce their contributions to Russian projects, Russian programmers keep their
activity level on Ukrainian projects almost intact. This asymmetry can point to the
presence of identity-related costs, other than poorer peer interaction. The second pos-
sible "identity" channel could make Ukrainian programmers less willing to identify with
projects owned by Russians. On the intensive margin, Ukrainian programmers would de-
crease their contributions to Russian projects, as they start valuing the success of these
projects less. On the extensive margin, fewer Ukrainian programmers would now want
to become members of Russian projects. The data confirm presence of both effects.
This project contributes to several strands of literature. First, it relates to the literature
on team performance. Bandiera et al. (2005, 2009) and Mas and Moretti (2009) empha-
sised the importance of social preferences and provided evidence that socially-connected
teams may be more resilient, for instance, to free-riding or to coordination problems.
Lazear (1999) and Prat (2002) discussed the optimality conditions for team diversity.
Together these studies focused on the importance of peer interaction and outlined the
trade-off related to diverse or socially-distant teams: potential productivity gains against
collaboration challenges. My project adds to this literature by providing empirical evi-
dence for one of the risks that diverse teams face: external events can exacerbate social
differences within teams and hence inhibit the performance. Second, the project also
contributes to the theoretical and experimental literature on social identity and group
performance (Charness et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2014; Chen and Li, 2009). These works
have established the importance of a common group identity for the individual decision-
making and suggested it as a tool for improving cooperation and coordination in diverse
teams. When people, apart from their own utility, value the group’s or, in my context,
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the project’s payoff, it increases the overall effort. Programmers in my sample reduce
their contributions to or never join projects with a conflicting national identity. This
effect seems to be stronger than the drop in collaboration due to poorer interactions
between team members, as the first strand of literature would suggest.
Third, by investigating the consequences of an interstate conflict on workplace behaviour,
the project contributes to the literature on microeconomic effects of international or eth-
nic tensions (Fisman et al., 2013; Hjort, 2014; Ksoll et al., 2010; Marx et al., 2015;
Rohner et al., 2013a,b). The research in this area, apart from documenting the eco-
nomic effects, has tried to identify the underlying mechanisms: the external political
pressure, trust, national or ethnic preferences and social norms. The evidence so far has
been mixed. Fisman et al. (2013) evaluate the consequences of Sino-Japanese political
tensions and find a strong negative stock-market response for firms that depended on bi-
lateral trade relations. Their evidence points to the large role of political pressure rather
than that of potential consumer animosity in shaping the effect. Rohner et al. (2013a)
argue for another channel: they show that a military conflict in Uganda enforced ethnic
identity and decreased generalized trust toward "out-group" people, which in its turn
inhibited inter-ethnic cooperation and slowed down the subsequent economic recovery.
Hjort (2014) examines the effect of ethnic divisions on team productivity at a Kenyan
flower firm. Using micro-level data and a convincing identification strategy, he argues
that an external political conflict increased the taste for discrimination of a rival ethnic
group, thus resulting in the misallocation of resources and lower productivity of hetero-
geneous teams.2 The analysis performed in my paper complements the existing empirical
work. Direct political pressure, though possible in other economic settings, could hardly
impose restrictions on the open-source cooperation on GitHub. It is also unlikely that
the conflict altered the beliefs of Ukrainian programmers regarding trustworthiness or
quality of Russian colleagues. As in Hjort (2014), it seems that the shift in social pref-
erences (the need to comply with the new identity prescription) can explain the drop in
the Ukrainian-Russian collaboration.
2In recent work, however, Berge et al. (2016) conduct a series of "lab-in-the-field" experiments in
Kenya and find no evidence for ethnic preferences. The authors call for more careful linking of the
observed ethnic bias in behaviour and the actual ethnic bias in preferences.
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the setting: it outlines the con-
flict between Russia and Ukraine, discusses the particularities of online collaboration on
GitHub, and presents the dataset. Sections 3 and 4 explain the empirical strategy and
report the main results. Section 5 discusses the channels of the identity effect. Section 6
concludes.
3.2 The Setting
3.2.1 The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine had still preserved close ties to Russia. In
2012, Russia was Ukraine’s largest trading partner accommodating 25% of all Ukrainian
exports and accounting for 32% of all Ukrainian imports.3 As of the latest census in 2001,
Russians, constituting 17% of Ukrainian population, represented the second largest ethnic
group. Almost 30% of all Ukrainian citizens considered Russian their primary language.4
Practically, however, the vast majority of the Ukrainian population has been bilingual,
and since the Ukrainian independence in 1991, no major ethnicity- or language-based
conflict had ever occurred.
The internal crisis in Ukraine burst out in November 2013, when the former president
Viktor Yanukovych suspended preparations for an association agreement with the Euro-
pean Union. This unilateral decision, which contradicted the previously promised policy,
became the impetus for the series of so-called Euromaidan protests in November - Febru-
ary 2014. The protesters called for the resignation of Yanukovych and the government,
with primary accusations being corruption and abuse of power. The protests culminated
in February 2014 with intensive fights between protesters and police. In late February
2014, Yanukovych fled the country and a new government led by the opposition leaders
came into office.
3http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/UKR/Year/2012/Summary.
4According to the latest available census data: http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/.
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Meanwhile, anti-Euromaidan demonstrations started in Crimea and Eastern regions of
Ukraine. There, the apparent impetus was given by the Parliament’s vote (on the second
day after Yanukovych fled) to abolish the Law on the State Language Policy. This
law was adopted under the rule of Yanukovych and effectively gave Russian the status
of the second state language in regions where at least 10% of the population reported
Russian as their mother tongue. Although this decision never came in force, it easily
became one of the headlines of the pro-Russian propaganda. In the end of February
2014, during clashes between pro- and anti-Euromaidan supporters in Crimea, troops
without insignia (who turned out to be Russian military) silently took control over the
Supreme Council of Crimea and the major military bases on the peninsula. After that,
the Crimean parliament voted for a new government led by Sergey Aksyonov, the leader
of the Russian Unity party. On March 16, 2014, the new Crimean government held a
Referendum. According to the officially reported figures, the turn-out reached 83.1%, and
96.77% of the voters supported the government’s proposal first, to declare independence
from Ukraine and second, to become part of Russia.
The Referendum marked the beginning of the severe crisis between Ukraine and Rus-
sia. Shortly after the Crimean events, pro-Russian governments in Luhansk and Donetsk
regions declared their independence from Ukraine. In April 2014, active military ac-
tions (Donbass War) between the separatists and the regular Ukrainian army began. In
February 2015, after the peace negotiations in Minsk, both parties agreed to seize fire.
Effectively, however, irregular fighting still takes place with both sides accusing each
other of violating the peace agreements. According to the report of UNCHR, the war
has already resulted in over 10,000 casualties, more than 22,000 wounded, and 1.4 mil-
lion displaced persons.5 Although the international institutions classify the war in the
Eastern Ukraine as an "internal conflict", Russia is often accused of sending own troops
and of supplying the separatists. In January 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament voted on
officially calling Russia the "aggressor country".
For the Ukrainian population, the conflict with Russia came unexpectedly. Figure 3.1
illustrates changing attitudes of Ukrainians and Russians toward each other. While in
5http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20496LangID=E
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Figure 3.1: Dynamics of the Positive Attitudes of the Russian and the Ukrainian Popu-
lations Towards Each Other
Notes: The graph plots the percent of the Ukrainian and the Russian Population who have positive and very positive
attitudes towards the other country. Source: Kiev International Institute of Sociology
February 2014, more than 80% Ukrainians had still reported to have a positive attitude
toward Russia, in the next poll conducted in June 2014, this number had dropped to
50%. As of the latest report available (November 2015), the share of Ukrainians with a
positive attitude toward Russia stays below 40%.
Unsurprisingly, the conflict had direct economic consequences. In 2015, Ukrainian exports
to Russia dropped to constitute 12.1% of all Ukrainian exports, whereas the share of
Russian imports declined to 20%.6 Bilateral economic sanctions and increased tariff
protection introduced and reinforced throughout 2014-2015 had directly contributed to
the decline. Hence, for general economic collaboration, it is impossible to separate the
effects related to changes in people’s attitudes (identities) from those imposed by political
decisions. I try to overcome this problem by exploiting the setting where external factors,
such as sanctions, should not play a role - the online open-source platform GitHub.
3.2.2 GitHub
GitHub is a web-based repository hosting service, launched in 2007. It offers the infras-
tructure to store and to share software projects and provides several collaboration features
such as code review, bug tracking, feature requests, task management, and wikis. As of
6http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=UA
76
From Friends to Foes
April 2016, GitHub reports having more than 14 million users and more than 35 mil-
lion repositories (projects), making it the largest host of source code in the world. The
projects on GitHub can be initiated by individuals as well as by companies. The products
may be aimed at end users or at developers. Users can choose between public and private
repositories. GitHub provides the latter on the paid basis and allows restricting access
to the general public. Project’s founders can choose from a variety of licences to protect
their code and to stipulate sharing rules.7
To begin working on GitHub, a person first registers as a user. During the registration,
users choose their login and optionally report their name, location (in most cases, city),
company, and biography. To start a project, a user creates a repository to store all
source codes and related materials. Every project can have only one owner. The project
owner then invites other GitHub users to collaborate, by offering them to become project
members. Alternatively, an interested user can signal his willingness to become a project
member by starting to contribute to the project (McDonald and Goggins, 2013). Project
members have the right to copy (in GitHub slang: fork) the code to their own repositories,
directly modify the source code (in GitHub slang: commit) in the master repository,
open and close issues related to the project. They can also remove themselves from
the project without the agreement of the project owner. All other users, who are not
project members, can copy the project’s source code, report bugs and other issues, and
suggest their own modifications (in GitHub slang: pull requests). The project owner or
other project members then review these proposals and decide on whether to accept them
or not. If a pull request is approved, the proposed modification is merged to the source
code. Every GitHub user can observe who, when, and how much contributed to a project,
provided the project is public. The profile page of every user displays projects he/she
contributes to, together with the timeline of commits. Moreover, upon interest, users can
directly examine written codes of each other. This feature makes GitHub a collaboration
environment with low information asymmetry and low free-riding opportunities. Quality
and quantity of contributions by each project member or external contributer can be
directly observed. Apart from the collaboration environment, GitHub also offers some
7 The available licences range from GNU General Puplic License, which literally make the source
code open to anyone to the more restrictive Apache Licenses.
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features of a social network. Users can get updates on the activities of other users they
choose to "follow". Similarly to the "like" button on the Facebook, users can "star" an
interesting project on GitHub or "watch" it to receive project updates.
Motivations of GitHub users differ.8 Economic research, starting with the works by Lerner
and Tirole (2001, 2005) and followed, among others, by Belenzon and Schankerman
(2008) and Hergueux and Jacquemet (2015) aimed at identifying motivation of open-
source contributors. Programmers can be driven by pure economic incentives (software
companies pay for working on the open-source or the platform is used to launch own
new product), career concerns (contributing to the open-source increases programmer’s
visibility), utilitarian needs (developing software for own purposes), reciprocity, or pure
altruism. Whereas, motivations of open-source contributors vary, the utility from their
work should relate to the success of the projects they are contributing to. The commonly
accepted measures of success are the number of commits, the number of committers,
and the number of forks (Kalliamvakou et al., 2014; McDonald and Goggins, 2013).
Apart from that, GitHub combines a variety of activity indicators including stars, forks,
commits, follows, and page views to construct ranks of projects and users. The ranks are
updated in real-time and are visible to every one interested.9
3.2.3 Dataset
The main dataset is the data dump from the GitHub platform. I work with a snapshot
of the GitHub database as of June 2016.10 The database records all activities, which
happen on the platform, such as user registration, project creation, adding commits,
issues, comments, etc.11 In the analysis, I use several tables from this database. The table
"Users" contains all users ever registered on the GitHub. The table "Projects" records all
repositories created at the GitHub. The tables "Commits" and "Issues" track activities
8It should be noted, that substantial amount of GitHub users do not really collaborate, but rather
use the platform for storage purposes. Consequently, many GitHub projects have only one committer. I
exclude these cases from my analysis
9https://github.com/trending
10downloaded from http://ghtorrent.org/
11The activities are only observable for public repositories.
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related to projects and users, such as modifications of source code, adding comments,
exchanging messages, bug tracking and fixing. I can also observe pull requests and their
approval/decline, stars, and followers. Through the unique identifiers of users, projects,
commits, and other events I can link the tables together. As the dataset is huge (over
300 GB), I make several restrictions to construct the working data sample. First, I
consider only projects with at least two contributors and only those users who have at
least one commit. Second, I select only those projects and events, which are related to
users from the countries of interest (Ukraine, Russia, and several countries for the control
group, which will be discussed later). I determine nationality based on self-reported user
locations and country codes provided by GitHub.12 Third, I aggregate all activity events
(per user and project) by month. In order to control for overall activity levels of particular
projects and users, I also calculate their total monthly activity levels (number of commits,
issues, etc.). Table C.1 in the Appendix summarizes the main data tables used in the
analysis.
Most events in my dataset are automatically recorded by GitHub. Therefore, the mea-
surement error related to the timing of different events (user registration, project creation,
commits, etc.) is small. For each activity, GitHub generates a timestamp. Sometimes,
dumps of huge databases such as GitHub suffer from "holes" in data (for example, due
to a connectivity problem during the data dump, some observations may be missing).
However, I do not expect this problem to affect activities of Ukrainian and Russian pro-
grammers differently from all other GitHub users. The main measurement error for my
analysis can occur due to misreporting of user locations, which I use to identify the
programmers’ nationalities. I observe locations as of the data dump (June 2016). Part
of the attenuation bias will come from users reporting wrong or non-existing locations.
It is more problematic if some users adjusted their locations after the conflict (for ex-
ample, Ukrainian programmers who still wanted to work with Russians without being
"blamed" by others could have opened additional accounts or Russian users could have
masked their real locations). Under such selective mis-reporting, I would get an upper-
bound estimate of the effect’s magnitude due to misclassifying users with the highest
12To clean self-reported locations (as they can be in any language/spelling), I use Google geocoding
API, which generates the standard English name and geographical coordinates.
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benefits from the collaboration. Yet, given the nature of GitHub, such misreporting is
unlikely. First, reputation building is important for most users, and it accrues through
the cumulated number of commits, followers, and stars, thus lowering incentives to hold
multiple accounts. Second, complete activity history is usually observable, making it
difficult for users to hide their information. In addition, I can make use of country codes,
automatically generated by GitHub and not subject to user control.13
3.2.4 Descriptives
This section presents the descriptive statistics on activities of Ukrainian and Russian
programmers on GitHub. Figure 3.2 below and Figure C.1 in the Appendix illustrate
that projects from Ukraine and Russia follow the dynamics of other GitHunb projects
very closely. Figure 3.2 shows the monthly count of newly registered projects by region. I
assign projects to regions: Ukraine, Russia, EU, or Overseas (US, Canada, Japan) based
on the location of the project owner. Figure C.1 presents the count of "star" events.14
To generate these measures, I count how many stars projects from Ukraine, Russia, EU,
and Overseas regions received per month. New projects create demand for potential
contributions, while the amount of stars proxies projects’ quality. There seems to be no
Russia- or Ukraine-specific demand or quality shock during the analysed period. The
inclusion of month fixed effects can absorb general changes in project activity level.15
Figures C.2 and C.3 in the Appendix and Figure 3.3 below refer to collaborative activ-
ities of Ukrainian and Russian users on GitHub. I use the number of commits (source
code modifications) as the main activity measure of GitHub users. Both Russian and
Ukrainian users do not seem to be less active after March 2014: their number of commits
increases almost every month. While the share of Russian commits to Ukrainian projects
stays rather stable throughout 2013-2015 (commits to Ukrainian projects represent about
0.6% of all Russian commits), the share of Ukrainian commits to Russian projects drops
13The country code information is, however, not available for all users.
14A "star" event is recorded whenever a user puts a star (a like) on a particular project.
15One may wonder about the observable drops in the time-series around May-December 2014 and
July-December 2015. I am not aware of GitHub-specific changes in policy or technology, which could
have provoked it. Most likely, these holes are due to technical problems during the data dump.
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Figure 3.2: Registration of New Projects on GitHub
Notes: The graph plots the amount of newly registered projects on GitHub. The region is determined by the location
of the project owner. The data is smoothened with a 3-month moving average filter. To accommodate different activity
levels, the left y-axis accounts for Ukrainian and Russian projects, the right y-axis - for EU and Overseas (US, Canada,
Japan) projects. The vertical black line corresponds to March 2014 (The Crimean Referendum).
substantially (from, on average, 4.5% before the conflict to 1.5% afterwards). Until the
end of 2015, there had been no signs of recovery. I will further validate this descriptive
Figure 3.3: Commits by Ukrainian Users to Russian, EU, and Overseas Projects
Notes: A "commit" event is recorded whenever a user modifies the source code of a project. The graph shows the commits
by Ukrainian users to projects owned by Russian, EU, and Overseas users as a share of total Ukrainian commits. The
monthly data on commits is smoothened with a 3-month moving average filter. The vertical black line corresponds to
March 2014 (The Crimean Referendum).
result with a regression analysis and will argue that changes in identity prescriptions
could have led to this drop in the collaboration of Ukrainian and Russian users.
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3.3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical analysis comprises two parts. First, I analyse overall changes in the col-
laboration between Ukrainian and Russian programmers. Second, I focus on the Github
projects that prior to the conflict received contributions from Russian and Ukrainian pro-
grammers (projects with mixed teams) and investigate how their performance changed
after the conflict relative to a comparable group of other GitHub projects.
3.3.1 Estimating the Effect of the Conflict: Change in the Col-
laboration between Ukrainian and Russian Programmers
To estimate the effect of the conflict on the collaboration between Ukrainian and Russian
programmers, I focus on changes in the number of bilateral commits. A commit means
any modification to the source code of a project. In comparison to other contributions
(reporting issues, tracking bugs, adding comments), it is of the greatest value to any
project and serves as the direct measure of the project’s progress (McDonald and Goggins,
2013). From a user perspective, commits represent their most visible activity and serve as
the measure of their productivity. GitHub summarizes user commits by project directly
on user profile pages (see Figure C.6 in the Appendix). To create the baseline sample,
I select all commits done by Ukrainian and Russian programmers over 2012-2015. I
also add commits done by programmers from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Poland, and Czech
Republic, who will later constitute the control group. Through the unique identifiers I
link commits to user and project data. For each project and user, I also generate several
monthly performance measures. For projects, these include total number of commits
from all users, number of project members, and received stars. For users, I obtain total
number of commits, total number of project memberships, and total number of followers.
On GitHub, both internal (project members) and external users can submit commits to
a particular project. In the baseline sample, I pool both internal and external commits
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together.16 I aggregate the dataset by summing commits on month, user, and project
level. I further restrict the sample to include only those commits where user ID and
project owner ID are different to focus on collaborative activities (the costs of contributing
to own rather than to others’ projects are very different and are not directly comparable).
I thus drop more than 60% of all observations, which leaves me with 85,138 user-project-
month observations for Ukrainian programmers and 202,434 observations for the Russian
programmers. I have 1650 observations (user-project-month) for commits by 600 unique
Ukrainian programmers to Russian projects and 1484 observations for commits by 611
unique Russian programmers to Ukrainian projects. As the main outcome variable, I
employ the number of Ukrainian-Russian collaborations, i.e. the number of commits by
all Ukrainian users to projects owned by Russians and vice versa. To this end, I further
aggregate the dataset by month, committer country, and project region.
My baseline empirical strategy builds on a difference-in-difference approach and evalu-
ates changes in the Ukrainian-Russian collaboration patterns caused by the conflict over
Crimea and the Donbass region. I use monthly data from 2012 to 2015 and set March
2014 (the month of the Crimean Referendum) as the start of the conflict. I run separate
regressions for the Ukrainian and for the Russian sample of commits (based on committer
country).17 Below, I describe the estimated regressions for the Ukrainian sample. The
regressions for the Russian sample are identical.
The baseline difference-in-difference regression has the following form:
Commitspt = β0 + β1 ∗RUp ∗ POSTt + β2 ∗Xpt + γt + δp + pt (3.1)
16The technical difference between the two is that internal commits can appear in the master project,
whereas external commits must be linked to the local copies (forks) of the master project (the external
users do not have access rights to directly modify the source code). Because I can observe the "parent"
for each forked project, I can link all the commits to the actual master projects.
17Alternatively, I could pool the commits together, but given cross-country differences, the separation
allows for more precise estimation of fixed effects and controls. Besides, from the descriptive evidence,
the effect of the conflict on Ukrainian and Russian commits is not symmetric.
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In (1), the independent variable Commitspt is the natural logarithm of commits by
Ukrainian users to projects from a given region p in a month t.18 Project regions (Ukraine,
Russia, Post-USSR, EU, Overseas, Other) correspond to the location of project owners.
Commits to Russian projects represent the "treatment" group. The coefficient β1 is the
classic difference-in-difference estimator (as in Duflo (2001) or Moser and Voena (2012)).
Xpt is the vector of variables, which control for region-specific time-varying demand
effects: number of active projects and number of stars. γt are month fixed effects, which
control for time shocks in the activity of Ukrainian programmers and possible "holes" in
the dataset. δp are project-region fixed effects.
The difference-in-difference estimator β1 is consistent provided common pre-trends and
the absence of time-varying unobservable factors, which independently from the conflict
could influence the collaboration patterns between Ukrainian and Russian programmers.
To account for the first requirement, I center the data around quarter 1, 2014 and allow
treatment coefficients to vary across quarters before and after the conflict.
Commitspt = β0 +
6∑
t=−6,t6=−1
β1,t ∗RUp ∗Qt + β2 ∗Xpt + γt + δp + pt (3.2)
In (2), β1,t are the interaction coefficients between quarterly time dummies and the in-
dicator for commits to Russian projects. The reference period (omitted interaction) is
quarter 4, 2013. All other controls and fixed effects are the same as in the Specification
1. In the absence of pre-trends, the pre-conflict interaction coefficients should be zero.
The Specification 2 also allows to see how the effect evolves over time: do Ukrainian
programmers immediately respond to the conflict? Does the effect persist?
Another threat to the consistency of β1 is that the collaboration patterns with Russia,
relative to other regions, in the absence of the conflict would change anyway, for ex-
ample, due to a quality shock to Russian projects. To account for this, I estimate a
triple difference regression. I select a control group of commits by users from several
other countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Poland, and the Czech Republic) with activity
levels similar to Ukrainian programmers. Whereas the time-varying quality and the eco-
18Here and further in the text, whenever I refer to the natural logarithm of a variable x, I mean
ln(x+ 1). Adding 1 allows to keep observations with zeros.
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nomic considerations regarding Russian projects should be similar across all countries,
the conflict-related effects are likely to be stronger for Ukrainian users. The estimated
equation has the following form:
Commitscpt = β0 + β11 ∗ UAcRUp ∗ POSTt + β12 ∗RUp ∗ POSTt+
+β2 ∗Xpt + γct + δcp + cpt
(3.3)
In (3), the level of observation is at the committer-region (c), project-region (p), and
month (t). c includes Ukraine and the above control countries. p includes all the c
countries, Russia, EU, Overseas, and Other regions. β11 is the triple-difference estimator,
measuring the effect of the conflict on Ukrainian commits to Russian projects relative
to other non-Ukrainian commits. β12 captures (if any) general changes in commits to
Russian projects after the conflict. Xpt are time-varying controls of the project-regions.
γct - committer-region by month fixed effects. δcp committer-region by project-region
specific effects.
3.3.2 Estimating the Effect of the Conflict on Project Perfor-
mance
Did the change in collaboration result in real productivity effects? In the next step,
I evaluate the consequences of the conflict for project performance. The difference-in-
difference approach compares the performance of the affected projects before and after
the conflict relative to the control group. As affected (treated), I consider projects that
received both Russian and Ukrainian commits before March 2014. I start with a sample
of GitHub projects that received at least one commit by users from Ukraine, Russia, and
the above control countries in 2012-2015. I further restrict the sample: first, I drop all
projects with only one committer (to focus on collaborative work only) and, second, I
consider only project that were active throughout February 2013-February 2014. This
leaves a sample of 30,808 unique projects. I then assign treatment status if at least
one Russian and one Ukrainian programmer collaborated on a project within the same
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month.19 With the disaggregated data, I can identify all the projects with Russian and
Ukrainian collaborations, without restricting the nationality of project owners. In the
treated sample, owners from EU, Russia, and Ukraine account each for about 10% of
projects, Overseas users own 18% of the projects, and about 50% of owners are located
in other countries.
As Table C.2 in the Appendix illustrates, the treated projects are very different from an
average GitHub project: on average, they are twice as old, have more project members,
and over February 2013-February 2014 they received several times more commits and
stars. This is due to the fact that despite seemingly low collaboration costs, the majority
of GitHub projects, similar to scientific research or patent production, feature strong
localisation bias. Only projects of the highest quality manage to attract committers
from a different location or company. Therefore, average local GitHub projects cannot
constitute a reasonable control for the treatment group. In order to identify comparable
projects, I apply the coarsened exact matching procedure (see Blackwell et al. (2009))
to match projects on age, programming language, region of owner (Russia, Ukraine, EU,
Overseas, Other), number of project members, and number of commits over February
2013-February 2014. I manage to match 690 treated projects (from 272 bins). Columns 3
and 4 in the Table C.2 illustrate that the pre-conflict descriptives for the matched sample
are now well balanced.
I estimate the following difference-in-difference regression:
Yjt = β0 + β11 ∗RU ∗ TREATj ∗ POSTt + β12 ∗ UA ∗ TREATj ∗ POSTt+
+β13 ∗ TREATj ∗ POSTt + δpt + TREATj ∗ κp + β2 ∗Xjt + jt
(3.4)
In Specification (3.4), Yjt represents one of a project’s j monthly performance measures:
total number of commits (project’s progress) or number of stars (project’s popularity),
both in natural logarithms. The main coefficients of interest are β11, β12, and β13. β13
measures whether performance of all treated projects changed relative to the matched
control group after the conflict. For example, if some users decided to leave their projects
19Alternatively, I define the continuous treatment by calculating the shares of Ukrainian and Russian
commits to total project commits within one year preceding the conflict and construct the treatment
variable as the min{shareua, shareru}.
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to not work together with people from a "hostile" country or if coordination costs within
a Russian-Ukrainian team increased, this could have negatively impacted the flow of
commits and, consequently, the project’s popularity. β11 and β12 allow for a different
treatment effect for projects owned by Russians or by Ukrainians. δpt are project-region
by month fixed effects. As previously, region p is defined by the location of the project’s
owner. TREATj ∗ κp is the interaction between the treatment indicator and the owner’s
region fixed effect to account for possible region-specific differences of treated projects at
the baseline. Xjt are project-specific controls, such as owner type (company or individual)
or the pre-conflict number of commits. Provided the matching of the treatment and
control projects was successful, the inclusion of terms TREATj ∗ κp, and β2 ∗Xjt should
not affect the coefficients of interest.
3.4 Results
The section presents the results of the empirical analysis. First, I show that the con-
flict negatively impacted the collaboration between Ukrainian and Russian programmers.
Second, I provide evidence for the role of national identity behind this result. Third, I in-
vestigate the effect of the conflict on performance of existing projects with mixed Russian-
Ukrainian teams. The regressions confirm the descriptive evidence that the number of
Ukrainian commits to Russian projects dropped after March 2014. Moreover, the conflict
negatively affected the overall performance of Russian projects, which prior to the conflict
received contributions from both Ukrainian and Russian programmers.
3.4.1 Change in Collaboration Patterns
The regression analysis aims to illustrate that the observable drop in the number of
Ukrainian commits to Russian projects (Figure 3.3) is directly caused by the conflict
rather than by some other Ukraine- or Russia-specific shocks. In this Sub-Section I
focus on changes in Ukrainian contributions to Russian projects. The relative number
of Russian commits to Ukrainian projects did not change after March 2014. While I
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cannot establish the true reason for this asymmetric effect with the observational data, it
could be that the identity shock affected only Ukrainian programmers. Possibly, Russian
programmers, unlike an average Russian (who participated in the survey from Figure
3.1), did not change the attitudes toward Ukraine after the burst-out of the conflict.
Table 3.1 reports the results of the baseline difference-in-difference estimations. The out-
come of interest is the natural logarithm of commits by users from one region (committer-
region) to projects owned by users in another region (project-region). The data covers
January 2012-December 2015, with the post period starting in March 2014. All specifi-
cations include month- and committer-region by project-region fixed effects. The main
explanatory variable is the dummy UAcRUpPOST , which equals one for Ukrainian com-
mits to Russian projects after March 2014. Columns 1 and 2 present the results of
the baseline difference-in-difference regressions, where I consider only commits made by
Ukrainian programmers to projects from different regions: Ukraine, Russia, EU, Over-
seas, and Other. Specification 1 includes only fixed effects and Specification 2 additionally
controls for changes in demand for commits across different regions. Both specifications
yield very similar estimates of the UAcRUpPOST dummy (−0.8 log points) suggesting
that the number of Ukrainian commits to Russian projects in the post period was about
60% smaller than what Russian projects would have received if the conflict did not take
place.20 To ensure that this result is not driven by the general decline of Russian projects
I estimate triple-difference regressions where I compare changes in Ukrainian commits to
those from similar countries. It is important to keep in mind that the triple-difference co-
efficient may be overstated if Russian project owners started to more actively attract users
from the control countries to compensate for a possible loss of Ukrainian collaborators.
On another side, it may represent a lower-bound magnitude, if the Russian-Ukrainian
conflict also negatively affected the attitudes toward Russia in other countries. Spec-
ification 3 includes only Belarusian programmers as the control group. The estimate
of the UAcRUpPOST dummy effectively does not change. Specification 4 extends the
control group to Kazakhstan, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The magnitude of the
201− e−0.8 ∼ 0.55
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coefficient drops to 0.6, but remains highly significant.21 Specification 5 repeats the same
regression as in 4 but drops all commits from the Eastern regions of Ukraine, which
were directly affected by war. If before the conflict these regions accounted for the large
portion of the collaborations with Russia, the observed drop in commits could be caused
by mechanic destruction of the infrastructure. Dropping Luhansk, Donetsk, and Crimea
regions, however, leaves the coefficient intact.
Table 3.1: The Effect of the Conflict on Ukrainian Commits to Russian Projects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Commits Commits Commits Commits Commits
Diff-in-diff Diff-in-diff Triple diff Triple diff Triple diff
UAcRUpPOST -0.838*** -0.820*** -0.807*** -0.607*** -0.609**
(0.167) (0.166) (0.298) (0.232) (0.240)
RUpPOST -0.00648 -0.214 -0.214
(0.247) (0.161) (0.161)
New projects, 3m 0.461 0.714** 0.528** 0.515**
(0.326) (0.279) (0.233) (0.233)
Stars, 3m 0.710 0.0687 -0.206 -0.180
(0.600) (0.495) (0.480) (0.481)
Observations 288 288 575 863 863
R2 0.953 0.954 0.938 0.955 0.955
Month FE yes yes
Project-region FE yes yes
Committer-region*project-region FE yes yes yes
Committer-region*month FE yes yes yes
Extended control group yes yes
Without Crimea and Donbass yes
Robust yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is ln(commits + 1), where commits is the number of commits from
programmers in one region (c) to projects from another region (p). UAcRUpPOST - a dummy for commits by Ukrainian
programmers to Russian projects. POST period starts after March 2014. New projects, 3m and Stars, 3m - the number
of new and "starred" projects from a project-region over the last 3 months. In columns 1 and 2, the sample includes
commits by Ukrainian programmers to projects from different regions (Ukraine, Russia, EU, Overseas, Other). In columns
3, the sample includes commits by Ukrainian and Belarusian programmers; columns 4-5 in addition include commits from
other control countries. Column 5 drops commits from programmers in Crimea and Donbass before aggregating Ukrainian
commits.
Table C.3 in the Appendix presents the same regressions but for a different outcome:
the monthly number of unique user-project collaborations between two particular re-
gions. YUA/RU/t for example, corresponds to the number of Ukrainian users committing
to Russian projects in a month t. This measure, hence, can serve as an extensive mar-
gin of collaboration. The estimated coefficients in all specifications remain negative and
21The obtained coefficient may include both biases discussed above: Belarusian users could easily
substitute for Ukrainian programmers on Russian projects, while the attitudes toward Russia could also
significantly worsen in Poland and the Czech Republic after March 2014, given already low popularity
of Russia in these countries.
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strongly significant, but are statistically significantly smaller in magnitude compared to
the results in Table 3.1. This suggests that the conflict had a stronger effect on the
intensity of collaboration.22 One explanation for such result is that the conflict increased
communication costs between Ukrainian and Russian programmers (i.e. psychological
costs of communicating with someone who shares opposing views). Given the collabo-
rative nature of GitHub (in many cases commits have to be approved by another team
member before being integrated) these additional communication costs would inhibit co-
ordination and, hence, reduce the amount of commits. Alternatively, the conflict could
have lowered the preference of Ukrainian programmers for the identification with Rus-
sian projects and made them, for example, less willing to accept project membership. In
the open-source environment, where non-monetary incentives (among them, membership
commitments) play an important role, this change could lead to lower average commits.
I will provide additional evidence for this explanation in Section 3.5.
Figure 3.4: Commits of Ukrainian Programmers to Russian Projects: Quarterly Treat-
ment Effect of the Conflict
Notes: The graph plots the interaction coefficients between quarterly time dummies and the indicator for Ukrainian
commits to the Russian projects. Dependent variable: ln(commits+1) aggregated by month and project-region. Controls:
month and project-region fixed effects. The vertical black line corresponds to the reference period (Q4 2013).
Finally, Figure 3.4 reports the check for the absence of pre-trends in Ukrainian commits
to Russian projects. I use a similar specification as presented in Table 3.1, but instead of
using a single dummy UAcRUpPOST , I interact the indicator for the Ukrainian-Russian
commits with the quarterly time dummies, which I center around the first quarter of 2014.
22The mean of commits is equal to 2,540, whereas the mean of user-project collaborations is 350.
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Figure C.4 in the Appendix presents a similar graph but for a triple difference (relative
to the commits from the control group countries). Both figures show a clear absence of
pre-trends. They are also illustrative about the timing of the effect: collaboration drops
rapidly over the first two quarters following the start of the conflict, and over the analysed
period (until December 2015) there had been no signs of recovery.
3.4.2 Evidence for the Identity Effects
The above results establish that the conflict indeed reduced the Ukrainian-Russian collab-
oration on GitHub. It is, yet, not enough to argue that this effect was due to the identity.
In this Sub-Section, I, first, investigate the possibility of alternative (pure economic) ex-
planations that could have led to the observed results. Second, I provide additional
evidence, which supports the identity hypothesis.
It might be that the main motivation to commit to a particular project is to increase own
visibility in front of a potential employer. If Russian companies lose their attractiveness
due to the economic crisis that burst out in 2014, fewer Ukrainian programmers would
seek a job in Russia. The incentives to contribute to Russian projects would diminish,
leading to a smaller number of commits. This could still represent the indirect effect
of the conflict (introduced sanctions against Russia account for some of the economic
decrease), however, it is not related to the identity. The triple-difference estimations,
with users from other countries as the control group, can partly alleviate these concerns.
Career opportunities in Russia for Belarusian or Kazakh programmers due to language
similarity and the intensity of previous relations should be very similar to those of their
Ukrainian colleagues. Therefore, if the bad economic situation makes Russian companies
and projects less attractive, it should also influence the flow of contributions from the
control countries. The data, however, does not confirm it: the estimated coefficient
RUpPOST , which measures changes in commits from the control countries to Russian
projects after March 2014, is not significant (see Tables 3.1 and C.3).
Another possibility is that Ukrainian programmers, who used to work on GitHub for
Russian companies, were affected by real or anticipated increase in bilateral transaction
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costs. Higher uncertainty about future collaboration costs (for example, due to possible
interruptions in banking services between Russia and Ukraine) could make Ukrainian
programmers withdraw from Russian projects. If this were the case, the triple-difference
check would not suffice. To alleviate this concern, I compare changes in Ukrainian com-
mits to projects owned by Russian companies vs. those owned by individual users. If
bilateral transaction costs mattered, I would expect a stronger decrease in commits to
companies. I reestimate regressions from Table 3.1 for the sample of Ukrainian commits
including an additional dummy Company ∗ RUpPOST . This dummy allows a different
treatment effect for Ukrainian commits directed at Russian companies. Yet, as the results
from Table C.4 in the Appendix indicate, there are no differential effects for Ukrainian
collaborations with Russian companies compared to individuals.
To provide more support for the identity effect, I analyse differences among Ukrainian
programmers, for whom the role of external factors should be the same, but the identity
effects could be different. One dimension to vary is the strength of national identity.
The larger the importance of the national identity for an individual, the more he or
she will react to changing prescriptions.23 While the true national identity cannot be
observed, the bilingualism of Ukrainians provides an opportunity to construct a proxy for
it. Practically, all Ukrainians are fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian languages. Both
languages are widely applied in everyday and professional life. Moreover, at least, prior
to March 2014 there was no negative stigma attached to speaking Russian. Therefore,
if an individual reveals to prefer Ukrainian as the first language it could be considered
as a signal of a stronger national identity, rather than a consequence of other strategic
considerations.
Using GitHub data I can identify the preferred language of Ukrainian programmers. Upon
registration on the platform, users report their names and locations and can do it in any
language they choose. For a number of Ukrainian cities and first names, the Russian and
the Ukrainian versions are slightly different and can be easily distinguished from each
23For instance, in a recent experimental study Mechtel et al. (2016) show that the revealed strength
of identification predicts subsequent allocation choices.
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other.24 By using spelling differences of 10 male names and of 11 major Ukrainian cities,
I manage to classify about 70% of Ukrainian users: 34% as having a stronger Ukrainian
identity (prefer Ukrainian language), 38% with a weaker identity (prefer Russian), for
28% of Ukrainian programmers the preferred language could not be established.
Table 3.2: The Effect of the Conflict on Ukrainian Commits to Russian Projects: Strong
Ukrainian Identity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Collab. Commits Collab. Commits
UA identity*RUpPOST -0.113 -0.760*** -0.0924 -0.709**
(0.129) (0.294) (0.122) (0.290)
RUpPOST -0.288*** -0.230 -0.310*** -0.292*
(0.0996) (0.180) (0.0945) (0.175)
New projects, 3m 1.076*** 0.967*** 1.019*** 0.916***
(0.122) (0.219) (0.123) (0.219)
Stars, 3m 0.0701 0.239 0.108 0.291
(0.179) (0.315) (0.178) (0.313)
Observations 860 860 860 860
R2 0.960 0.923 0.960 0.923
Month FE yes yes yes yes
Identity*project-region FE yes yes yes yes
Without Donbass and Crimea yes yes
Robust yes yes yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 3 is ln(collaborations + 1); in Columns 2 and 4 - ln(commits + 1).
UAidentityRUpPOST - a dummy for commits by Ukrainian programmers with a stronger Ukrainian identity to Russian
projects. POST period starts after March 2014. Baseline group - other Ukrainian programmers. New projects, 3m and
Stars, 3m - the number of new and "starred" projects from a project-region over the last 3 months. All specifications
include identity ∗project− region fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 drop commits from programmers in Crimea and Donbass
before aggregating Ukrainian commits.
Table 3.2 repeats the baseline estimations by allowing a differential treatment effect
for users with a stronger Ukrainian identity. According to the estimates, these users
indeed react stronger to the conflict relative to other Ukrainian programmers. This effect
is mostly pronounced at the intensive margin of collaboration: the average number of
commits per user decreases.
3.4.3 Effect on Project Performance
This Sub-Section investigates the consequences of the conflict on the performance of
projects with mixed teams. For this analysis I look at the project level of the Github
24For example, the spelling of Kiev (Russian) or Kyiv (Ukrainian) or of the name Alexander (Russian)
or Olexander (Ukrainian).
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dataset. This analysis complements the above results, by first, focusing on the effects for
projects that already existed prior to the conflict and second, by being able to identify
the effects for all projects (also administered by owners from countries other than Russia
and Ukraine) where Ukrainian and Russian programmers used to work together.
Table 3.3 reports the estimation results. In all the specifications I use monthly project-
level data from 690 "treated" projects and 690 matched "control" projects identified
as described in the section 3.3.2. The control group comprises similar projects, to
which either Ukrainian or Russian programmers contribute, but which did not have a
Russian-Ukrainian collaboration within one year preceding the conflict. The dummy
TREATjPOSTt shows the difference between treated and untreated projects after the
conflict. In addition, I allow for the differential treatment effects for projects owned by
Russians and by Ukrainians. For the third (neutral) countries’ projects, the conflict’s ef-
fect should come mainly through additional communication costs and lower coordination
between Russian and Ukrainian team members. For projects owned by either Russian
or Ukrainian users, the conflict effect has an additional channel: it imposes the stigma
costs of helping the "enemy". Moreover, GitHub displays all open projects, to which a
user contributes, on the profile page, thus amplifying the public image concerns. All
specifications include month by project-region fixed effect, treat by project-region fixed
effect, and programming language fixed effect. I conservatively cluster standard errors
by project-region and programming language.
Column 1 displays the effect for the total number of commits to a project. Total number
of commits captures the progress of a project and can be treated as a proxy of success.
While there seems to be in general no difference between treated and untreated projects,
the treatment effect for projects owned by Russians is negative. While in the presented
Specification the coefficient is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.153), the coefficient
gains significance with less conservative standard errors. Figure 3.5 shows the absence
of pre-trends and reveals that the negative effect for Russian projects becomes sizable
in about a year after the conflict started. Column 2 shows that, consistently with the
results in the previous section, Ukrainian programmers significantly stronger reduce their
commits to the treated Russian projects. Although, in response, the amount of contri-
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Table 3.3: The Effect of the Conflict on Project Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total commits Commits by UA Commits by RU Stars
RU_TREATjPOSTt -0.270 -0.173*** 0.219 -0.0869*
(0.189) (0.0589) (0.190) (0.0465)
UA_TREATjPOSTt 0.140 0.253 -0.0124 -0.112
(0.384) (0.220) (0.181) (0.175)
TREATjPOSTt 0.0271 -0.0798** -0.0830 0.0477
(0.0950) (0.0370) (0.0537) (0.0365)
Pre-confl. commits 0.701*** 0.0584*** 0.151*** 0.0585***
(0.0231) (0.0111) (0.0179) (0.00984)
Company -0.206*** 0.0256 -0.0736 0.00903
(0.0661) (0.0372) (0.0531) (0.0534)
Observations 31,954 31,954 31,954 31,954
R2 0.544 0.168 0.188 0.080
Treat*project-region FE yes yes yes yes
Month*project-region FE yes yes yes yes
Language FE yes yes yes yes
Robust yes yes yes yes
Clusters 83 83 83 83
Notes: The dependent variable are: Columns 1 ln(total commits+1); Columns 2 and 3 ln(commits by UA or RU users)+1;
Column 4 ln(stars+1). All variables are measured per month RU(UA) TREATjPOST - a post period dummy for treated
projects owned by Russian or Ukrainian programmers; TREATjPOST - a post period dummy for all treated projects.
Pre− confl. commits control for the total number of commits to a project before March 2014. Company - a dummy for
projects owned by companies. All specifications includemonth∗project−region, treat∗project−region, and programming
language fixed effects.
butions from Russian users increases, as column 3 reports, it does not fully compensate
for the reduction.
Another observation, is that both Ukrainian and Russian users commit less to the treated
projects from the third countries. This effect is not strong, but still indicates the pres-
ence of possible communication problems in mixed teams following the conflict. Column
4 compares treated and control projects in terms of their popularity, as measured by
the amount of new stars, which a project receives from other users. As with the total
performance, the coefficient is negative only for the treated Russian projects. This effect
is estimated beyond possible general negative effects, which might arise for all Russian
projects after the start of the conflict. It can be, therefore, attributed to the loss in value
of the treated projects due to lower commits from Ukrainian team members.
95
From Friends to Foes
Figure 3.5: Total Commits to the Affected Russian Projects: Quarterly Treatment Effect
of the Conflict, Triple Difference
Notes: The graph plots the interaction coefficients between quarterly time dummies and the indicator for treated projects
owned by Russian users. Dependent variable: ln(total commits) aggregated by month and project-region. The vertical
black line corresponds to the reference period (Q4 2013).
3.5 Discussion: the Identity Channels
I have provided evidence that the political conflict between Ukraine and Russia has in-
deed modified collaboration patterns among programmers from these countries. Russian
projects, which prior to the conflict received Ukrainian contributions, lost the most. In
this section, I further discuss and provide suggestive evidence for channels, through which
identity seems to affect collaboration between programmers.
Possible channels, often discussed in the literature, include the change in bilateral trust
(beliefs) and the increase in communication costs among team members from conflicting
social groups. In the GitHub setting, trust is not likely to be the cause, as the program-
ming quality and even collaborating skills are directly observable. Every registered user
can view the code written by other programmers, their projects, number of followers,
network, and upon deeper interest, comments, issues, etc. The trust channel would also
result in lower number of commits mainly due to the reduction in new collaborations,
however, the data show that the decrease on the extensive margin is significantly smaller
than that of the intensive.
Another possibility is that the conflict imposed higher (psychological) communication
costs between Ukrainian and Russian team members. Such costs would, for example,
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include poorer communication due to sudden animosity between team members. This
would negatively affect coordination and create iceberg type of costs: for example, a
Ukrainian programmer submits a commit, but due to the lack of proper communication,
this commit is not approved by a Russian team member and not integrated into a project.
This channel would hinder, thus, operations of all teams with Russian-Ukrainian collab-
orations. The magnitude of the effect should increase in the intensity of collaboration.
Moreover, even if the identity shock is one-sided (for example, modifies preferences of
only Ukrainian programmers), the communication channel should symmetrically affect
the contributions of both Ukrainian and Russian programmers. This channel is consistent
with the observed decrease in the intensity of collaboration. Although there is some evi-
dence for this effect from the performance of mixed Ukrainian-Russian teams on projects
from other countries (see Table 3.4, columns 2 and 3), it is not strongly pronounced and
does not affect overall project performance.
The third possibility is that the political conflict with Russia changed the preference
of Ukrainian programmers to identify themselves as contributors to Russian ("hostile")
projects. This could result from the internal change in preferences or by the wish to
follow the new social norm and to avoid public image concerns. If identification with a
project plays a strong incentive role (i.e. caring for project’s success as a whole directly
enters a programmer’s utility), the identity conflict is likely to reduce the flow of com-
mits. The data seems to confirm it: across projects with mixed teams, the amount of
Ukrainian commits falls significantly sharper if projects are owned by Russians. One can
still argue that this result is driven by communication costs, as the intensity of interac-
tion with Russian colleagues is likely to be higher on Russian-owned projects. With the
observational data, I cannot fully rule-out this explanation. However, if the intensity of
communication mattered, I would expect a symmetric reduction from Russian commits
to Ukrainian projects (as they should also be affected by poorer communication), which
does not happen.
A direct way to identify oneself with a project on GitHub is to become this project’s
member. In my sample, on average, project members make 12 modifications to a project’s
source code per month, while external contributors only make 6. Certainly, project
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Figure 3.6: Commits of Ukrainian Programmers to Russian Projects: Project Members
vs. External Contributors
Notes: The graph plots the shares of commits from Ukrainian programmers to Russian projects (in % of total commits
by Ukrainian users). The left axis corresponds to commits by project members. The right axis - to commits by external
users.
membership is not exogenous, but it could potentially represent a strong commitment
device. Decomposition of all Ukrainian commits to Russian projects (Figure 3.6) on those
by project members and by external contributors reveals an interesting picture: while the
relative amount of commits by external contributors does not change and even seems to
increase slightly in 2015, the amount of commits by project members drops sharply.
This result could, at first, be counter-intuitive: project members have the closest ties to
projects and thus should experience the highest costs of leaving them. A closer inspection
of the data, however, shows that this drop is not driven by lower contributions from the
pre-conflict project members, but mainly occurs because fewer Ukrainian programmers
have joined Russian projects as members after March 2014. This observation can then
explain why the effect of the conflict is stronger on the intensive margin: the conflict
changed the composition of Ukrainian contributors to Russian projects by lowering the
share of internal project members, i.e. those with the highest commitment to contribute
to a project. This result also accords with the observed differences in contributions by
Ukrainian users with stronger vs. weaker national identity.
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3.6 Conclusion
This project studies the role that the national identity plays in the performance of inter-
national teams. To conduct the analysis, I use data from GitHub - the world’s largest
open-source platform. For identification, I exploit the sharp aggravation in Russian-
Ukrainian political relations due to the unexpected annexation of Crimea in March 2014.
Following the event, collaboration between Ukrainian and Russian programmers fell sig-
nificantly and was mainly driven by lower contributions of Ukrainian programmers to
Russian projects relative to projects from other regions. This decrease cannot be ex-
plained by infrastructure problems, nor by general lower activity of Ukrainian and Rus-
sian programmers, nor by economic reasons such as higher bilateral transaction costs or
changing career concerns. I provide additional evidence for the role of identity in shap-
ing this effect: Ukrainian programmers identified as having a stronger national identity
react stronger to the conflict relative to other Ukrainian programmers. I then try to
empirically distinguish two channels that might transmit the identity effects. While I
find some evidence that the conflict inhibited communication and coordination among
Russian-Ukrainian team members, the strongest effect seems to come through changes in
the taste of Ukrainian programmers to identify themselves with Russian projects.
This project has policy implications for firms managing or planning to attract diverse
teams. The empirical evidence emphasises the risks of diverse teams due to their exposure
to external factors. My results further show that the identity conflict not only hinders
peer interaction within a diverse team, but also changes the preferences of some team
members towards projects that are associated with a "hostile" social group. Therefore,
in case of an identity-based conflict, having a third "neutral" party to lead team’s work
or enforcing a common project identity might be beneficial.
My results can be also relevant for open-source platforms, such as GitHub, that aim at
facilitating international "barrier-free" collaboration. One option would be to hide the
country of origin information before the real value of the collaboration is revealed.
Lastly, this project could be interesting for the general public by bringing to awareness
the role of the national identity. Usually, people blame politicians and external factors for
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creating constraints to their collaboration. However, my results show that even in a set-
ting with negligible legal or physical barriers, educated and informed people, still choose





Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Additional Tables and Graphs
Figure A.1: Example of Legislation Dummies
Notes: The figure shows a print-screen from Stata to illustrate the construction of the Free Movement variable. 0 denotes
that a given market is closed, 1 denotes that it is open for labour migrants from the new member states. If a country did
not open from the beginning of a calendar year (for example, Great Britain opened in May 2004), the legislation dummy
is weighted accordingly.
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Table A.1: Summary of Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Main_sample Incumbent Foreign Hightech Innovator
Firm-level data:
number of employees 40.5 65.5 80.0 195 87.1 238
[305] [296] [344] [554] [367] [727]
sales, 000 EUR 3,908 5,554 6,686 26,972 9,954 34,662
[162,210] [61,742] [70,814] [172,423] [109,758] [267,709]
assets, 000 EUR 3,251 4,854 5,735 21,440 7,629 28,953
[60,287] [61,480] [65,025] [145,629] [90,648] [226,421]
firm age 9.16 10.7 13.6 10.8 10.8 14.6
[8.03] [7.78] [7.71] [8.66] [7.78] [9.63]
labour productivity (Y
L
) 3.47 3.67 3.69 4.28 3.85 4.22
[1.35] [1.10] [1.09] [1.16] [1.07] [0.90]
labour productivity ( Y
WL
) 2.08 1.97 1.94 1.91 1.71 1.80
[1.08] [0.89] [0.85] [0.92] [0.89] [0.71]
TFP index -0.012 -0.046 -0.050 -0.059 -0.10 -0.15
[0.89] [0.67] [0.68] [0.63] [0.63] [0.55]
Industry-level data, 2 digits:
FM 0.083 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.15
[0.11] [0.14] [0.14] [0.14] [0.18] [0.15]
human capital constraints 0.090 0.092 0.10 0.088 0.096 0.12
[0.11] [0.11] [0.12] [0.11] [0.12] [0.13]
financial constraints 0.25 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.12
[0.17] [0.14] [0.14] [0.13] [0.12] [0.12]
number of employees 11.6 15.4 16.6 22.2 21.7 22.3
[20.9] [25.0] [25.9] [38.7] [38.8] [34.8]
sales, 000 EUR 948 1,033 1,136 2,076 1,911 2,468
[5,403] [7,006] [8,135] [7,331] [5,174] [11,083]
labour productivity (Y
L
) 4.03 3.79 3.78 4.03 4.05 4.23
[0.84] [0.70] [0.73] [0.71] [0.67] [0.56]
labour productivity ( Y
WL
) 2.21 1.91 1.92 1.91 1.78 1.91
[0.62] [0.40] [0.40] [0.46] [0.50] [0.41]
Observations 3.25e+06 532760 334693 55979 116540 19143
No. of firms 555072 108256 58245 10628 26224 2758
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in brackets) of variables used in the regressions. ‘Full’ denotes
the sample of all available observations. Further sub-samples do not include observations with missing variables. ‘Main
sample’ is a sub-sample of firms used in the main regression. ‘Incumbent’ is a sub-sample of firms that existed prior to 2002.
‘Innovator’ denotes a sub-sample of firms with patents. ‘High-tech’ denotes a sub-sample of firms operating in high-tech
industries according to the Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE) at 2-digit
level. ‘Foreign’ denotes a sub-sample of firms with foreign capital.
Productivity measures are reported in natural logarithms.
Constraints are measured as the shares of firms in a given industry-country-year reporting to be constrained.
FM is our preferred instrument: the sum of legislation dummies, weighted by proximity measures to a given old EU
member-country.
Sources: Amadeus, EU Commission Business Survey, Eurostat Structural Business Statistics
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Table A.2: First Stage Regression. Effect of Free Movement on Skill Shortages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FM, dist FM*skill sh., dist FM, migr FM*skill sh., migr
FMict 0.0522* 0.125*** 0.0767*** 0.112***
(0.0298) (0.0461) (0.0144) (0.0376)
L.log_investmentict 0.00644 0.00650 0.00400 0.00604
(0.00451) (0.00455) (0.00447) (0.00446)
Log_total_salesit 0.0105 0.00993 0.0109 0.00912
(0.00929) (0.00914) (0.00916) (0.00885)
Mean skill sh.it 0.200** 0.165* 0.206** 0.148*
(0.0905) (0.0875) (0.0891) (0.0879)
L.log_FDIct 0.00145*** 0.00148*** 0.00134*** 0.00148***
(0.000484) (0.000483) (0.000480) (0.000482)
D.log_GDPct 0.368*** 0.372*** 0.387*** 0.377***
(0.0807) (0.0794) (0.0812) (0.0802)
Observations 2,069 2,069 2,069 2,069
Number of pp 428 428 428 428
R2 0.349 0.352 0.357 0.355
Dummies ci y ci y ci y ci y
Clusters 428 428 428 428
Fstat 3.081 7.332 28.40 8.859
pval 0.0799 0.00704 1.60e-07 0.00308
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of free movement on skill shortages. All specifications are estimated
with industry·country fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent variable: % of firms reporting skill shortages. FM
denotes the Free Movement variable. In specifications 1 and 2, we use distance-weighted FM dummies, in 3 and 4 -
weights with migration stocks. In specifications 2 and 4, FM dummies are in addition interacted with skill shortages in
destination industries. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the country-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure A.2: Dynamic effects (lagging and forwarding the instrument)
Notes: This graph shows the coefficients of the L&P TFP measure, the TFP index, wage-adjusted labour productivity, the
capital labour ration, capital productivity and personnel costs when the instrument is lagged, simultaneous or forwarded
by up to three years. The 0 value on the x-axis indicates the year of the labour market opening and the values 1,2,3 are
the years following the opening, while the values -3,-2 and -1 are the years preceding the sector openings.
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Table A.3: First Stage Regression (Robustness). Effect of Free Movement on Financial
Shortages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FM, dist FM*skill sh., dist FM, migr FM*skill sh., migr
FMict 0.0791 -0.0414 -0.00399 -0.0800**
(0.0535) (0.0553) (0.0274) (0.0364)
L.log_investmentict 0.00126 0.00115 0.00131 0.00141
(0.00638) (0.00643) (0.00654) (0.00637)
Log_total_salesit 0.00508 0.00522 0.00502 0.00601
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0113)
Mean skill sh.it -0.0551 -0.0342 -0.0476 -0.00650
(0.0970) (0.0999) (0.0967) (0.102)
L.log_FDIct -0.000566 -0.000595 -0.000579 -0.000608
(0.000508) (0.000506) (0.000512) (0.000507)
D.log_GDPct -0.381*** -0.393*** -0.391*** -0.400***
(0.0747) (0.0730) (0.0769) (0.0734)
Observations 2,070 2,070 2,070 2,070
Number of pp 428 428 428 428
R2 0.075 0.074 0.073 0.076
Dummies ci y ci y ci y ci y
Clusters 428 428 428 428
Fstat 2.184 0.561 0.0213 4.832
pval 0.140 0.454 0.884 0.0285
Notes: The table presents reduced-form estimates of free movement on skill shortages. All specifications are estimated
with industry·country fixed effects and time dummies. Dependent variable: % of firms reporting skill shortages. FM
denotes the Free Movement variable. In specifications 1 and 2, we use distance-weighted FM dummies, in 3 and 4 -
weights with migration stocks. In specifications 2 and 4, FM dummies are in addition interacted with skill shortages in
destination industries. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the country-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1























0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Instrumental variable
EU-8 EU-2
Notes: Skill shortages and FM (instrumental) variable are aggregated on a country-level proportionally to the number of
firms in each industry. Source: EU Commission Business Survey, own calculations.
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A.2 Proof of the Comparative Statics and the Sim-
ulation of the Model
In this sub-section, we first present the proof of the comparative statics results using a
general production function and then provide a numerical solution to the model using a
Cobb-Douglas production function.
A.2.0.1 Comparative Statics
We assume a general production function with three variable inputs: skilled and unskilled
labour (Ls, Lu) and training t. Capital is fixed in the short-term. The firm faces the
output price P , wages ws and wu, and job separation rate of skilled labour δs. Vs denotes
the number of posted vacancies, cs denotes the cost of a skilled vacancy, and ct = 1
denotes the costs per hour of training t. For simplicity search and training costs for
unskilled labour are set to zero. The firm solves the following maximization problem:





f(t, Ls, Lu) is increasing and strictly concave in t, Ls, Lu. We denote the first-order partial
derivatives of f by fi where i = t, Ls, Lu. fi > 0. fij are the second-order derivatives.
fii < 0. We assume that the cross-derivatives fij, i 6= j are positive.
Firms maximise profits, by choosing the number of workers and the initial amount of
training (which then affects the level of firm-specific knowledge t). The first order condi-
tions give the implicit solution of the model.
FOC1: ∂Π
∂Ls
= Pfs − ws − δscs − δst = 0
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FOC2: ∂Π
∂Lu
= Pfu − wu = 0
FOC3: ∂Π
∂t
= Pft − δsLs = 0




- the effect of δs
on the firm’s demand for skilled labour and ∂t
∗
∂δs
- the effect on the initial training and
consequently the firm’s TFP. We assume that the above system of equations has the




where |D| is the determinant of the Hessian matrix:
D =

Pfss Pfsu Pfst − δs
Pfsu Pfuu Pfut
Pfst − δs Pfut Pftt

To fulfil the second-order conditions, D has to be negative-definite, therefore, |D| < 0.
|D˜sδs | is the determinant of the following matrix:
|D˜sδs| =









depends on the term (P 2fuuftt−P 2f 2ut)(cs+t)+P 2Lsfutfsu−PLsfuu(Pfst−
δs). Under the assumption that the above profit maximization problem has a solution,





1(P 2fuuftt − P 2f2ut)(cs + t) > 0, P 2Lsfutfsu > 0. PLsfuu(Pfst − δs) > 0, but should be smaller
than the sum of the two first summands, otherwise the stationary point will be a saddle point.
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Similarly, the sign of ∂t
∗
∂δs
depends on the term (P 2fuufss−P 2f 2su)(Ls)+P 2(cs+t)futfsu−





We further illustrate the effect of a increasing job separation rate δs on the firm’s factor
demand and TFP. For this exercise, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and
simulate the model in Matlab.





The first-order conditions define the implicit solution of the problem.
FOC1: ∂Π
∂Ls
= αPtγLα−1s Lβu − ws − δscs − δst = 0
FOC2: ∂Π
∂Lu
= βPtγLαsLβ−1u − wu = 0
FOC3: ∂Π
∂t
= γPtγ−1LαsLβu − δsLs = 0
Again, we assume that the solution to the above maximization problem exists: γ+α+β <
1 and the second-order conditions are satisfied.
To simulate the model, we used the following parameter values: γ = 0.1, α = 0.5, β = 0.3,
ws = 1, wu = 0.6, cs = 0.05.
Figure A.4 presents the simulation results. We investigate the effect of δs on the firm’s
demand for skilled workers Ls, on the firm-specific knowledge t, and on the share of
trained workers δsLs
L
. The graph illustrates that if δs increases, the firm’s demand for
the skilled labour decreases and so does the amount of training t that the firm decides to
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provide for the new hires. The latter eventually lowers the firm-specific knowledge and
hence TFP. The share of trained workers to the total workforce, however, increases since
more workers have to be trained.
Figure A.4: The Effect of the Job Separation Rate δs, Simulation Results
Note: This graph shows the simulation results of our theoretical framework for different values of delta
(the job separation rate). "Skilled workers" - the amount of optimal skilled labour, "t" - the amount of
of the optimal training (the firm-specific knowledge). Both "Skilled workers" and "t" are normalised to
their optimal values at δs = 0.05. "Trained workers/L" - the share of trained workers to the firm’s total
workforce.
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A.3 TFP Index Calculation
We calculate the TFP index, following Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013), according
to the formula below:
TFPfict = yˆfict − sLiclˆfict − sKic kˆfict − sMic mˆfict (A.1)
where yˆfict, lˆfict, kˆfict, mˆfict are log deviations of a firm’s output, labour, capital, and
materials from industry’s averages. The latter are calculated on a four-digit industry
level (for each country), by taking geometric means across all firm-year observations.
By using deviations instead of levels, we exclude time-invariant country-industry fixed





ic are cost shares of labour, materials, and capital, which are computed for each
firm-year and then also aggregated on a four-digit industry level for each country.
As a proxy of output we use firms’ sales, labour (wages and salaries), capital (fixed assets),
and material (material costs). We should note that the obtained TFP index contains not
only firms’ unobserved technology and management ability, but also firms’ market power,
and differences in their workforce composition.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Tables and Graphs











−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Years since Free Movement
Notes: Annual treatment effects on migration around the introduction of free movement (1986-2012). The regression
includes destination-year and country-pair-industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair-industry
level.
Source: PATSTAT, European Commission, own calculations.
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all EU inventors from New Member States
Notes: The graph shows the number of mobile inventors normalised to the total number of patent applications. We count
as mobile inventor and inventor who changes his country of residence compared to the previous patent application. Thus




Table B.1: Overview of the Gradual Opening of the EU15+4 Labour Markets
Country NMS8 NMS2 Sectoral Exceptions
(2004 entry) (2007 entry)
Austria 2011 2014 NMS8 (2007-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): Construction, Manufactur-
ing of Electronics and Metals, Food and beverage services (restau-
rant business), other sectors with labour shortages
Belgium 2009 2014 -
Denmark 2009 2009 -
Finland 2006 2007 -
France 2008 2014 NMS8 (2005-2007), NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Construction,
Accommodation and food services (tourism and catering), other
sectors with labour shortages
Germany 2011 2014 NMS8 (2004-2010), NMS2 (2007-2013): sectors with labour short-
ages
Greece 2006 2009 -
Iceland 2006 2012 -
Ireland 2004 2012 -
Italy 2006 2012 NMS8 (2004-2005): sectors with labour shortages; NMS2 (2007-
2011): Agriculture, Construction, Engineering, Accommodation
and food services (tourism and catering), Domestic work and care
services, other sectors with labour shortages; Occupations: Man-
agerial and professional occupations
Lichtenstein 2011 2016 -
Luxembourg 2008 2014 NMS2 (2007 - 2013): Agriculture, Viticulture, Accommodation and
food services (tourism and catering)
Netherlands 2007 2014 NMS8 (2004-2006), NMS2 (2007-2013): International transport, In-
land shipping, Health, Slaugther-house/meet-packaging, other sec-
tors with labour shortages
Norway 2009 2012 NMS8 (2004-2008), NMS2 (2007-2011): sectors with labour short-
ages
Portugal 2006 2009 -
Spain 2006 2009 Reintroduction of restrictions for Romanians: 11/08/2011 -
31/12/2013
Sweden 2004 2007 -
Switzerland 2011 2014 -
United Kingdom 2004 2014 NMS2 (2007-2013): Agriculture, Food manufacturing
Notes: Column 2 shows the year of the labour market opening of the respective country for the NMS10 countries, column
3 shows the year of the labour market opening of the respective country for the NMS2 countries. Column 4 shows, which




Table B.2: Migration and Free Labour Mobility: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU19 and NMS NMS NMS 2004 only EU19 and NMS
VARIABLES all migrants all migrants all migrants patent potential
L3.FM 2.352*** 5.039** 19.37* -0.563
(0.754) (2.320) (10.48) (0.645)
L4.FM 1.860*** 3.271* 4.298 1.156**
(0.630) (1.704) (4.065) (0.506)
L5.FM -0.136 -0.0996 9.662 0.350
(0.375) (0.418) (19.23) (0.292)
in EU 0.447** -4.541* 0.261
(0.204) (2.526) (0.180)
L2.Trade flow -1.077 -74.12 -2.072**
(1.089) (76.99) (0.953)
L2.FDI inflow 1.14e-05 0.000161*** 0.000185*** 1.45e-05**
(2.40e-05) (4.31e-05) (4.76e-05) (6.90e-06)
Observations 383 186 163 383
R-squared 0.597 0.683 0.701 0.363
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
F 10.20 48.57 660.0 10.11
Clusters 53 30 23 53
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the first stage corresponding to table 2.1 in column 1 and 4: The dependent
variable is the (second lag of the natural logarithm) of emigration in a region and outflow of migrants with patenting
potential, respectively. The instruments are the free movement variables for the three previous years. The regressions
include controls for EU membership, trade flows and FDI inflows. The first pair of columns includes all EU and EFTA
countries, the third and fourth column limit the sample to new member states and the last two columns include only the
2004 accessions. All specifications include year and region-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.3: Patent Applications and Free Labour Mobility (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU19 and NMS EU19 and NMS NMS NMS NMS 2004 only NMS 2004 only
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents cit. weighted Patents cit. weighted
L3.FM 1.075* 1.309* -0.276 -0.0181 1.758 2.047
(0.576) (0.717) (2.315) (2.193) (3.247) (4.016)
L4.FM 1.786*** 2.206*** -0.606 -0.216 -4.447 -4.335
(0.276) (0.386) (0.863) (0.805) (3.655) (3.624)
L5.FM -0.177 0.0565 -0.395 -0.264 3.418 4.612
(0.392) (0.526) (0.545) (0.710) (3.751) (3.579)
in EU 0.167 0.278**
(0.107) (0.121)
L2.Trade flow -1.399** -1.456*
(0.662) (0.863)
L2.FDI inflow 3.10e-05** 4.29e-05*** 1.45e-05 4.15e-05 2.49e-05 5.34e-05
(1.26e-05) (1.28e-05) (2.70e-05) (2.75e-05) (3.15e-05) (3.20e-05)
Observations 496 496 209 209 184 184
R-squared 0.442 0.742 0.267 0.177 0.257 0.162
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 56 56 32 32 24 24
Notes: The dependent variables in the regressions shown in this table are the number of patent applications (columns
1,3 and 5) and citation-weighted patent applications (columns 2,4 and 6). More precisely, the dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of 1 plus these counts. The same transformation is applied to the trade flow regressor and for FDI
inflows, the percentage change from the previous year is used as regressor. The first pair of columns includes all EU and
EFTA countries, columns 3 and 4 include all countries which joined the EU in 2004 and later and the last two columns
only includes those which joined in 2004. All specifications include year and region-industry fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
Table B.4: Patent Applications and Migration in NMS10, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0924** 0.0730* 0.115 0.212
(0.0350) (0.0375) (0.156) (0.249)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.203* 0.101
(0.112) (0.0950)
L2.Trade flow 0.482 -0.650 0.758***
(0.518) (0.820) (0.251)
L2.FDI inflow -1.41e-05 -5.82e-06 -3.23e-07 -1.80e-05 -3.03e-05 9.41e-07
(1.87e-05) (1.80e-05) (1.72e-05) (3.34e-05) (4.83e-05) (1.68e-05)
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 23 23 23 23 23 23
F 16.81 26.31 65.74
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the relationship between the migration flow out of a country and innovation
in that country. The first three columns are estimated with OLS and the last three column use a 2SLS estimation with
our instrument based on free movement legislation. The dependent variables are the number of patent applications in
an industry and origin region in a year or, in columns 2 and 5, the citation-weighted patent applications (i.e. patent
applications + forward citations to these patents). Patent application numbers and citation-weighted counts, number of
migrants and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample includes only the 10 countries which joined the
EU in 2004. All specifications include year and region-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.5: Patent Applications and Migration, USPTO Patents Only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0270 -0.0894 0.346** 0.503**
(0.0535) (0.0694) (0.171) (0.232)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.000889 0.702
(0.0606) (0.429)
in EU 0.0258 0.402 0.0182 0.115 0.567 -0.0508
(0.204) (0.305) (0.206) (0.238) (0.374) (0.222)
L2.Trade flow 1.623** 2.409** 1.740** 0.252 -0.144 2.493***
(0.687) (1.002) (0.654) (0.901) (1.246) (0.842)
L2.FDI inflow 1.24e-05 3.06e-05** 1.28e-05 7.25e-06 2.11e-05*** 1.13e-06
(1.02e-05) (1.41e-05) (9.91e-06) (1.43e-05) (8.16e-06) (1.16e-05)
Observations 383 383 383 383 383 383
Region industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 53 53 53 53 53 53
F 32.56 273.0 26.87
Notes: The regressions in this table estimate the relationship between the migration flow out of a country and innovation
in that country, counting only patents that were filed with the USPTO. The first three columns are estimated with OLS
and the last three column use a 2SLS estimation with our instrument based on free movement legislation. The dependent
variables are the number of patent applications in an industry and origin region in a year or, in columns 2 and 5, the
citation-weighted patent applications (i.e. patent applications + forward citations to these patents). Patent application
numbers and citation-weighted counts, number of migrants and trade flows are taken in natural logarithms. The sample
includes all EU members and countries in the European Free Trade Association. All specifications include year and region-
industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the region-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.6: Convergence in Patenting Levels (Patentsdest/Patentsorigin) and Migration,
NMS only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




















VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents cit. weighted Patents
L2.Migrants 0.0289 0.0349 -0.254* -0.259*
(0.0229) (0.0285) (0.141) (0.151)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.118 -1.809
(0.0747) (2.810)
Patents, origin -1.080*** -1.052*** -1.081*** -1.083*** -1.055*** -1.065***
(0.109) (0.120) (0.109) (0.110) (0.122) (0.119)
Patents, dest 1.078*** 1.128*** 1.080*** 1.071*** 1.120*** 1.044***
(0.0713) (0.0910) (0.0717) (0.0765) (0.0962) (0.0890)
Within EU 0.0435 -0.0278 0.0431 0.0572 -0.0136 0.0724
(0.0529) (0.0584) (0.0533) (0.0555) (0.0612) (0.0693)
GDPd/GDPo -0.444 -0.0942 -0.446 -0.480 -0.132 -0.471
(0.359) (0.413) (0.360) (0.372) (0.430) (0.365)
L3.Trade flow -0.0394 0.0516 -0.0355 0.00323 0.0959 -0.0277
(0.0623) (0.0792) (0.0616) (0.0662) (0.0842) (0.0633)
L3.FDI flow 0.00139 0.00150 0.00108 0.000924 0.00101 0.00544
(0.00662) (0.00662) (0.00663) (0.00750) (0.00741) (0.0112)
Observations 2,763 2,763 2,763 2,681 2,681 2,681
R-squared 0.499 0.565 0.499 0.458 0.535 0.406
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 559 559 559 477 477 477
F 90.89 137.0 81.10
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Patentsdest/Patentsorigin. Number of patents (in origin
and destination countries), number of migrants, FDI, and trade flows are in natural logarithms. The sample includes
country-industry pairs, where origins are NMS and destinations - EU19 countries. All specifications include year and
origin-destination-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.7: Convergence in Patenting Levels (Patentsdest/Patentsorigin) and Free Labour
Mobility (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU19 and NMS EU19 and NMS NMS only NMS only EU19 and NMS (all) NMS only (all)
VARIABLES Patents cit. weighted Patents cit. weighted Patents Patents
L3.FM -0.0135 0.00186 -0.0150 -0.00166 0.0179 -0.0131
(0.0368) (0.0434) (0.0412) (0.0496) (0.0122) (0.0130)
L4.FM -0.0631 -0.0573 -0.0534 -0.0554 -0.0403*** -0.0337**
(0.0440) (0.0469) (0.0505) (0.0554) (0.0133) (0.0146)
L5.FM -0.0256 -0.0393 -0.0267 -0.0283 -0.0166 -0.00647
(0.0419) (0.0449) (0.0495) (0.0534) (0.0127) (0.0137)
Patents, origin -1.242*** -1.407*** -1.094*** -1.067*** -0.640*** -0.618***
(0.0797) (0.0873) (0.111) (0.122) (0.0113) (0.0114)
Patents, dest 1.051*** 1.090*** 1.062*** 1.112*** 0.800*** 0.813***
(0.0725) (0.0921) (0.0729) (0.0929) (0.0216) (0.0218)
Within EU -0.00662 -0.100* 0.0241 -0.0442 -0.0781*** -0.0527***
(0.0494) (0.0549) (0.0553) (0.0620) (0.0141) (0.0149)
GDPd/GDPo 0.00771 0.555 -0.251 0.0737 0.183*** 0.175***
(0.331) (0.391) (0.384) (0.451) (0.0393) (0.0402)
L3.Trade flow -0.0450 0.00903 -0.0127 0.0766 -0.0499*** -0.0341***
(0.0629) (0.0810) (0.0629) (0.0807) (0.00866) (0.00878)
L3.FDI flow 0.00170 0.000342 0.00259 0.00241 -0.0140*** -0.0112***
(0.00656) (0.00665) (0.00651) (0.00659) (0.00416) (0.00418)
Observations 2,946 2,946 2,763 2,763 71,496 66,504
R-squared 0.487 0.552 0.500 0.565 0.217 0.225
Origin-dest-ind FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 582 582 559 559 5688 5304
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Patentsdest/Patentsorigin. Number of patents (in origin and
destination countries), number of migrants, FDI, and trade flows are in natural logarithms. All specifications include year
and origin-destination-industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
Specifications 1-4 show the reduced form regressions for the sample used in the OLS/2SLS estimations (i.e. the sub-sample
for which migration data are available), specifications 5-6 show estimates for the full sample of country-industry pairs in
2000-2012.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.8: Citations to Destination Industries, NMS only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.00255 0.00895 0.427* 0.436*
(0.0281) (0.0282) (0.222) (0.224)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.124 5.695
(0.133) (5.457)
Patents, origin 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.146*** 0.158**
(0.0332) (0.0331) (0.0369) (0.0622)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0118 0.0121 0.0183 0.0317
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0248) (0.0332)
Within EU -0.00869 -0.00991 -0.0280 -0.0827
(0.0608) (0.0609) (0.0637) (0.0991)
L3.Trade flow -0.0575 -0.0566 -0.122 -0.0791
(0.0722) (0.0724) (0.0837) (0.0895)
L3.FDI flow 0.00342 0.00306 0.00393 -0.0129
(0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0268)
Observations 2,763 2,763 2,763 2,681 2,681 2,681
R-squared 0.083 0.087 0.088
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 559 559 559 477 477 477
F 11.64 8.404 6.418
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. The sample is limited to new EU member states. All specifications include year and
origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.9: Citations to Destination Industries and Free Labour Mobility (Reduced Form)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EU19 and NMS NMS only
VARIABLES EU19 and NMS NMS only (all) (all)
L3.FM 0.00662 0.0785 0.0400** 0.0670**
(0.0349) (0.0516) (0.0163) (0.0306)
L4.FM 0.0734 0.0856 0.0431** 0.0903**
(0.0451) (0.0603) (0.0182) (0.0392)
L5.FM 0.0480 0.0753 0.0255 0.0406
(0.0470) (0.0559) (0.0169) (0.0337)
Patents, origin 0.138*** 0.134*** 0.0591*** 0.0974***
(0.0238) (0.0308) (0.00785) (0.0119)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0478*** 0.000519 0.0258*** -0.0130*
(0.0137) (0.0192) (0.00541) (0.00687)
Within EU 0.0154 0.163*** 0.00274 0.180***
(0.0361) (0.0553) (0.0144) (0.0247)
L3.Trade flow -0.152*** -0.0732 -0.0627*** 0.0372**
(0.0352) (0.0596) (0.00955) (0.0144)
L3.FDI flow -0.000418 0.0114 0.0257*** 0.0235***
(0.00520) (0.0113) (0.00357) (0.00639)
Observations 7,279 3,498 29,604 11,851
R-squared 0.174 0.133 0.099 0.110
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 592 2304 912
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. All specifications include year and origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level. Columns 1 and 2 show the reduced form regressions for the
sample used in the OLS/2SLS estimations (i.e. the sub-sample for which migration data are available), columns 3 and 4
show estimates for the full sample of country-industry pairs in 2000-2012.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
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Table B.10: Citations to Destination Industries, USPTO Patents Only, OLS and 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0476** 0.0313* 0.679*** 0.288
(0.0188) (0.0178) (0.197) (0.184)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0512 0.745
(0.0485) (1.703)
Patents, origin 0.193*** 0.194*** 0.186*** 0.195***
(0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0227) (0.0227)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0545*** 0.0542*** 0.0542*** 0.0491**
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0150) (0.0195)
Within EU 0.00444 0.00724 -0.00468 0.0300
(0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0343) (0.0667)
L3.Trade flow 0.0797* 0.0858** 0.0294 0.0853**
(0.0416) (0.0417) (0.0552) (0.0418)
L3.FDI flow -0.00960* -0.0102* -0.00738 -0.0152
(0.00526) (0.00527) (0.00568) (0.0134)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.132 0.150 0.149
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 44.41 35.32 34.64
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. The sample is limited to citations among US patents. All specifications include year and
origin-destination-industry level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Sources: Patstat, Eurostat, CEPII
Table B.11: Only Citations Added by the Applicant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
L2.Migrants 0.0234 0.0258 0.489*** 0.336*
(0.0176) (0.0172) (0.170) (0.192)
L2.Migr.pat.potential 0.0759** 1.239
(0.0342) (1.915)
Patents, origin 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.139*** 0.150***
(0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0231) (0.0233)
L3.Patents, dest 0.0253 0.0247 0.0249 0.0162
(0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0221)
Within EU -0.0992*** -0.0958*** -0.110*** -0.0574
(0.0335) (0.0334) (0.0354) (0.0712)
L3.Trade flow -0.0194 -0.0143 -0.0805 -0.0153
(0.0369) (0.0369) (0.0542) (0.0373)
L3.FDI flow 0.00811 0.00735 0.0108* -0.000953
(0.00506) (0.00508) (0.00554) (0.0154)
Observations 7,299 7,287 7,287 7,136 7,124 7,124
R-squared 0.070 0.080 0.080
Origin-dest-industry FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Clusters 1322 1320 1320 1159 1157 1157
F 22.90 20.46 18.95
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of citations from a region and industry to another country in a year. Citation
counts, number of migrants, total number of patent application in origin and destination industries, FDI and trade flows
are taken in natural logarithms. The sample is limited to citations which have been added by the applicant according to
PATSTAT. Robust standard errors are clustered at the origin-destination-industry level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Eurostat and PATSTAT.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Additional Tables and Graphs
Figure C.1: New "Star Events" on GitHub
Notes: A "star" event is recorded whenever a user puts a star (a like) on a particular project. The amount of stars is
used by GitHub as one of the quality measures. The region is determined by the location of the owner, whose project is
"starred". The monthly data on new "star" events is smoothened with a 3-month moving average filter. The vertical black
line corresponds to March 2014 (The Crimean Referendum).
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Figure C.2: Commits by Ukrainian and Russian Users on GitHub
Notes: A "commit" event is recorded whenever a user modifies the source code of a project. The monthly data on commits
is smoothened with a 3-month moving average filter. The vertical black line corresponds to March 2014 (The Crimean
Referendum).
Figure C.3: Commits by Russian Users to Ukrainian, EU, and Overseas Projects
Notes: A "commit" event is recorded whenever a user modifies the source code of a project. The graph shows the commits
by Russian users to projects owned by Ukrainian, EU, and Overseas users as a share of total Russian commits. The monthly
data on commits is smoothened with a 3-month moving average filter. The vertical black line corresponds to March 2014
(The Crimean Referendum).
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Figure C.4: Commits of Ukrainian Programmers to Russian Projects: Quarterly Treat-
ment Effect of the Conflict, Triple Difference
Notes: The graph plots the interaction coefficients between quarterly time dummies and the indicator for Ukrainian
commits to Russian projects (estimated relative to the commits from the control countries to Russia). Dependent variable:
ln(commits+1) aggregated by month, committer-region, and project-region. Controls: month and committing*receiving
region fixed effects. The vertical black line corresponds to the reference period (Q4 2013).
Figure C.5: Profile of a Public Github Project
Notes: This view of a project is accessible to all registered Github users.
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Figure C.6: Profile of a Github User
Notes: This view of a user profile is accessible to all registered Github users. Github links the user profile to all public
projects, to which a user has contributed.
C.2 Tables
Table C.1: Summary of Github Tables
GitHub Table Variables
Users user id, registration date, deleted (dummy), fake (dummy), login, name, email, coun-
try code (generated), location (self-reported), company name, type (organisation or
individual)
Projects project id, registration date, deleted (dummy), url, owner id, name, description, lan-
guage, forked from
Events (commits, issues,
pull requests, stars, fol-
lows)
date, event type, user id, project id
Notes: GitHub Data Dump from http://ghtorrent.org/
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Table C.2: Treated and Control Projects on GitHub
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
treat = 0 treat = 1 treat = 0 treat = 1 Diff. T-C
all all matched matched (se)
Continuous treat 7.83e-05 0.0426 2.09e-05 0.0434 0.04***
[0.00450] [0.100] [0.000424] [0.101] (0.00)
Commits 83.33 540.6 446.0 483.0 37.00
[529.5] [1,802] [2,187] [1,304] (96.92)
Commits, weight. 35.71 248.0 216.5 223.5 7.04
[247.5] [824.7] [1,073] [614.3] (47.07)
Mean commits 16.15 59.65 55.48 54.19 -1.29
[62.22] [180.6] [244.3] [133.2] (10.59)
Commits, w/t RU and UA 74.93 476.4 428.1 426.2 -1.92
[522.8] [1,639] [2,179] [1,261] (95.83)
Number of members 0.282 0.637 0.351 0.457 0.11
[1.935] [4.816] [1.494] [1.685] (0.09)
Project age, m. 12.75 19.15 18.67 18.75 0.08
[14.01] [16.94] [16.51] [16.65] (0.89)
Stars 1.464 4.733 3.622 4.725 1.10
[15.84] [25.95] [19.63] [26.16] (1.25)
Stars, w/t RU and UA 1.456 4.703 3.591 4.694 1.10
[15.75] [25.81] [19.48] [26.01] (1.24)
Observations 30,105 703 690 690 1,380
Notes: The table compares projects with mixed Russian-Ukrainian teams (treated) to other projects on GitHub. Columns
1 and 2 compare all treated and non-treated projects. Columns 3 and 4 compared treated and non-treated projects in the
matched sample. Column 5 shows the differences in values between Columns 4 and 3.
126
Appendix: From Friends to Foes
Table C.3: The Effect of the Conflict on Ukrainian Commits to Russian Projects: Ex-
tensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Collab. Collab. Collab. Collab. Collab.
Diff-in-diff Diff-in-diff Triple diff Triple diff Triple diff
UAcRUpPOST -0.450*** -0.417*** -0.384*** -0.355*** -0.338***
(0.0776) (0.0768) (0.131) (0.103) (0.100)
RUpPOST -0.0432 -0.0781 -0.0785
(0.107) (0.0696) (0.0696)
New projects, 3m 0.948*** 0.644*** 0.504*** 0.490***
(0.174) (0.143) (0.133) (0.133)
Stars, 3m 0.231 0.236 0.0581 0.0692
(0.388) (0.253) (0.289) (0.289)
Observations 288 288 575 863 863
R2 0.976 0.979 0.976 0.983 0.983
Month FE yes yes
Project-region FE yes yes
Committer-region*project-region FE yes yes yes
Committer-region*month FE yes yes yes
Extended control group yes yes
Without Crimea and Donbass yes
Robust yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable in all specifications is ln(collaborations+1), where collaborations is the monthly number of
unique user-project collaborations between a committer-region (c) and a project-region (p). UAcRUpPOST - a dummy for
commits by Ukrainian programmers to Russian projects. POST period starts after March 2014. New projects, 3m and
Stars, 3m - the number of new and "starred" projects from a project-region over the last 3 months. In columns 1 and 2,
the sample includes commits by Ukrainian programmers to projects from different regions (Ukraine, Russia, EU, Overseas,
Other). In columns 3, the sample includes commits by Ukrainian and Belarusian programmers; columns 4-5 in addition
include commits from other control countries. Column 5 drops commits from programmers in Crimea and Donbass before
aggregating Ukrainian commits.
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Table C.4: The Effect of the Conflict on Ukrainian Commits to Russian Projects: Com-
pany vs. Individual Projects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Collab. Commits Collab. Commits
Company*RUpPOST -0.0468 0.109 -0.0798 0.124
(0.147) (0.328) (0.141) (0.340)
RUpPOST -0.282*** -0.546*** -0.267*** -0.612***
(0.107) (0.193) (0.0990) (0.207)
New projects, 3m 0.924*** 1.001*** 0.909*** 0.990***
(0.153) (0.269) (0.155) (0.272)
Stars, 3m 0.0710 0.361 0.0843 0.400
(0.189) (0.330) (0.188) (0.332)
Observations 575 575 575 575
R2 0.967 0.928 0.968 0.926
Month FE yes yes yes yes
Company*project-region FE yes yes yes yes
Robust yes yes yes yes
Without Donbass and Crimea yes yes
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 3 is ln(collaborations + 1); in Columns 2 and 4 - ln(commits + 1).
Company ∗ RUpPOST - a dummy for commits by Ukrainian programmers to Russian projects owned by companies.
POST period starts after March 2014. Baseline group - commits of Ukrainian programmers to individual projects.
New projects, 3m and Stars, 3m - the number of new and "starred" projects from the project-region over the last 3
months. All specifications include identity ∗ project− region fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 drop commits from program-
mers in Crimea and Donbass before aggregating Ukrainian commits.
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